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ABSTRACT
The following study endeavors to synthesize knowledge on what has heretofore
been an almost entirely unexplored factor in the internationalized Spanish Civil War, that
of the debate between Roman Catholics and Protestants in the United States. Upon
examining documentary evidence collected from three different periodicals from either
denominational camp between February, 1936 and June, 1939, a number of suggestive
conclusions have been reached.
First, American Catholics and Protestants were fundamentally at odds regarding
the Spanish Republic, the Popular Front, and Francisco Franco's Nationalist insurgency
which rose five months after the election of that Leftist coalition. This study indicates that
Catholics universally, but not unfairly, condemned the Popular Front as a Soviet
construct, bent upon fomenting revolutionary chaos and, hence, supported the rebellion as
the shield and the sword of Western Civilization and Christendom. Conversely, Protestant
opinion adamantly defended the Spanish government which, despite containing some
unpleasant radical elements, would nevertheless be represented as being in consonance
with the democratic tradition and humankind's hatred of squalid backwardness.
Next, throughout the course of the conflict, both segments of Christian opinion
entrenched themselves in their respective positions and would champion ―their‖ Spanish
belligerents by employing of a ceaseless stream of proving by assertion, or argumentum
ad infinitum. This would include a brief, albeit curious, episode in which both sides
would attempt to correlate either combatant faction in Spain with the revolutionary and
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democratic heritage of the United States.
Finally, and due in part to the previous item, the almost unswerving partisan
fidelities of those American Catholic and Protestant publications demonstrated that they
were, in fact, ignorant as to the underlying issues and the fundamental realities of the
struggle in Spain. Their reductionist interpretations rendered in black-and-white a
scenario that was nothing if not a cloudy, ambiguous gray.
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DEDICATION
For those I love and for those who have left us behind.
―History to the defeated
May say Alas but cannot help nor pardon‖
 W. H. Auden, ―Spain‖
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A Brief Introduction and Historiography1
The brutal civil war that ravaged Spain for nearly three years between July, 1936
and April, 1939 has long been a topic of curiosity for professional historians and amateur
enthusiasts. An exceptionally complicated conflict, textured and nuanced with
labyrinthine intricacies, it has been burdened with a wealth of historiographical
interpretations. Often, it has been sentimentally portrayed as the ―last great cause‖ of the
modern era, the ―good fight,‖ most commonly between the forces of liberal democracy
on the one hand and those of reactionary, militaristic fascism on the other. Other opinions
have held that the struggle in Spain stood as an ideological clash between communism
and fascism, a battle between atheism and religion. But what seems to be an almost
universal thematic facet of these interpretations has been that the Spanish Civil War acted
as something of a prologue or dress rehearsal for the European theater of the Second
World War, if not its actual opening act. This is, of course, not an especially surprising
conclusion, given the almost immediate ―internationalization‖ of that conflict, which
transformed Spain's domestic conflict into a proxy war between the Great Powers then
competing for dominance.
In very brief, the war began from a cauldron of purely Spanish forces but was
quickly contaminated by external interference. Following the fall of the essentially
dictatorial premiership of M. P. de Rivera in 1930 and the subsequent collapse of the
Alfonsine monarchy (under Alfonso XIII, of the House of Bourbon) in April, 1931,

1

For additional information, see annotated bibliography.
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Spanish popular opinion allowed for the creation of a second Spanish Republic.2 The new
government of Spain had arisen primarily through the efforts of the assorted political Left
and their immediate aims were to institute a battery of reforms that were inimical to the
traditionally vested interests of the constituents of the Right. The new Constitution
stripped the heirs of the Spanish aristocracy of their elite legal status and disestablished
the Roman Catholic Church. There would be a movement to reorganize (or rather
partially dismantle) the bloated Spanish military officer corps; legislative action would be
undertaken to proceed toward the secularization of education, the nationalization of banks
and railways, and there would be much discussion on the topic of the redistribution of
land and wealth.3
Leftist control of Spain's governmental infrastructure did not last, however. By
November, 1933, the forces of the conservative and traditionalist Right organized a
political confederation (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, CEDA) under
the leadership of one G. Robles and handily claimed victory in the elections of that year.
Realigned thus, the government of the Republic took on a reactionary character and
endeavored to reverse many of the policies put into place by the preceding regime—even
to the extent of insisting that its efforts were necessarily defensive against the
encroaching Marxist plague.4

2

3

4

The first endured very briefly from February, 1873 until December, 1874. It, like the Second Republic,
ended ignominiously following a military pronunciamento, albeit much less violently.
In regard to the Roman Catholic Church in Spain, that ancient religious institution would be subjected
to incendiary attacks during the formative period of the Republic, as it was probably perceived as
outcast and unprotected.
A belief seemingly confirmed by the revolutionary Asturian miners' rebellion in October, 1934 and the
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But this, too, did not long endure. By February, 1936, the political pendulum had
swung again to the Left: this time, it triumphed through the formulation of a Popular
Front. Simply defined by the standards of the day, a Popular Front existed as a broad
coalition of elements from the political Left and Center, including every group from
anarchists, syndicalists, communists, socialists, social-democrats, bourgeois liberals, and
so forth—and these all applied in the Spanish context.5 Again drastically reorganized, the
government then sought to overturn the reactionary reversals of the regime which had
come before.
Very soon after the elections, the nation was stricken by a series of crippling
strikes and faced waves of violence directed by radicals against the Right and the
Catholic Church. Those in power either could not or would not act decisively to control
the actions of their allies, the Right accused the administration of abdicating its
responsibility of enforcing the public order, the government faced parliamentary gridlock,
and the social turbulence continued to escalate, begetting a cascade of politicallymotivated assassinations and reprisals.6 Among this number, there would be two that
would be the trigger for the beginning of the civil war. During the evening of 12 July,
1936, one Lt. José Castillo, a socialist activist and Assault Guardsman (Guardia de

5

6

contemporaneous Catalonian separatist uprising.
The idea originated with the Comintern's G. Dimitrov in 1934, and had been devised as the most
practical way in which democratic nations could resist fascism and reaction at a time when both Hitler
and Mussolini were growing ever more menacing and nearly every developed country appeared to be
germinating fascist movements of one description or other.
Indeed, Spain increasingly appeared to be ungovernable, descending into a state of total social anarchy.
There would be bold talk from the Right to the effect that if the government did carry out its duty, then
the Right would have to take the steps necessary to quell the public disorder.
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Asalto), would be murdered in the streets of Madrid by a group of four Falangist
gunmen.7 Then, in the early hours of 13 July, 1936, José Calvo Sotelo, a prominent
monarchist leader, was taken from his home and shot by multiple socialist militants and
Asaltos. On 17 July, 1936, the military outposts in Spanish Morocco rose in rebellion; the
following day, the garrisons in the major cities on the Iberian mainland revolted. Spain's
civil war had begun.8
The conflict would, again, rage across nearly three years and, in the end, victory
would be claimed over the Republican ―Loyalists‖ by the Right-wing insurgency, later to
be dubbed the ―Nationalists.‖ The collective composition of the rebellion would be quite
as complex as that of the Loyalists: clerical traditionalists, Falangist ―fascists,‖ two
different factions of monarchists, all united by the upstart Spanish military and abetted by
the elite, and the Spanish Catholic Church. The progress and eventual outcome of the war
notwithstanding—though, at the time, it represented something of a signal triumph, a new
high-water mark for fascism—the conflict would be perhaps most significant for its
international aspects.
Indeed, the whole of Europe had a great deal of interest in the Spanish struggle.
The Spanish Republic received moral and materiel aid from the Soviet Union (and very
nominally from France and Mexico). The former power represented the war as a

7
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Note that the Assault Guards (Asaltos) were paramilitary police units established under the auspices of
the Second Republic; their trust was to maintain order in urban settings. Secondly, ―Falangist‖ denotes
those belonging to the Falange Española, the party most closely approximating a ―fascist‖ organization.
Though they might have offered ―bold talk,‖ the fact was that elements of the incensed Spanish Right
were, by the Summer of 1936, already deep into planning a rebellion—they were merely biding their
time.
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microcosm of the battle between the political ideologies of the Left, particularly
―democracy,‖ and fascist militarism. But, in reality, Soviet investment in the Spanish
contest was more cynical. Alongside the armaments and logistical support sent to the
Republic, Soviet authorities also dispatched Red Army officers and agents of the NKVD
and GRU (respectively, the Soviet secret police and military intelligence agencies); the
Comintern, meanwhile, sent its own observers and spies. Their intention was to combine
with the relatively diminutive Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España,
PCE) and its allies to gradually infiltrate into and exert greater control over the
government's political, economic, and military apparatuses.9
French interest in the conflict should be obvious. At the time, a similar Popular
Front coalition reigned in France and, aside from facing its own troubling episode of
social strife, that anxious nation had to confront the potentiality of being almost
completely encircled by admittedly unfriendly fascist states. A fascist Spain would have
surely meant that France's access to her North African possessions would have been
imperiled. But, more importantly, Italy and Germany would have been able to add an ally
in any potential scheme to isolate and neutralize France. Thus, during this early phase of
appeasement, the French government did not wish to do anything that might provoke the
totalitarian powers or incite a larger conflagration, and so endeavored to limit foreign
intervention in Spain.
The same might be said to have been true of the government of Great Britain. As
9

For more on this intriguing topic, see Spain Betrayed, ed. Ronald Radosh, Mary Habeck, and Grigory
Sevostianov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).
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with the French government, it did not want a general war sparked over the Spanish
issue, nor could it abide a situation in which the Nationalist rebels reached a state of
indebtedness to Italy and Germany that the country would be forced into a state of
vassalage to those two powers. At stake in the Spanish crisis was Great Britain's
dominance over the Mediterranean—and thereby her access to her vast maritime empire.
British authorities could not permit Spanish independence to be undermined by the Italian
and German states, for a Spain under the thrall of those hostile powers, particularly Italy,
could have been absolutely crippling in that respect. So, too, did British authorities wish
to restrict the level of external meddling in Spain.10
On the other side of the equation, Fascist Italy backed the Spanish Nationalists,
deploying tens of thousands of soldiers, along with valuable armored units and squadrons
of military aircraft. A major consideration in Italian intervention, as both Great Britain
and France had feared, involved Mussolini's ambition of restoring ―Roman‖ hegemony
over the Mediterranean, and he believed that a friendly ―fascist‖ Spain would greatly
contribute toward accomplishing that formidable goal.
Nazi Germany, too, inserted itself into the Spanish arena for similarly selfish
reasons. Other than arming the Nationalists with sophisticated German weaponry for the
purpose of testing their tactical applications in real-world scenarios, Hitler wished to
extract economic, particularly mineral, concessions from Spain in exchange for his
assistance. Otherwise, the dictator wanted the Spanish fire to burn long and bright. It now
10

These two nations would be responsible for the creation of the international Non-Intervention
Committee.
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seems that he wished to deflect the attention of Great Britain and France away from his
larger designs of expansion, several vital episodes of which actually occurred during the
course of the Spanish war.11
With these elements considered, one might now briefly address the
historiographical discourse on the Spanish Civil War as it has stretched across the
decades. Therein, one can delineate a number of tendencies. First, among these, and
perhaps the most noticeable, has been the relative domination of the topic by non-Spanish
academicians while native Spanish historians have been slow to synthesize their own
histories of the struggle between the Republican Loyalists and the Nationalist insurgency.
Unfortunate though this reality might be, it should nevertheless be understood. The long
years of totalitarian rule under ―Caudillo‖ Francisco Franco rendered forthright internal
inquiry into the causes, course, conduct, conclusion, and consequences of the conflict
rather a formidable impracticality, if not a stark impossibility. Moreover, the unquiet
ghosts of the civil war have continued to haunt that nation; the discussion of it, even since
the historic transition of Spain away from a dictatorial regime, has therefore been
contentious.
A second observable propensity in this field of specialization is multifaceted.
Traditionally, a great deal of emphasis has rested upon the aforementioned
―internationalization‖ of the struggle and the geopolitical and ideological implications

11

For a concise, organized overview of the contemporary international considerations invested in the
Spanish Civil War, Spanish Civil War, see Michael Alpert's A New International History of the Spanish
Civil War, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004).
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thereof. Indeed, much scholarly effort has been expended to enumerate the historical
roles of the foreign powers which actively intervened in the war, whether focusing on the
narrative of Soviet manipulation, that of the treading of Italian boots on Spanish soil, or
of the humming of German aircraft in the skies above. And this discussion has also
extended into the role of the major, ostensibly non-intervening nations: in the case of
Great Britain and France, the discourse has tended to dwell upon their respective imperial
interests, their desire to maintain the international status quo, and their frantic efforts to
keep the Spanish contest from exploding into a genuine international crisis—hence the
formation of the comically ineffectual Non-Intervention Committee.
There is, however, one final nation to consider in the historiographical discourse
on the Spanish Civil War. Across the Atlantic and far away, the United States became
acutely interested in the conflict, representative as it was of wider European tensions. In
any event, there is a special historiographical niche of studies dedicated to American
interest in the war, but on a relatively limited scale. For example, a substantial corpus of
literature has been developed on the phenomenon of American volunteerism in Spain,
emphasizing the (perhaps over-romanticized) Abraham Lincoln and George Washington
battalions of the XV International Brigade.12 Another specific topic involves President
Roosevelt, the American government, and the paired questions of isolationism and
neutrality during a time in which the world appeared to be hurtling toward another
12

See, amongst others: Cecil D. Eby, Between the Bullet and the Lie: American Volunteers in the Spanish
Civil War (New York: Holt Reinhart & Winston, 1969) and Comrades and Commissars: The Lincoln
Battalion in the Spanish Civil War (University Part: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). And
also: Peter Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
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scenario of general warfare. Recently, historian Dominic Tierney published a monograph
on the evolution of Roosevelt's opinion on the Spanish war as it related to wider world
events. This author contends that the battle for Spain significantly contributed to the
president's growing appreciation of the danger of fascist aggression and his desire to
move the United States toward a policy of internationalism, regardless of the
contemporary controversy that it aroused.13
Controversy, indeed, would describe American public opinion in respect to the
Spanish Civil War: that conflict would, perhaps more than any other contemporary
European issue, divide the people of the United States. Some scattered monographs have
been written that have attempted to detailed this division, but they are few and dated.
Allen Guttmann's The Wound in the Heart dates from 1962 and undertakes to
analyze, utilizing source material produced in the United States between 1936 and 1939,
how Americans broadly perceived the war in Spain, and why some people understood it
as a ―personal tragedy.‖14 The author explains that, while seeking to understand any part
of the conflict with exclusively American sources, it would nevertheless begin to address
the scholarly question of exactly how limited American perception of the war truly was.
13

14

Dominic Tierney, FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that
Divided America (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).
Roosevelt's emerging understanding of the essential danger of fascism, particularly in the Spanish
context, met in confluence with Latin American affairs. He worried that an ascendent ―fascist‖ Spain
might adversely affect that region, perhaps inspiring fascist or fascist-esque revolutions there. Though,
in fact, there were a number of nominally ―fascist‖ regimes in that part of the world, if delineated by
nothing else then their anti-communist credentials. (See: Argentina and Brazil, particularly, but also
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela).
For an earlier study, see: Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968).
Allen Guttmann, The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War (New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1962). v.
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And, moreover, how it was formulated through fractured, frequently tainted knowledge
from the armed camps within Spain while the rest of the world world stood poised upon
the precipice of war.15 And, published in 1971, F. J. Taylor's The United States and the
Spanish Civil War discusses the same topic, again with the conception that despite the
official policy of neutrality of the United States, its citizens somehow felt themselves a
part of the ideological drama being enacted in Spain, which they perhaps understood it as
a prism for the future of contemporary Europe.16
Both of these studies observe the phenomenon of the investment of generalized
American public sentiment in the Spanish conflagration, yet there is a smaller facet
contained therein which both authors address very briefly, but which has not yet been
more thoroughly explored. This gap in the discourse centers upon the question of the
contentious response of the American Christian community to the Spanish Civil War,
specifically in regard to the respective organs of the Catholic and Protestant presses. It
will therefore be the intention of this study to address this particular issue, albeit in a
limited fashion, and offer a degree of interpretative analysis thereto.
Being restricted by both space and time, the scope of this undertaking will be
necessarily narrow. Nevertheless, it will endeavor to trace the development of Catholic
and Protestant opinion in the United States in respect to the Spanish crisis from the rise of
the Popular Front coalition following the February, 1936 elections until June, 1936—that
15

16

Allen Guttmann, The Wound in the Heart:America and the Spanish Civil War (New York: The Free
Press of Glencoe, 1962).
See also: American Neutrality and the Spanish Civil War, ed. Allen Guttmann (Boston: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1963).
F. Jay Taylor, The United States and the Spanish Civil War (New York: Octagon Books, 1971).
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is, until the dust had begun to settle after the fall of the Republic in April of that year. In
order to maintain relative parity, both sides of this conversation will be explored using
three individual publications (in addition to some supplementary materials). For the
American Catholics, America, the Commonweal, and the Sign will be used. And, for the
American Protestants, the Christian Century, the Christian Evangelist, and the Christian
Leader will be examined.
Amongst the Catholic newspapers, both America and the Commonweal were
weeklies while the Sign existed as a monthly journal. America was (and remains) a Jesuit
publication, based in New York City. Over the course of the struggle, this paper would
demonstrate impeccable anti-communist credentials and never wavered in its support of
the Nationalist rebels in Spain, which it perceived to be battling for the perpetuation of
Christian civilization. The Commonweal, also headquartered in New York, initially
boasted a similarly militant degree of stridency in respect to the Spanish war. However,
this journal of opinion would later reverse course and, insisting upon more liberal
examination of the conflict, couched itself within a policy of impartiality. And, like
America, the Sign was published under the auspices of a Catholic religious society, the
Passionists, and would also prove itself to be a great moral enemy of the Spanish
Republic.
On the other side of the debate, the Christian Century, a self-proclaimed
―undenominational,‖ liberal Protestant newspaper situated in Chicago, would offer
enormous, almost unqualified sympathy for the Republican Loyalists and disdain for the

11

pro-Nationalist stance of the American Catholic Church and, indeed, of the Roman
Catholic Church in general. Almost exactly the same could be said to have been true of
the Christian Evangelist, a St. Louis-based weekly produced by the Disciples of Christ
(otherwise simply known as the ―Christian Church,‖ and often perceived as more of a
conservative sub-denomination). And, so too of the Christian Leader, a Universalist
journal from Boston (which, for its part, was often perceived as a more liberal
denomination).
What could be said of all of these publications, however, was that each boasted
impressive qualities of intellectual acumen, for the topics thoughtfully discussed within
their columns ranged from theology to contemporary domestic politics and, indeed, to the
international developments during that troubled time. However, the bubbling Spanish
cauldron, and its sudden eruption into a scenario of civil war placed blinders on these few
journals; each of them immediately proclaimed partisan fidelities to one side or the other,
even before hostilities broke out in earnest, and remained mostly entrenched in those
positions until the end of the war. This was, as previous historians have posited,
indicative of the wider scene in the United States, and is partly the inspiration for the title
of this thesis: ―None Spoke Spanish.‖
This title comes, in fact, from a gibe in the 23 January, 1937 edition of the
Christian Leader. It ran as such: ―then there was the commander in Madrid who gave the
regiment a fifteen-minute fight talk, only to find that none of the boys spoke Spanish.‖17

17

―Crackling,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 23 January, 1937, 128.
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The author of this study believes that, apart from lightly mocking the confusingly
―internationalized‖ nature of the Spanish Civil War, this innocent joke reflected the
unyielding positions of these small segments of American Catholic and Protestant
opinion on the struggle and, indeed, the way in which the whole of the United States
seemed to have interpreted it. In this context, that ―none of the boys spoke Spanish‖
might be illustrative of a certain fundamental ignorance as to the realities of the conflict
itself, the complexities of the combatant factions, and that for which they were fighting—
all of which had been tainted by ideology and befogged by propaganda.
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Chapter 1: Crusade or Class Conflict?
Early Winter, 1936 – Late Summer, 1937
The Initial Perceptions of the Spanish Civil War in the American Christian Press and
the Drawing of the Denominational Battle Lines
―A special word must be given to controversy. Controversy between Catholic and non-Catholic has its
value...[but] controversy tends to bring out some of the worst traits in people; very often it has its origin
and motive not in a zeal for God's truth but unconsciously in a desire to demonstrate that I know what is
right, that our (or worse, my) church alone has got the truth, or simply that the other fellow is wrong.
...Controversy on important matters...is like war, very difficult to wage without sin and without doing more
18
harm than good.‖

I.
Though the Spanish Civil War would not truly erupt until July, 1936, the
American religious press demonstrated a remarkable attentiveness to the socio-political
controversies and growing unrest within Spanish Republic following the elections in
February of that year. More notable still, these publications, whether Protestant or
Catholic, established respective partisan allegiances to the Spanish Left and Right well
before the actual commencement of martial hostilities, fidelities which would remain
relatively unshaken throughout the duration of the conflict.
To begin in the Protestant camp, for example: Chicago's Christian Century, a selfdelineated ―undenominational‖ weekly, ran an editorial which rejoiced that Spain had
―turned from Fascism‖ toward a more ―moderately liberal‖ regime with the ascent of the
Popular Front, despite the presence of certain radical elements in that coalition.19
By the end of March, and as Hitler reconsolidated German control over the Rhineland,

18
19

Donald Attwater, ―People, Press and Propaganda,‖ The Commonweal, 24 July, 1936, 317-318.
―Spain Turns from Fascism,‖ editorial, in The Christian Century, 4 March, 1936, 348-349.
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this same periodical opined that the Spanish cauldron appeared to be in danger of boiling
over as politically-inspired tensions mounted. At that time, indications were present to
suggest that distinct factions had begun to align against one another in that troubled
nation, potentially being preparatory to an episode of violent civil strife. Specifically,
another editorial comment in the Christian Century mentioned that the violence seemed
to be between the forces of ―Marxism‖ on the one side and ―clericalism‖ on the other,
nebulous though those descriptors may have been.20 Recognizing that the Spanish
Catholic Church had been the recipient of increasing hostility since the rise of the new
leftist government, this piece extended the hand of Christian sympathy to that suffering
religious organization. But it then immediately negated its fraternal message by casting
the stone of blame, implying that the contemporary outpouring of popular anti-clerical
violence in Spain had been the result of the long-festering detestation of the entrenched
interests of the Church and its own reactionary determination to defend them.
Whatever the case, the author believed that the catalyst for these attacks could be traced
to certain irresponsible and inflammatory elements, and warned that international liberal
sympathy for the Popular Front would quickly evaporate if the coalition could not bring
its more radical components to heel. Further, he presciently predicted that some nascent
strain of Spanish fascism might be given the opportunity to seize the reins of power amid
the atmosphere of instability, most likely in the form of a military uprising, armed with
the ostensible excuse of restoring order to the decaying national situation where the

20

―Marxism, Clericalism or Fascism in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 25 March, 1936, 451.
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legitimate government could not.21
Likewise, the Christian Leader, a Universalist journal based in Boston,
acknowledged that trouble existed in Spain. Interest in and sympathy for the Popular
Front appeared to be stronger with the editorial staff of and contributors to this
publication. Late in March, 1936, the Leader published a full article on the election of the
new government: authored by one J. Menéndez, this article celebrated that Spain had
been ―saved from fascism.‖ He wrote of the new government's election in a spirit of
celebration, asserting that its coming reign represented the hope and the future of the
Spanish nation—but also that it would act as the instrument of the people's vengeance
against the hateful, almost criminal, negligence of the reactionary regime which came to
power following the general elections of November, 1933.22 Menéndez asserted that
though critics of the new regime might insinuate some conspiratorial alliances with
Moscow, such claims were entirely unfounded; meanwhile, however, definite intimacies
had existed between the preceding rightist administration and the National-Socialist
government in Germany. In any event, the author applauded that the nation would once
more be able to pursue the path of progressive liberalism after nearly two years of
common misery under a backward political structure that had teetered dangerously close
to the fascist precipice; indeed, that black tide, peculiarly hued with clericalism, would be

21
22

Ibid.
Jaime Menéndez, ―Spain is Saved from Fascism,‖ The Christian Leader, 28 March, 1936, 399-400.
The author was almost certainly the prominent Spanish leftist intellectual who spent some time in the
United States during the 1930s (and who also contributed to the New York Times).
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halted decisively with the ―tremendous force of socialism.‖23
American Protestant interest would balloon for a short time following the
February elections, but general interest in Spain would subsequently decline over the next
months, with a few small exceptions. In late April, the Christian Century commented on
a governmental shake-up in Spain, resulting in the presidential ouster of the relatively
moderate N. Zamora; his successor, M. Azaña, leaned considerably further to the radical
Left. According to the paper's staff, these developments would only embolden the
dangerous revolutionary elements of the Popular Front.24
That same issue of the Century, however, also featured a brief article entitled ―We
of the Left.‖ Evidently an anecdote taken from an actual experience, this piece briefly
detailed a political discussion shared between the author and two youths who, belonging
to some unspecified faction ―of the Left,‖ indicted the Catholic Church as being an
intractable barrier to social progress and a truly democratic Spain.25 While perhaps based
upon a true occurrence, this tale must be held in suspicion, for it seems to have been
tainted with a subtle degree of anti-Catholic bigotry. Concluding the story, the author
claimed to have conferred with an unnamed Spanish Protestant clergyman (a rarity in
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Ibid.
Despite the author's insistence that the Spanish Popular Front represented a spontaneous movement of
―people's‖ parties to stamp out reaction, fascism, clericalism, and militarism—and that it was in no wise
affiliated with the Soviet Union—the Comintern had formulated (with the intention of directing) its
Popular Front strategy as early as 1934, which became the organization's official policy in 1935. See G.
Dimitrov's Speeches at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International (August, 1935).
A similar article later appeared in The Christian Leader (―Will American Liberties Survive,‖ 23 May,
1936) that warned of an incipient American fascism and that the only obvious defense would be for the
United States to follow the examples of France and Spain and adopt its own ―Popular Front.‖
―President of Spain Is Deposed by Radicals,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 22 April, 1936, 589.
Helen G. Murray, ―We of the Left,‖ The Christian Century, 22 April, 1936, Pgs. 601-602.
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eminently Catholic Spain), who corroborated this rather forceful opinion on the Church
by stating that those of the ―Left [had] the right of it.‖26
Indeed, even as specific coverage of the Spanish ferment waned as the year 1936
advanced into the summer, these few Protestant publications managed to secure avenues
by which to attack the Roman Catholic Church. An editorial writer for the Christian
Century lashed out at what he perceived to be the jeopardized state of the Vatican's moral
authority in respect to its public sentiments of ―triumphal gladness‖ regarding Mussolini's
declaration of final victory in his Ethiopian adventure in May of that year.27 Likewise, a
dedicated commentator for the Christian Evangelist, the official organ of the Disciples of
Christ (a Baptist sub-denomination), wrote that ―fascism translated into religion comes
very near to the dogma of St. Peter's Chair.‖28
Such anti-Catholic hostility on the part of these few American Protestant
newspapers, as reflected in almost defamatory print, could perhaps be taken as an early
indicator of the totally contrary position they would adopt as the representatives of the
Church declared their own partisanship when the Spanish conflict began in earnest.
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Ibid.
―The Pope Is Not Yet Free,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 10 June, 1936, 830-831.
Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: Religious Fascists,‖ The Christian Evangelist,
4 June, 1936, 724.
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II.
Though relatively slower in responding to the emerging crisis in Spain, American
Catholic publications nevertheless began to report on it with more consistency. The
interpretative conclusions reached by these periodicals, of course, could not have been
more different than those reached by the Protestant press.
Most interested in the development of the contemporary Spanish political scene,
the Commonweal, a respected Catholic weekly based in New York, commented on the
February elections even before they took place. Rather than expressing a tone of hopeful
optimism for the prospects of a sister democracy, this newspaper portended impending
doom for that country: the Popular Front and ―Spanish socialism.‖29 Editorializing further
on this leftist coalition, the Commonweal denounced it as the spawn of Russian
Bolshevism, and that its election would only invite revolutionary anarchy.30 A mere two
weeks after this prediction, the same paper noted unrest following the election of the
―united leftist ticket‖ which had been comprised of, on an apparently exclusive basis,
―anti-Christian Republicans, Socialists and Communists.‖31
This same publication continued to bring its readership disquieting news from
troubled Spain in the wake of the February elections. By then the country had devolved
into general civil disorder: radical extremists had inaugurated an orgy of terrorist
violence, setting the torch to churches, convents, Right-wing political offices, presses,
and so forth. Although retaining hope that the administration would be able to rein in
29
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―Seven Days' Survey: Spain Lines Up,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 14 February, 1936, 438.
Ibid.
―Seven Days' Survey: the Wide World,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 28 February, 1936, 494.
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these unstable elements, the Commonweal wrote with authority that the campaign of
chaos had been deliberately designed by leftist fanatics in order to force the government
into a ―Marxist revision of the Spanish Constitution.‖32 Week by week, the situation
seemed to spiral further; the tumult eventually reached such a feverish pitch that the
government declared an official state of alert.33
Soon the Commonweal began reporting that sources within Spain had indicated
that some form of electoral mischief might have taken place, which would have then
meant that the scepter of power did not truly belong to the Popular Front. Similarly, the
regime itself (rather than, as previously, bands of lawless incendiaries) faced allegations
of conspiracy from the Right. Such charges read thus: that the coalition in question meant
to gain control of the governmental apparatus by any means necessary and to
subsequently abuse its ill-gained power in the interest of inciting chaos and revolutionary
upheaval.34 And, as the Protestant Christian Leader had posited virtually simultaneously,
Commonweal asserted that the Spanish military officer corps, while proclaiming loyalty
to the Republic itself, would be forced to take extra-legal action and intervene if the
government found itself unequal to the task of quelling the social turbulence.35
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―Seven Days' Survey: Disorders in Spain,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 20 March, 1936, 577.
―Seven Days' Survey: Spain,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 27 March, 1936, 606.
Ibid.
These charges of electoral fraud and the revolutionary intentions of the Popular Front (under Soviet
direction) would occasionally emerge as a point of debate between the Catholic and Protestant
publications.
Ibid.
This, too, would become an important position taken be either side—the question of whether the
coming insurrection actually constituted an act of loyalty or disloyalty to the Republic.
America, too, would editorialize upon rumors of a possible rightist coup d'état (―Spanish Troubles,‖ 11
April, 1936, 23-24), potentially with the aim of re-establishing the Alfonsine monarchy (―Spain's
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America, another Catholic circular established in New York, only began to feature
substantial pieces discussing the nervousness of Spain in May, 1936.36 O. B. McGuire, a
regular contributor to the weekly, sought to ―tell the truth about Spain,‖ writing that time
had not served to mend the disturbances.37 He, like many others of the Catholic press,
wrote that the genuine republican souls of that country had made a grave mistake in
consolidating an alliance with radical and revolutionary political organizations.
Moreover, he found himself taken aback as to how certain portions of the American press
interpreted the woes of Spain, particularly in that so much sympathy had been invested in
the cause of the Popular Front. McGuire believed the leftist coalition to be the antithesis
of Americanism, having totally contrary attitudes toward such fundamental issues as
religious liberty, property rights, the family, and education—but not least because it
ostensibly favored a dictatorship of the proletariat. He could not conceive of such support
being lent to the proponents of this pernicious strain of extremism while moderate and
conservative dissenters (including the Catholic Church) were bracketed wholesale as
―clericals, reactionaries, and fascists,‖ and summarily denounced by a wide segment of
the American press.38 What concerned the author most, however, remained the possibility
that such an attitude might yield bitter fruit, and could contribute to a resurgence of

36

37
38

President Removed,‖ 18 April, 1936, 46-47).
The Sign, the third and final Catholic publication to be discussed in this study, would not print anything
of significance on the Spanish troubles until June of that year.
Owen B. McGuire, ―The Truth about Spain,‖ America, 2 May, 1936, 81-83.
Ibid.
The name-calling device would remain a critical feature of the discussion of the Spanish Civil War in
the United States in general, not only in the Catholic-Protestant debate.
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domestic anti-Catholicism.39
Meanwhile, crisis succeeded crisis in Spain. Parliamentary gridlock resulted in
successive dissolutions of the Cortes, ultimately leading to President Zamora being
removed from office, being accused of betraying the ―popular revolution.‖40 New
elections had to be arranged for the selection of his replacement which, of course, would
only lead to further clashes between Left and Right. And even as the Second Republic
passed the fifth anniversary of its founding, what should have been a prevailing mood of
celebration was instead marred by a string of apparent political murders, reprisals,
bombings, strikes, and riots. The government became more repressive against the Right,
forcibly disbanding the relatively diminutive Falange Española, the party most closely
approximating to a genuine Spanish fascist movement.41 Outrages continued against the
Church: since the February elections, hundreds of churches and convents had been
sacked and despoiled by ―Marxist rioters.‖42 America reported that, at that time, the most
recent wave of attacks against the Church had resulted from wild rumors flying about
Madrid to the effect that priests and nuns had been feeding poisoned candy to the children
of leftists. Although the tale had been proven false by a government investigation into the
matter, an assortment of communists and socialists responded by setting alight three
39
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Ibid.
Interpreting freely, one could regard this as a rather prescient hypothesis, as accusations of fascism were
consistently hurled at the supra-national Roman Catholic Church during this period.
―Chronicle: Spain's President Removed,‖ editorial, America, 18 April, 1936, 46-47.
Ibid.
―Chronicle: Spanish Anniversary,‖ America, 25 April, 1936, 71.
―Chronicle: Spanish Troubles,‖ America, 1 May, 1936, 88.
―Seven Days' Survey: the Wide World,‖ The Commonweal, 1 May, 1936, 16-17.
―Chronicle: Spanish Disorders,‖ America, 16 May, 1936, 144.
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churches, one convent, and four schools.43
While this particular aspect of the pre-war Spanish feud had been briefly
portrayed in the American Protestant press as a predictable result of the Church's
unreformed habits of medieval reaction, the Catholic press rather saw the burnings as a
component of the communist conspiracy, a directive handed down from the Comintern to
splinter movements worldwide. Certain writers maintained that the destruction of
religious institutions, most particularly Catholic Christianity, had been designated as
essential by the puppet-masters in Moscow wherever they wished to establish and
maintain a presence, and that Spain stood at the forefront of this crucial struggle.44
Successful Popular Front programs, then, represented the culmination of this strategy to
enslave humanity through means more subtle than active revolution. L. K. Patterson, a
contributor to America, warned his readers against such platforms. He wrote that however
they might describe themselves as the patrons of peace and democracy in the face of
implacable fascist militarism, they only camouflaged the reality that, back of their
movement, stood the Red colossus which ruled through terror.45
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Ibid.
―Seven Days' Survey: the Wide World,‖ The Commonweal, 15 May, 1936, 73.
G. M. Godden, ―Soviet Destruction of Religion,‖ America, 9 May, 1936, 107-108.
John LaFarge, S. J., ―The Catholic Press and Communism,‖ America, 30 May, 1936, 177-178.
―Lessons from Spain,‖ editorial, The Sign, June, 1936, 645.
This being the first article published in this magazine on the Spanish situation; commented on the
ostensible assault against Catholic Spain by the forces of extreme anti-clericalism.
Lawrence Kent Patterson, S. J., ―The Communistic Common Front,‖ America, 23 May, 1936, 155-157.
In this article, the author also warned of the existence of a similar ―Common Front‖ in the United
States. This was, of course, pointing the finger at CPUSA and its chief, Earl Browder. At the time, this
organization attempted to manipulate devices of patriotism to foster the image of communism as being
the ―Americanism of the Twentieth Century.‖ Particularly, this meant the attempted appropriation of
Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln—mighty heroes of the bourgeois revolutionary tradition—in order
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In the month leading up to the outbreak of the rebellion, the Catholic publications
seemed to have lost any hope that the discord in Spain might have been ameliorated
through the concerted efforts of reasonable factions both within and outside of the
government with constructive input from the opposition. Instead, America reported that
the respectable and responsible segments of the leftist government had been shunted
aside to make way for a ―Socialist-Syndicalist-Communist alliance‖ to sit upon the
throne, an unholy communion headed by a ―Masonic Premier.‖46 And while admitting
that the traditionally impoverished conditions of that nation had fertile soil for such
ideologies to take root, the same weekly held that the solution to the fundamental causes
of the Spain's social and economic woes rested in a ―Christian organization of society‖
and Catholic social action, not Marxist radicalism, no matter how those of the Left might
demonize clerical-traditionalism.47
This age-old conception of Spanish society, wrote O. B. McGuire of
Commonweal, found its greatest threat in the person of M. Azaña, who had by that time
been elected to replace Zamora as the president of the Republic.48 In trying to better

46

47

48

to pigeonhole them into the evolving lexicography of the proletarian revolution.
―The Spanish Crisis,‖ editorial, America, 6 June, 1936, 194-195.
The ―Masonic‖ label, was definitely employed as a device to drum up as much loathing in the Catholic
community as possible, given that the clerical hierarchy had long damned the order as an anti-religious
conspiracy. In any event, the charge of ―Masonry‖ would occasionally be applied to the Spanish
government by the Catholic press.
Ibid.
By this time, America seemed to have gotten in the habit of leveling invectives against the Republic
itself, which this editorial also accused of being corrupt from its inception in 1931 and, by 1936, had
become utterly despicable for attempting to undermine the foundations of a Catholic nation by offering
the ―Godless panaceas of Moscow.‖
Owen B. McGuire, ―President Azaña,‖ The Commonweal, 5 June, 1936, 145-147.
Azaña, for his part, would remain the Spanish president until the end of the civil war and the fall of the
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personify the new Spanish executive, McGuire painted a portrait designed to shock his
readers. According to the author, Azaña abandoned his Catholic faith during his youth
and shortly turned to radical ideologies, becoming militantly anti-clerical in the process;
the president faced further charges of wanting to stamp out all vestiges of the Faith in
Spain for the sake of assuaging his obsession with revolutionary purity. However, while
the author did not then subscribe to the fearful position adopted by his colleagues that
Azaña, in collusion with the Popular Front, sought to establish a sort of ―Soviet republic‖
in Spain, he nevertheless perceived a lurking danger from the more fanatical elements
within the leftist coalition.49
As the heady days of June, 1936 waned, America offered a short piece on the
unabated public commotion in Spain. Illustrating a situation clearly careening out of all
control, J. G. Robles rose to address the Cortes earlier that month. This man, a prominent
rightist and founder of the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA,
Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right, the conservative coalition that secured
the 1933 elections) recited a litany of morbid statistics before the leftist-dominated
parliamentary body. Since the Popular Front assumed power in February of that year,
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Republic in April, 1939—but would scarcely be mentioned again by the American Christian press.
Ibid.
A similar position was espoused by L. A. Fernsworth—a journalist who would report extensively on the
Spanish war for the New York Times—in Commonweal (―The Red Drive in Spain,‖ 26 June, 1936, 237239). He did not detect the solidarity of leftist or extremist political opinion that so worried Catholic
authors. Rather, he correctly believed that the large, anti-Soviet Spanish socialist and anarchosyndicalist blocs would present an obstacle so tremendous as to offset the feared machinations of
Moscow. Still, one wonders how this would be of any consolation to Catholics—for even if the
communists were to attempt to precipitate a revolutionary crisis, the Republic would still have to deal
with the similarly-minded militancy of the anarchists. (See also Radosh, Habeck, and Sevostianov's
Spain Betrayed for how this inter-factional dispute would play out over the course of the war).
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according to his numbers, over 400 churches had been totally or partially destroyed; 269
people had been killed, with more than 1,500 having been injured; over forty offices
belonging to Right-wing organizations had been totally or partially demolished; more
than 340 strikes had been called. Going further, Robles stated that in the mere two days
before his address, there had been 65 new deaths, attended by 230 woundings and the
declaration of some 170 fresh strikes.50
By then, the apoplectic squabbling and virtual paralysis of the Spanish political
scene likely gave the impression that the government either could not or would not do
anything to suppress what increasingly appeared to be an inexcusably extended episode
of general anarchy—and either possibility damned. Robles' appearance before the Cortes
might have served as a notice to the administration that the Right-wing had become
thoroughly disgusted with the government's immobility, and that it might burden itself
with the restoration of order. Indeed, that day would come, but not before another halfmonth of social disharmony, which both the American Catholic and Protestant presses
covered in detail.
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―Chronicle: Spanish Violence,‖ America, 27 June, 1936, 287.
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III.
Even as the waves of rebellion, revolution, and civil war broke over Spain after
mid-July, the representatives of the Protestant press did not recognize the significance of
developments in that country for some weeks. Among these, the Christian Century first
(and tellingly) acknowledged the mutiny of Spain's ultra-conservative military officer
corps, which it immediately delineated as a ―fascist-monarchist revolt‖ against the
―socialist government‖ of the Popular Front.51 The Christian Evangelist, too, featured an
editorial on the newly-born Spanish Civil War at the end of July, but refrained from
commenting on the relative justice of either cause: this publication opined that the early
dispatches coming from across the Atlantic were contradictory and misleading to the
point of rendering sound judgment impossible. And though it attempted to maintain a
tone of impartiality, the Evangelist quickly revealed its sympathy for the Republic. The
paper's editorial staff saluted the gallantry of the government and its supporters, motley
an assortment though they were, for their stand against a concerted ―fascist‖ onslaught,
led by experienced military personnel. As would become fashionable (both in the
contemporaneous and historiographical sense), the paper would declare that the melee in
Spain represented a crucial episode for the whole of Europe in the general war between
the mutually hostile ideologies of the Left and Right.52
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―Editorial: Fascist-Monarchist Revolt Flames in Spain,‖ The Christian Century, 29 July, 1936, 1029.
This particular editorial lamented that the bubbling socio-political strife in Spain had evolved into ―the
bloodiest civil war in over a century.‖ It further wondered if Spain would be forced to return to a
monarchy or whether she would be able, through force of arms, to maintain her Republic.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 30 July, 1936, 980.
The issue, as it was represented in the Evangelist, stood thus: would fascism (or something similar)
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This understanding of the Spanish war in terms of its ideological complexion
found further articulation in a prominently-featured editorial comment in the Christian
Leader during the following month. According to this piece, the conflict demonstrated the
―destructive centrifugal force of extreme class consciousness,‖ and both sides possessed
the trappings of quixotic, all-or-nothing idealism.53 While the Leader expressed sympathy
for the Popular Front, it nevertheless put forward a position more notably negative than
either the Century or the Evangelist. It could not recognize the cause of the government
as being any more democratic than that of the rebels, conceived and maintained with the
collusion of rabid extremists as the leftist coalition had been.54
The writers on the staff of the Evangelist could not bring themselves to agree with
this perspective on the civil war and denounced certain newspapers in the United States
which, ever wary of international communism, had grown positively inconsolable over
rumors coming from Spain. However it might be constituted, they argued, and for better
or worse, the embattled Left-wing government came to power following a legitimate
election (in which the incumbent rightist regime controlled the electoral machinery), and
therefore absolutely represented the side of ―democracy.‖55 Moreover, the blanket label of
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prevail in Spain, or would the Republican government (honeycombed as it was with radical anarchosyndicalists, socialists, and communists) be free to carry forward its confused ideas of revolution?
Furthermore, it had been asserted that if Spain were to fall beneath the fascist jackboot, France would
shortly follow.
―Don Quixote versus Machiavelli,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 15 August, 1936, 1027-1028.
Ibid.
Indeed, the Leader believed Spanish democracy to have been an abortive experiment from the start, for
the political pendulum had swung from extreme to extreme thrice in five years and had never found the
happy home of reasoned moderation.
―Spain, America, and Communism,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 6 August, 1936, 1011.
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―communism,‖ as it had been applied to the Popular Front, had been propagated by the:

―...forces of black reaction—the fascist, militarist, clerical, landowning groups which
[had] halted progress for centuries and which [considered] it their duty to serve God by
halting progress in [the twentieth] century.‖56
Addressing the religious issue, the piece regretted pre-war attacks against the Church, and
also that the bloodshed had aroused cruelty in the Spanish Left, which had led to
unspeakable excesses against the Faith. But then this article almost entirely excused the
violence because ―quite understandably...[the Spanish people have] accepted the Catholic
Church in their country as a symbol of everything reactionary, privileged, and
plutocratic.‖57
Expressing more interest in the religious embellishments affixed to the uprising,
specifically by the insurgents and their supporters, the Christian Century remarked in
early August on the evolution of the Spanish ―holy war.‖58 It should have been no
surprise that the clash should have been denominated as such by that side, especially as
the Roman Catholic Church had so much at stake. Much like the Evangelist, the Century
believed that the Church's age-old union with the ancien régime made it a virtual
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Ibid.
The rebels, the editorial maintained, were not really opposed to ―communism,‖ but merely used the
blanket invective against anything which they disliked—that is, anything trending toward social and
economic reform that would damage their interests, which had been entrenched over centuries.
Ibid.
The article even goes on to draw a corollary between the historic role of the Church in Spain and the
Orthodox Church in Russia—both had been the traditional ―servant of the oppressors.‖ Whatever the
political or religious situation, the Evangelist declared for the government of Spain, even if its victory
might usher in a radical, perhaps communist, dictatorship—for even that would be ―better...than
fascism, the alternative.‖ But then, does not faint praise damn?
―Spanish Revolt Becomes a Holy War,‖ editorial, in The Christian Century, 5 August, 1936, 1052.
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inevitability that it would throw its formidable weight on the side battling for a social
order conceived of as:
―...an absolute monarchy defended by a Praetorian guard, a feudal system of land
ownership and Catholic unity enforced by the inquisition and police power of the state.
Their cry is against godless communism and materialistic Marxism, but their antipathy
toward any form of liberalism, republicanism, or parliamentarianism is no less.‖59
Indeed, it had been reported that the most devoutly (if not fanatically) Catholic segments
of the rebel faction had drawn the sword of the Crusade, proclaiming a new Reconquista
to drive the heathen Marxists, the modern Moors, from the Spanish fatherland.60
R. Niebuhr, writing for the Century, would continue the discussion of the religious
question in the Spanish conflict that seemed to have so absorbed the paper. Reviewing the
hardships the Church had suffered over the brief progress of the war, the author could
find precious little sympathy for it, as had become the trend with those writing for the
other Protestant publications. He perceived unforgivable spiritual arrogance in any
institution which sought to identify its momentary tribulations with those endured by
Christ at Golgotha.61 What other Protestant writers had merely implied, Niebuhr stated
more forthrightly his opinion in respect to the case of the Spanish Church: that it had
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Ibid.
A later editorial (―Spanish Civil War Poises on the Verge of Crisis,‖ 19 August, 1936, 1099) in the same
periodical would turn this formula around and designate the Spanish rebels as contemporary Moors,
only then under Catholic leadership.
Ibid.
Reinhold Niebuhr, ―Spiritual Arrogance in the Name of Christ,‖ The Christian Century, 2 September,
1936, 1157-1158.
Niebuhr also assailed the Church for having the audacity to demean the Spanish Loyalists (who had by
that time been denominated thus) as the ―rabble‖ while lauding the rebels, the supposed defenders of the
Church, as ―the forces of Christian law and order.‖ A similar sentiment can be found in an editorial in
the Christian Leader (―The World Situation and We the People; 5 September, 1936, 1130).
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richly deserved the drubbing it had received. Though it might drape itself in the martyr's
cloak and clutch a crucifix to its breast, the author asserted, that did not not change the
historical reality that it had served as an instrument of reaction which had kept the nation
mired in backwardness for centuries, a total betrayal of its sacred trust to the common
people of Spain. In short, the Church had sown the wind of fury over the course of
generations and therefore had to suffer the furious whirlwind of retribution. For that
institution to then dissemble with professions of sanctimonious piety could only be
described as the ―most sinful pretension of the human spirit.‖62
Sins of the Spanish Church aside, the initial months of the war saw these
Protestant publications maintain a powerful interest in the international implications of
the civil war. The conflict had been quickly represented as potentially problematic for
Europe—a legitimate concern, given that it might have escalated into a general
conflagration and, at that time, it appeared as if a number of the major powers had
already chosen sides. Great Britain and France, for their parts, were desperate to keep the
peace and, perhaps in an early fit of appeasement, winked at the support lent to the
rightist rebellion by Italy and Germany. Therefore, with the insurgency enjoying the
substantial backing of the international ―fascist bloc,‖ it should have been considered
natural that the Soviet Union would back the Spanish Republic—though into the Autumn
of 1936, such assistance to either side had only barely begun to arrive in any substantial
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Interestingly, this quotation stands almost as a corollary to Samuel Johnson's charge of patriotism being
the last refuge of the scoundrel.
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quantity.63
On the topic of the ―internationalization‖ of the Spanish war, the activities of the
hastily-assembled Non-Intervention Committee would become de rigueur for discussion
amongst the Protestant publications, though opinions on its activities and effectiveness
would vary somewhat. All seemed to agree that such a program, flawed though it might
have been (and would, indeed, later prove itself to be), the Committee would serve as a
useful mechanism for relieving the warlike tensions in Europe, which the Spanish
question had only exacerbated. In addition, some thought that strict non-intervention
would be to the exclusive benefit of the Republic. It began the conflict being much better
armed than the rebellion and, considering the relative poverty of the uprising before its
allies had poured in aid, it followed that if the flow of materiel into the country could be
decisively halted, the government's forces would have little difficulty in crushing the
insurrection.64
As for their own country, each paper seemed to believe in the course of
isolationism, the contemporary national standard. Yet on the other hand, the Christian
Century intelligently posited that the whole of the Western Hemisphere should have been
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―Spanish Civil War Threatens Europe,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 12 August, 1936, 1075.
―Spanish Civil War Poises on the Verge of Crisis,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 19 August, 1936,
1099.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 27 August, 1936, 1108.
By this issue of the Evangelist, the conflict was already being portrayed as a Continental proxy war.
―Powers Pledge Neutrality toward Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 2 September, 1936, 1147.
Charles A. Thomson, ―Understanding Our World: Non-Intervention in Spain,‖ The Christian Leader,
5 September, 1936, 1145.
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concerned with the potential impact of the war on Latin America.65 The Christian
Evangelist, expressing the strongest opinion, considered it to be the duty of the United
States to be pro-active in blockading the rebel-held ports in Spain in recognition of
international law. But the Century took this to be a foolhardy course, for direct military
action of this sort carried danger that could potentially lead to the heightening of
international hostilities, if not the immediate declaration of war.66 This fear almost
immediately justified itself: the Evangelist reported on the previous month's unsuccessful
bombing of the USS Kane, a Navy destroyer, in Spanish waters by a belligerent aircraft
of unspecified origin. Though the event passed without ill effect, the paper recognized
that such incidents could be manipulated by the jingoistic ―yellow‖ press to raise the hue
and cry for retaliation.67
Meanwhile, the Spanish rebels had arrived in Toledo to relieve the diminished
garrison which had defended the ancient fastness of the Alcázar since the first days of the
uprising. Apart from such striking military gains being made by the rebels these
Protestant papers were finally able to report the announced intentions of the mutiny.68 To
the Christian Century, its platform stood as fascism, naked and unqualified. Interpreting
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―America Refuses to Intervene in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 2 September, 1936, 11471148.
―The Week in Review,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 3 September, 1936, 1140.
―American Neutrality Requires More Than Legal Argument,‖ editorial, The Christian Century,
9 September, 1936, 1179-1180.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 10 September, 1936, 1172.
This vessel's objective was to evacuate American citizens left stranded and endangered in Spain with
the outbreak of the civil war.
Charles A. Thomson, ―Understanding Our World: Non-Intervention in Spain,‖ The Christian Leader
5 September, 1936, 1145.
―The Saving of Our World,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 24 September, 1936, 1234.
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emotionally, the paper's editorial staff wrote that the rebels' twenty-seven point program
promised the formation of a dictatorial state based on the precepts of Italian corporatist
Fascism, but that it also made allowances for the restoration of some of the privileges of
the traditional ruling elite and the Spanish Church.69 But even if the destiny of Spain were
to be seized by the rightists, certain correspondents wrote that it would not be bought
cheaply. Repeating the words of J. Allen of the Chicago Tribune, the Evangelist predicted
ghastly consequences if the fall of the government ever became inevitable: radical
extremists might endeavor, with their last gasp, to re-enact the September Massacres of
1792 against their class enemies.70
By October, 1936, the Protestant papers became fixated upon the insurgents' thrust
toward Madrid, their seemingly impending triumph, and the potential effect that a
―fascist‖ Spain would have on international political equations. First, and in spite of the
work done by the Non-Intervention Committee, there continued to be external
involvement in the Spanish war; the Christian Evangelist nominated Italy, Germany, and
Portugal as the worst offenders. Such flagrancy, wrote the Evangelist, could only invite
war—especially as the Soviet Union promised before the committee that it would openly
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―Powers Promise Hands Off in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 9 September, 1936, 1179-1180.
―Spain's Rebels Promise to Curb the Church,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 16 September, 1936,
1211-1212.
These two editorials also admitted that the Spanish ―fascist‖ platform did not necessarily guarantee the
restoration of the temporal power of the Church in political matters and also recognized that the rebels
might settle for the return of the Alfonsine monarchy. An article in the Leader (―News from the
Nofrontier News Service: Back of the Spanish War,‖ 26 September, 1936, 1232) would conclude,
however, that there had definitely been collusion between fascists, monarchists, and the Church in the
contemporary uprising.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 10 September, 1936, 1172.
Such brutality, in fact, had already been occurring on behind the lines on both sides.
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declare for the Republican cause if aid to the rightists did not cease. In any event, this
same piece held that a rebel victory in Spain, should it be achieved, would have done so
only through the force of foreign arms.71 And while one might conclude that an ascendent
―fascist‖ Spain might not have been so worrisome on its own, the papers expressed great
anxiety that the total political reversal promised by the rebels (achieved, again, with
extensive foreign assistance) would do much to upset the delicate balance of power in the
Mediterranean. What concerned them most in this scenario, however, was the fate of
France; their fearful deductive logic concluded that a defeated Spain implied that the
French Republic would be the next to crumble beneath the fascist wheel.72
Other important developments that month received due recognition. First, after
months of waging warfare against the Republic while fighting its own internal battles, the
rebellion proclaimed General F. Franco as its leader and, indeed, as the leader of all
Spain.73 Second, the Vatican extended unofficial sympathy to the Spanish insurgency, an
event which received predictably extensive commentary in these few Protestant
publications.
The Christian Century noted that the Pope had addressed certain ―serious lessons‖
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―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 15 October, 1936, 1332.
―The Attack on Madrid Continues,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 28 October, 1936, 1411-1412.
Reporting likewise, an editorial in the Christian Century (―How Near to War Is Europe,‖ 21 October,
1936, 1382-1383) added the Vatican alongside Italy, Germany, and Portugal in the list of the natural
allies of the Spanish rebels.
―Spanish Rebels Near Madrid,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 7 October, 1936, 1309.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 8 October, 1936, 1300.
A later editorial in The Christian Century (―The Fascist Pressure Grows in France,‖ 14 October, 1936
1348-1349) reinforced this opinion, stating that fascist elements were already in place in that country,
biding their time to stage their own rebellion.
―General Franco Proclaimed Dictator of Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 14 October, 1936,
1348.
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being taught to the world in troubled Spain, where Providence had elected to stage the
modern episode in the struggle for the survival of Christian civilization.74 This
newspaper's staff took indignant exception to this religious inflection, as well as to the
ostensible blessing of the uprising and its portrayal as an earthly instrument of the
Kingdom of Christ; its writers interpreted this as a disingenuous attempt to obliterate the
political, social, and economic factors which so obviously defined the war.75 This
Protestant publication, alongside its peers, maintained that the contemporaneously radical
and violent strain of Spanish anti-clericalism had not been born out of hatred for the Faith
itself, but rather out of a justifiable sense of animosity toward a Church that had become
the defender of wealth and privilege, the abettor of class oppression.76
Yet the Christian Leader still thought it worthwhile to reprint certain
sensationalist stories indicting the Loyalist forces of heinous anti-religious atrocities,
even though they had apparently been confirmed to be total fabrications by
correspondents on the ground in Spain. Included among these ―outrages against
Christianity‖ were stories of a female communist militant who mutilated the eyes of a
dying priest with a hatpin, the public beheading of eight monks, and, in what stands as a
truly bizarre mental image, a ―Red beauty queen‖ who engaged in the torture of a large
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―The Pope and Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 7 October, 1936, 1310-1312.
―How Near to War Is Europe?,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 21 October, 1936, 1382-1383.
Ibid.
―The Pope and Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 7 October, 1936, 1310-1312.
It was incumbent upon the Spanish Church, therefore, to ―repent in sackcloth and ashes‖ for the betrayal
of its sacred trust to the meek and lowly.
Herman A. Newman, ―Death in the Summertime,‖ The Christian Leader, 17 October, 1936,1328-1329.
Likewise, this article cast opprobrium on the Catholic Church for employing the straw-man of Marxism
for the justification of the rightist revolt in Spain.
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group of helpless nuns.77
Even more galling to the Protestant press than the sympathies of the Vatican in
respect to the Spanish crisis would be Pope Pius XI's invitation to Protestant Christendom
to join with the Roman Catholic Church in its worldwide struggle against communism.
The Christian Century found this to be a curious development, as for centuries the
authorities of that religious institution had refused to acknowledge as legitimate the
schismatic branches of the Faith. In any case, the paper urged the rejection of this
proposed anti-Marxist crusade, for Protestantism, in its turn, did not recognize the claims
of the Roman Church to either spiritual or temporal authority.78 F. D. Kershner, of the
Christian Evangelist, believed much the same, although one can detect in his opinion a
far greater degree of bigoted anti-Catholic paranoia. He thought that such a proposed
partnership could be positively identified as a component of a conspiracy to subtly
corrupt the foundations of Protestantism (particularly American Protestantism) in order to
further the agenda of conquest nurtured by the medieval Church.79
Protestant interest in the international developments in relation to the Spanish
conflict and the complex Catholic dynamic thereof remained high during the last two
months of the year. Even as F. D. Roosevelt secured the American presidency for the
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―News from the Nofrontier News Service,‖editorial, The Christian Leader, 10 October, 1936, 1295.
―The Pope Would Lead All against Communism,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 28 October, 1936,
1411-1412.
Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: the Real Thing,‖ The Christian Evangelist,
15 October, 1936, 1332.
This rather odious opinion would be repeated by the same author in the same section of the same
publication; he believed that the massive American Catholic Church sought to place the yoke of papal
domination upon the shoulders of the United States. (26 November, 1936, 1535).
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second time and the Italian and German dictators solidified the foundation of the alliance
that would come to be called ―the Axis,‖ Franco's rebels and his auxiliaries were
hammering on the gates of Madrid.80 These papers reported that European tensions
remained high as the provisions of the non-intervention agreement were routinely
violated on an enormous scale. Men and materiel from various foreign sources continued
to flood into Spain daily, more completely transforming the civil war into an international
brawl. And though the opinion seemed to prevail that the odds were increasingly
weighted against the defenders of the embattled Republic, the Century and Evangelist
carried weekly editorials proudly informing their readers that the ―fascists‖ had not yet
passed.81
Praising the Spanish Republic's stand against aggression though they might, these
papers leveled charges of rank cowardice against the major European democracies which,
in their self-interested urgency to maintain the wider peace of the Continent, had allowed
non-intervention to become a sham at the expense of a sister democracy. To their
thinking, it appeared as though Great Britain and France were content to abandon Spain
to the consuming plague of a ―fascist‖ insurgency, equipped through the largess of Italy
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―The Tension Tightens over Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 4 November, 1936, 1445.
―Italy and Germany Reach Accord,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 4 November, 1936, 1445-1446.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 19 December, 1936, 1500.
The Century would also comment on the separate German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, which would
later be joined by Italy (―Japan Joins the Fascist Front,‖ 2 December, 1936, 1597-1598).
―The Tension Tightens over Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 4 November, 1936, 1445.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 5 November, 1936, 1436-1437.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 12 November, 1936, 1469.
―Spanish Fascists Close in on Madrid,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 18 November, 1936, 1516.
―The Week in Review,‖editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 19 November, 1936, 1500.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 26 November, 1936, 1532-1533.
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and Germany, a theory which gained more credence when those totalitarian powers
formally recognized Franco's legitimacy at the end of November.82 Indeed, as it then
appeared that Mussolini and Hitler would soon be gaining a grateful fraternal ally in a
Franco-dominated Spain, the Christian Century offered the estimation that the greatest
menace to the world should no longer have been considered to be the Soviet Union, but
rather the ascendent ―fascist internationale,‖ which held nothing sacred except the rule of
the sword.83
At the same time, these newspapers continued to ponder the Vatican's proposal of
a joint Catholic-Protestant, anti-communist action; these few sources replied,
unsurprisingly, with scathing and resounding negativity. The Christian Century
strengthened its already-established position, opining that this proposed campaign against
leftist radicalism existed primarily as a means to shore up the power and privilege of the
Church wherever it might be threatened—and not necessarily by Marxism alone, but also
by political, social, and economic liberalism. To join such an effort would only be to
promote reaction, if not to foster a strain of clerical-fascism. Furthermore, the editorial
staff of the Century thought that this Christian ―anti-communist front‖ could not be
scrutinized in isolation from the ongoing struggle in Spain. There the Church had a great
deal to lose and had responded by calumniating the recognized government while
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―The Week in Review,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 5 November, 1936, 1436-1437.
―The Week in Review,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 26 November, 1936, 1532-1533.
―The Fascist Internationale,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 2 December, 1936, 1600-1602.
Others, however, did not share this view. A correspondent wrote to the Evangelist to express his opinion
that Franco's ―Nationalist‖ movement existed as a militant manifestation of traditionalist patriotism, in
spite of it appearing to be of the fascist bent and however it might have been backed (and definitely
manipulated) by the Continental fascist powers. (17 December, 1936, 1637).
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essentially beatifying the ―fascist‖ rebels.‖ 84 The only logical option open to Protestants,
the paper would conclude in a later editorial, would be to ―stay out,‖ unless the suggested
offensive against communism could be amended to include fascism.85
There ended the American Protestant commentary for the last half of 1936.
During this period of time in which the Spanish Civil War broke out in earnest, the
evidence presented above demonstrates that each of these weekly newspapers adopted
attitudes favorable to the Republic from the very outset of the conflict, despite their
denominational differences.86 In analyzing these sentiments, one comes away with the
impression that, by and large, they were inspired by genuine sympathy for the
beleaguered Spanish government and its ―Loyalists.‖ One cannot, however, entirely
escape the likelihood that these opinions might have been motivated in part by antiCatholicism. Each of these publications put forth certain editorial comments and articles
which positively dripped with venomous dislike of the supranational Roman Church. And
often, too, were these pieces written in connection to the Church's position on the Spanish
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―Shall Protestants Accept Pope's Invitation?,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 25 November, 1936,
1550-1552.
The Christian Evangelist would publish a letter from chairman of the New York chapter of the ―Friends
of Spanish Democracy‖ agreeing with the Century's estimation of the Church's stake in Spain, for there
her ancient prerogatives were threatened by modern liberal laicism, leading those ―degenerate priests‖
in the Spanish hierarchy to ―degrade God to the position of a belligerent‖ in their support of the
insurgency. (Robert L. Paddock ―The Struggle in Spain,‖ 5 November, 1936, 1447-1448).
―Stay Out!,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 9 December, 1936, 1646-1648.
The editorial believed that no Protestants, especially no American Protestants, should combine forces
with a religious hierarchy that condemned the excesses of the radical Left (particularly, it noted, in
Spain) while simultaneously rendering silent sympathy to fascist terrorism.
Being what may have been the only voice of dissent, one Eleanor Bissell wrote two articles for the
Christian Leader in October, 1936 arguing for the cause for the Spanish rebels. She argued that theirs
was the just cause, for it represented the struggle against world communism. (24 October, 1936,1356)
(31 October, 1936, 1391-1392).
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war, its apparent tendency to see communists lurking in every shadow, and its supposed
mutual understanding, if not alliance, with reaction and fascism.
But, in any event, as the year came to a close, the Christian Leader remained the
sole publication to send holiday greetings, divorced from all politics, to all of suffering
Spain.87
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―As the Silent Stars Go by Madrid,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 19 December, 1936, 1600.
Interestingly, the Christian Century featured an editorial review of the year 1936 that commented on the
trend of fascist aggression sweeping across Europe. The Spanish war was discussed at some length and,
despite its earlier position on the ―democratic‖ cause of the Popular Front, the Century admitted that
regardless of which faction claimed victory in the war, only bloody dictatorship seemed likely to be
destined for Spain, indicating something of a cooling of pro-Republican passions.
(―Retrospect,‖ 30 December, 1936, 1743-1745).
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IV.
The American Catholic press entertained a very particular degree of interest in the
Spanish turmoil as it finally erupted into open warfare in July, 1936. And whereas those
Protestant newspapers cleaved onto their interpretation of the emerging civil war as a
class struggle (almost with the trappings of Marxist inevitability), the Catholic
publications tended to see it as a conflict informed primarily by a religious dynamic.
Into the month that would witness the beginning of the Nationalist uprising, the
Catholic journals would note that the discord which had plagued Spain since the February
elections had not abated. Rumors circulated that a number of the nation's middle- and
upper-ranking military officers had been arrested for their supposed involvement in an
alleged conspiracy to effect a coup d'état.88 Both America and Commonweal would
comment on the unrestrained political violence in unhappy Spain following the
assassination of J. C. Sotelo on 13 July.89 This politician, a prominent Catholic
monarchist and and important member of the rightist opposition to the Popular Front, had
stood before the Cortes earlier in July and denounced the government for its apparent
abdication of authority and seeming disregard for public order. He further charged that
the administration had allowed a certain Spanish ―Red Guard‖ of extralegal paramilitary
organizations, though political in outward complexion, to subvert the rule of law.90
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―Chronicle: Spanish Troubles,‖ editorial, America, 11 July, 1936, 328.
―Week by Week: Red Strains,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 24 July, 1936, 316).
―Chronicle: Spanish Monarchist Slain,‖ editorial, America, 25 July, 1936, 376).
―Week by Week: Red Strains,‖ The Commonweal, 24 July, 1936, 316).
The murder of Sotelo was carried out in Madrid by a mixed squad of Assault Guards (militarized urban
police) and socialist triggermen in an act of reprisal to answer the previous day's killing of one Lt. J.
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Events would escalate quickly after the death of Sotelo, though the American
Catholic papers would, understandably enough, report on Spanish developments with
confusion for some time. America would offer that while information on the emerging
war had been proven contradictory or, at best, uncertain, it had been established that the
revolt had been ―apparently well planned by Fascists and Conservatives later joined by
Royalists in fair numbers,‖ but had enjoyed a then-undetermined degree of success.91 Yet
further dwelling in confusion, the editorial staff of America struggled to define the
rightist movement: sources had ―variously described‖ it as monarchist, fascist, and
―Restoration[ist].‖92 Whatever the case, this paper held the opinion that the rebellion
stood as a justifiable ―protest against the prolonged inability of the leftist regime to
maintain order.‖93
It did not take long, however, for these Catholic publications to amend their
muddled opinions on the civil war and adopt what would become their own standardized,
nearly unyielding form of rhetoric with in respect to the Spanish conflict, which would be
notable for its particular emphasis on both Catholic solidarity and anti-communist
stridency.
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Castillo, himself a Guardsman and an active socialist, at the hands of a Falangist gang. These dual
assassinations, demonstrative of a national crisis careening out of all control, are also considered to be
the events which precipitated the rebellion.
―Chronicle: Revolt in Spain,‖ editorial, America, 1 August, 1936, 399.
―Chronicle: Behind the Revolt,‖ editorial, America, 1 August, 1936, 399.
Commonweal, meanwhile, reported Spanish news from sources that pinned the ―fascist‖ label on the
uprising from the outset. These same sources also claimed that clergymen bolstered rebel lines and that
their sanctuaries were used as strongholds; across the lines, conversely, the Church continued to suffer
atrocities ―amidst virtual anarchy.‖ (―Spain,‖ 7 August, 1936, 366).
Ibid.
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Indeed, less than a month into the war, America would declare war-ravaged Spain
to be a ―delightful playground for moralists, special pleaders, [and] propagandists,‖
especially for all those ―lovers of Communism and Sovietism‖ who foolishly exalted the
cause of the Popular Front, though its revolutionary underpinnings and anti-religious
hatreds had been clearly exposed.94 L. K. Patterson, a Jesuit contributor to America,
commented likewise. However, this author wrote that while the embattled Spanish
government coalition had been conceived with the sole objective of adding a territorial
possession to the communist bloc, he reluctantly admitted that the opposing faction likely
sought to realign the nation under some form of fascist-like regimentation. And though he
determined neither to be particularly palatable alternatives, he thought better of the latter,
for whatever its politics might have amounted to, it stood in defense of the Faith against
the radicals that would have seen it obliterated and scattered to the wind.95 America
would continue with its commentary on the war in this vein for some time, once even
going as far as to delineate the ―communist‖ cause in Spain, ostensibly espoused by the
government, as a kind of ―neo-Islam,‖ and hence the greatest threat to Christendom and
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―Comment,‖ editorial, in America, 8 August, 1936, 411.
This piece also expressed concern with the tendency of certain segments of the American press to affix
blame for the ―reactionary‖ uprising primarily to the Church, and worried whether the Spanish conflict
would exacerbate latent anti-Catholic hostility in the United States.
Lawrence K. Patterson, S. J., ―Left and Right Battle for Spain,‖ America, 8 August, 1936, 412-413.
This same edition of America would carry a like-minded editorial which stated that sympathy for the
rebellion did not necessarily imply approbation for either reactionary militarism or fascism, but rather
that it could be defended in light of the outrages committed by leftist regime against Christianity and,
indeed, against civilization itself. (―Perils of a Communist Victory in Spain,‖ 8 August, 1936, 420-421).
An article by J. P. Delaney, S. J. would continue this strain of the discourse, arguing that the Spanish
rebels should not really be called rebels, for theirs was the cause of Christian civilization against
Marxist barbarism. (―Call These Men Nor Rebels,‖ America, 22 August, 1936, 460).
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her civilization.96
Meanwhile, the Commonweal provided information on the conflict with more
marked sobriety than had its sister publication, though it did tentatively agree with the
general hypothesis that, for better or worse, the rightist rebels had more claim to
righteousness than did the ―radical‖ Spanish government.97 As had the Protestant papers,
this Catholic journal quickly demonstrated a sensitivity to the potential complications the
civil war might impose upon the wider stage of international politics. Even as early as
mid-August, when the rebellion had only just begun, the editors wrote fearfully that the
Spanish conflagration could become the flashpoint of another general European war, not
least because the major powers in that part of the world appeared to have declared for one
side or the other for reasons of irreconcilable ideological sympathies.98
Catholic interest in this facet of the war would, of course, endure through the
remainder of that year. Yet, during these few months, these representative Catholic
publications demonstrated a shift from cautioned skepticism to partisan certainty in
respect to the civil war in approximately the same fashion as had the Protestant journals.
During this period of time they became fixated upon the religious aspects of the war and
dwelt ever more upon the ostensible march of anti-religious communism in Spain that
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―Communism Marches On,‖ editorial, America, 15 August, 1936, 444-445.
A weekly update in Commonweal would state something similar, in that it saw the savagery of the
conflict as not unlike that of ―Christians and Turks‖ of ages past. (―Bread upon the Waters,‖ 14 August,
1936, 375). The September issue of Sign would, in fact, comment in an identical fashion.
―Murder in Madrid,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 28 August, 1936, 413-414.
―The World Revolution,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 14 August, 1936, 373-374.
―Week by Week: the Danger Spot in Europe,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 21 August, 1936, 394-395.
On the notion of Spain being a potential powder keg, America agreed.
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bordered on obsession. This could be considered reasonable, of course, as the Spanish
branch of their Church had undoubtedly been subjected to horrific persecution as the war
smoldered through its first phase. Regardless, and perhaps to an extent more so than their
Protestant contemporaries, these newspapers began to define the war in the sense of stark
moral absolutism that often attends uncompromising religiosity: in Spain, thereafter, the
issue was ultimately determined to be between communism and Christianity. 99
Even Commonweal, despite its temperance in previous months, became
increasingly disturbed with the unceasing reports from Spain detailing the revolutionary
desecration of the Spanish Church wherever the Popular Front retained power, which the
weekly concluded to have been enacted with the connivance of Soviet Russia.100 The
Sign, entering the stream of Catholic discourse for the first time since the rising,
subscribed to this understanding. It further offered that it had been perfectly natural that
the Spanish clergy committed to the ―conservative and decent‖ rebel coalition against the
―atheistic communism of the Loyalists,‖ which had been fully unleashed earlier that year
by radical proselytizers to fulfill their wish to remake Catholic Spain into a Soviet
possession.101 Yet, while urging Catholic Americans to lend their sympathy to tormented
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―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 19 September, 1936, 554-555.
―Current Fact and Comment: Seen from Different Angles,‖ The Sign, September, 1936, 67-68.
America would protest the arbitrary labeling of the government's supporters as ―Loyalists‖ and the antigovernment insurgents as ―Rebels;‖ its staff believed that it would be more appropriate to denominate
them respectively as the Marxist ―Rabble‖ and the ―Christian Forces of Law and Order‖ or simply
―Nationalists.‖ (5 September, 1936, 519-520). (3 October, 1936, 602-603).
―Week by Week: Spanish Horror,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 4 September, 1936, 435.
―Seven Days' Survey: the Wide World,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 4 September, 1936, 443.
―Current Fact and Comment: the Situation in Spain,‖ editorial, The Sign, September, 1936, 67.
―Current Fact and Comment: Catholics and the Revolt,‖ editorial, The Sign, September, 1936, 67.
America seconded this opinion, continuing its already-established commentary that held that the radical
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Spain as directed by the Vatican, Commonweal retained some of its moderation and
insisted that Catholics, and more particularly their press, avoid stances of alarmist
militancy in response to the Spanish Civil War. Its staff appeared to entertain a notunfounded fear that uncritical militancy might only arouse latent anti-Catholic feelings
among certain quarters of public sentiment in the United States which tended to support
the cause of the Spanish government.102

The editorial staff of America, on the other

hand, scoffed at Commonweal's suggestion. Rather than choosing the route of
conciliation, the journal scorned all those who defended the ―liberalism‖ of the Spanish
Republic and the ―communistic‖ Popular Front. It appeared to that journal's writers that
the definition of the word in contemporary Spain had been corrupted to mean the freedom
from the restraint which made civilization itself possible.103 Indeed, one contributor to
that publication, J. P. Delaney, would declare that the Catholics of Spain had but ―one
choice‖ in the matter, and that was either for or against the defense of their God, Country,
and Civilization in what he (and other Catholics) had already delineated as a religious
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assault upon Spain, more particularly on the Church, had been of Soviet manufacture, and that as more
of the American public became aware of this reality, then there would (should?) be a tidal shift of
opinion in favor of the insurgents. (5 September, 1936, 506-507). (12 September, 1936, 539).
―Week by Week: Footnote on Persecution,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 4 September, 1936, 436.
―The Beleaguered Church,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 11 September, 1936, 453-454.
―Through the Cross to Light,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 25 September, 1936, 493-494.
In accordance, Sign believed that if such anti-Catholic hatreds were aroused in the United States in
response to general Catholic sympathy for the cause of the rebellion, it should not have come as a
surprise; it would only have been a continuation of the long tradition of Anglo-American anti-Catholic
(and anti-Spanish) bigotry. (September, 1936; Pgs. 67-68) (October, 1936, 131-132, 141-144)
―Spanish Liberalism,‖ editorial, America, 5 September, 1936, 516.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 17 October, 1936, 26-27.
Especially irksome to the staff of America was the tendency of certain segments of the American press
to identify the cause of the Republic with ―democracy‖ without qualification; to the editorial staff of
that publication, this only demonstrated gross political illiteracy. (31 October, 1936, 84-85).
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crusade against the foreign contagion of atheistic communism.104
Based upon the evidence presented above, it can be demonstrated that, at least in
the columns of these few publications, the American Catholics rather quickly adopted the
conception of the Spanish Civil War as being a struggle between the hateful, atheistic
barbarity of Moscow and Roman Christian civilization—and then proceeded to reiterate
it ad infinitum. This pattern would continue throughout the remainder of 1936, and the
Catholic press would never acknowledge what troubled their Protestant contemporaries
about the conflict. That is, of course, the seeming allegiant confluence between the
Church and Franco's Nationalist movement, which to the Protestants appeared to be an
emergent iteration of fascism.105
Indeed, the last two months of the year saw very little development in their
commentary. But there was, to be sure, a brief period in which a few Catholic writers
turned their attention away from communism to focus on another whipping-boy, the
anarcho-syndicalists of Catalonia. To some, these radicals were considered to entertain
their own conspiracy, born of another poisoned doctrine; to others, they were merely
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John P. Delaney, ―Catholic Spaniards Have Only One Choice,‖ America, 12 September, 1936, 539.
A later article in America, containing the by-then-familiar trope of communism versus Christian
civilization, would offer that the rebels were battling against those who would subject Spain to the
―hammer and sickle of Asiatic slavery.‖ (10 October, 1936, 7-8).
―Week by Week: One Factor in Spain,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 6 November, 1936, 31-32.
Theophane Maguire, C. P., ―What of Spain,‖ The Sign, November, 1936, 194.
Francis McCullagh, ―Long Live Spain!,‖ The Sign, November, 1936, 205-207.
―Week by Week: the Lesson of Spain,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 18 December,1936, 203-204.
Philip Burke, ―The Claws of the Bear,‖ The Sign, December, 1936, 265-267.
And yet for all of this certitude, a certain T. Flanagan recognized the ―dilemma‖ of the Spanish war. In
his opinion, he wrote to America, the people of Spain had the unenviable choice of either siding with
those who claimed to be the servants of God and Civilization but who had for centuries oppressed them,
or with those who promised to break the chains of their slavery but who would only institute another
form of bondage. (19 December, 1936, 257).
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another of Moscow's creeping tentacles. Whatever the case, the anarchists were deemed
to have been just as injurious to the Faith as the communists.106
America did, however, report on one interesting event that seems to have escaped
the notice of the Protestant press. In early November, the so-called American League
against War and Fascism held a meeting at Madison Square Garden in which
representatives of the Spanish Popular Front addressed an audience of considerable size
and presented their country's plight. They apparently argued that their government was
not at all communistic, but rather proudly democratic. At the same time, according to
America's commentary, each of the constituent elements of the opposition (including the
Church) were tarred black with the unsophisticated brush strokes of broad generalization,
and were depicted as the appendages of advancing fascism.107
Catholic interest in the internationalized complexion of the Spanish conflict
naturally endured as the year ended. Perhaps more interestingly, though, one can glean a
sense of simmering resentment amongst certain Catholic writers in response to the
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Harry C. Plummer, ―Barcelona Seized by Anarcho-Syndicalists,‖ America, 21 November, 1936, 148149.
―High Points in the Spanish Situation,‖ editorial, America, 28 November, 1936, 156-157.
Harry C. Plummer, ―Twin Despots of Spanish Democracy,‖ America, 28 November, 1936, 177-178.
Harry C. Plummer, ―Spain Demands Religious Freedom,‖ America, 12 December, 1936, 220-221.
These opinions, of course, were offered without the understanding that the communists and the
anarchists did not get along particularly well, to say the least.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 7 November, 1936, 98-99.
The substance of this address would actually be turned into a pamphlet entitled ―Spain's Democracy
Talks to America,‖ which would be published and distributed by the American and Canadian Leagues
against War and Fascism. This meeting (and the subsequently produced pamphlet) would receive more
specific denunciation in an editorial comment in the Commonweal (4 December, 1936, 141-143).
Further, all of this was believed to be a part of a nation-wide propaganda effort, directed by CPUSA and
its subordinate ―front‖ organizations to further their revolutionary cause in Europe and the world—all,
of course, at the behest of the Comintern. What was worse, America and Sign offered, was that such
propaganda seemed to be having the desired effect—otherwise honest (non-Catholic) Americans were
being duped into subscribing to it. Catholics, on the other hand, were presumed to know better.
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swelling of anti-Catholic opinion in the United States, ostensibly due to the the civil war.
Indeed, one F. H. Spearman wrote a piece for America in which he expressed bitterness
over the fact that Catholic Americans were being forced to ―eat dirt‖ by their neighbors
and that their Church faced constant defamation from the non-Catholic press.108 On the
other hand, D. C. O'Grady wrote to the Commonweal and endorsed that publication's
established belief that hysteria or militancy in the Catholic position on the war would
only elevate anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States, and would contribute to the
arsenals of those who would place the whole of the Church in the camp of the fascists.109
But hysteria and militancy had, by the end of 1936, essentially become the
standard position on the Spanish Civil War by most of the contributors to these few
Catholic periodicals, and not to mention by the respective staffs thereof. Almost perfectly
encapsulating this trend, one need only reference the Sign's final relevant article on the
subject for the year, entitled the ―New Crusade,‖ which called for good Catholic souls to
declare a modern crusade (that glorious, thoroughly Christian institution) against the
modern enemy of the Faith, communism, the ―last great heresy of the East.‖110 According
to the author, the time had then come to confront that mortal enemy as Christ once
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109

110

Frank H. Spearman, ―They Must Not Get Away with It,‖ America, 21 November, 1936, 152.
This article expressed further irritation with the non-Catholic press's continued attacks against the
Church's relationship with the Nationalist coalition while it insisted upon the democratic virtues of the
Popular Front when ―democracy‖ appeared to be the contemporary rallying cry for world communism.
In other words: ―...democracy, into disrepute they have dragged down thy name.‖ (America, 5
December, 1936, 194-195). The December editorials in Sign commented likewise.
Daniel C. O'Grady, ―Communications: But Do You Know Your Reds?,‖ letter to the editor,
The Commonweal, 18 December, 1936, 221.
J. G. E. Hopkins, ―The New Crusade,‖ in The Sign, December, 1936, 312-313.
One will recall that communism had been designated elsewhere as a kind of ―neo-Islam.‖ Here the
Roman Catholic Church enjoyed further depiction as an organizational representation of, for example,
the Spartans at Thermopylae, holding the line of civilization against the encroaching Persian hordes.
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enjoined: ―...not with peace, but with a sword.‖111 And most Catholic Spain was certainly
to be the first battlefield.
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Ibid.
By the end of the year, both Commonweal and America began to press the argument through editorials
and articles that the use of force by Catholic Spain against its oppressors was justified by religious
doctrine. (America, 28 November, 1936, 180-181). (The Commonweal, 6 November, 1936, 42-44).
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V.
As 1936 faded into 1937, these American Protestant newspapers had, in respect to
their understanding of the Spanish Civil War, shifted from a position of caution to one of
entrenched partisanship. For most of 1937, the rhetoric adopted and employed by these
publications would change very little, and thereby assumed a character of rote
predictability.112 For the Protestants, of course, that would mean a continuation of the
emotional interpretation of the war as an ideological struggle between democracy and
reaction (or fascism), however imprecise those terms might have been.113 Otherwise, they
continued to be interested in the internal politics of wartime Spain, the progress of the
conflict and the way in which the international situation developed around it, the troubled
work of the Non-Intervention Committee, and the moral dilemma over whether more
steps should have been taken by the democracies to aid the Republic. There also
continued, albeit briefly, the derisive discussion of the Vatican's proposed campaign of
mutual Catholic-Protestant cooperation to confront and destroy the supposed menace of
communism.114
Opposite their own interpretation of the war, these publications worried over the
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As had, indeed, that of their Catholic adversaries.
―In a Nutshell,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 8 May, 1937, 581.
This edition of the paper featured a brief editorial quote: ―...we are sure that liberty and democracy in
the world will be endangered if Franco wins. The hodge-podge coalition against him so glibly damned
as red is fighting our fight.‖ (8 May, 1937, 581).
Here one might reference two items of peripheral interest. In early January, 1937, the Christian Leader
ran an editorial which reprinted a list from the Atlanta Journal; this list purported to rank the top ten
major news stories of the day. Interestingly, the Spanish Civil War ranked only ninth, coming in only
above the (outdated?) issue of German rearmament. Secondly: that year these three journals and a
number of their contributors would express their concern, indeed disappointment, with the happenings
inside the Soviet Union as limited details began to surface in respect to Stalin's Terror.
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extent to which rank-and-file Catholic opinion in the United States trended toward
sympathy for the Nationalists' ―holy war.‖ They already knew that certain important
members of the American Catholic hierarchy had come out in favor of the uprising.
Specifically citing the Archbishop of Cincinnati, J. T. McNicholas, the Christian Century
summarily denounced him as a pro-Franco propagandist who uncritically towed the
Catholic line. This clergyman attacked the ―communist‖ government of Spain while
totally ignoring the ―fascist‖ complexion of the supposedly Christian rebellion.115 The
Christian Evangelist would express similar concerns: even while the eminently
conservative Chicago Tribune had concluded that the uprising stood as a reactionary
assault on a progressive democratic government, Catholics of all descriptions seemed
unwilling to amend their established definition of the rightist movement as anticommunist and thoroughly Christian.116 Further, the Evangelist held such pro-Franco
vehemence as a rather foolish blunder, for its staff believed that the Nationalist movement
had amply demonstrated its fascist proclivities. And fascism, being at its core hostile to
religion, could never be regarded as a true friend of the Faith; indeed, the paper wrote that
the ―church which trusts the fascists is a church which walks knee-deep in folly.‖117
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―Cincinnati Archbishop Is Propagandist for Franco,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 27 January, 1937,
102.
The Century would also review with disdain at the Catholic ―American Committee for Spanish Relief‖
(chaired, in fact, by the Commonweal's own chief editor, M. Williams). Its editorial staff believed that
this venture was ―propaganda disguised as charity,‖ and only contributed to the cause of fascism in
Spain. (26 May, 1937, 668).
―Behind the Headlines,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 4 February, 1937, 145.
To describe the Chicago Tribune, the Evangelist nominated it as a ―sanctified newspaper of
conservatism.‖
―Again, Catholicism and Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 27 May, 1937, 679-680.
B. Y. Landis, writing for The Christian Leader would offer likewise. (12 June, 1937, 754-755).
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Such charged commentary naturally brought the various editorial staffs of these
Protestant newspapers again to the consideration of the Catholic Church's conception of a
pan-Christian anti-communist crusade. Without exception, these writers considered the
whole idea ludicrous, especially as it seemed to them that it would force Protestantism
into a sort of stooping vassalage in order to battle an enemy designated exclusively by the
Pontificate—which, in this case, they believed to be nothing more than a man of straw.
The Christian Century, as it had earlier established, continued to assert that this proposed
movement had been born from the Church's desire to preserve its power and privilege
wherever it faced diminution or destruction, with Spain then being the most obvious
pressure point.118 Moreover, it had become increasingly clear to these journals that the
whole concept had been fueled by the insufferable arrogance which typically attends
assumed entitlement, and that the Church did not much care who or what rallied to its
standard so long as its interests were upheld.119
Moving away from the more intangible ideological considerations, the staffs and
contributors to these Protestant newspapers maintained their discourse on the practical
118
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―The Church Must Itself Repent,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 6 January, 1937, 6-7.
S. H. Fritchman, writing for The Christian Leader, would later comment likewise (7 August, 1937,
1005-1006).
Ibid.
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 7 January, 1937, 4-5.
Randall S. Hilton, ―Our Greatest Need,‖ The Christian Leader, 30 January, 1937, 144-145.
―The Vatican Fires Both Ways,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 31 March, 1937, 401.
―Rallying under a Divinely Delegated Superior,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 31 March, 1937, 401.
The Christian Century did, however, acknowledge that such a campaign would be more palatable and
perhaps acceptable to American Protestants if all forms of fascism were included in the rubric of what a
united Christianity would undertake to defeat. Indeed, as certain American Catholic writers had warned,
for the Church and her faithful to encourage rabid anti-communist zealotry while only dismissing
fascism as a mildly objectionable extremism would only further impress upon Protestants that the
Church favored fascism. (13 January, 1937, 38).
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aspects of the Spanish conflict. As before, they reported on the military undertakings of
either belligerent faction, expended many column inches on the speculative discussion of
Spain becoming the casus belli of another general European war, and bemoaned the
already-compromised mission of the Non-Intervention Committee.
They continued their discussion on the complications that the civil war had
introduced into the arena of international relations, particularly as it then appeared that
the mastery of the Mediterranean hung in the balance—a question as critical to the
existing imperial interests of Great Britain as it was to the dearest ambitions of the Italian
dictator.120 And, as Europe had not then been plunged into war over the Spanish crisis, the
Protestant journals often highlighted the work of the Non-Intervention Committee,
though they entertained no illusions as to that body's effectiveness in preventing
international meddling in the conflict, specifically on the part of Italy and Germany.
These papers offered many editorial opinions on why that necessity had justified such
contemptuous non-compliance for the fascist powers. They had, during late 1936,
recognized the legitimacy of the Nationalist movement, and to renege on their Spanish
commitments would have meant not only the sacrifice of the valuable concessions that
Franco had supposedly promised them, but would have also constituted a disastrous blow
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―Italo-British Agreement an Influence for Peace,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 13 January, 1937,
35.
Harold E. Fey, ―A General War in 1937?,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 7 January, 1937, 12-13.
Also distressing to the Protestants was what they had understood to be Hitler's interest in the acquisition
of strategic North African territory opposite Gibraltar in return for his munificence, a development
which would have done much to upset the Mediterranean status quo. (The Christian Century, 20
January, 1937, 67-68).

55

to their international prestige.121
To have read these Protestant journals without any additional context, one might
have come away with the conclusion that Franco's rebellion had been fought for him by
foreign militants and mercenaries of the worst description. Indeed, an early January issue
of the Christian Leader featured an update on the progress of the conflict, which jokingly
offered the opinion that the only genuinely Spanish aspect of his campaign had been ―the
target.‖122 Purporting to understand the object of all this, these publications argued as
they had for months: that the mutiny had been abetted by Italy and Germany for the sake
of ensuring the creation of a fascist stronghold on the Iberian Peninsula in order to bolster
the strength of the previously-delineated ―fascist internationale.‖123 But however the
Protestants might have been determined to preserve their certitude that the complexion of
Franco's coalition was more specifically Italian and German than Spanish, they could not
deny the momentum of his military adventure, which despite his continued frustration
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Raymond Leslie Buell, ―Understanding Our World: German-Japanese Pact Arouses Democracies,‖ The
Christian Leader, 2 January, 1937, 20.
―Goering and Mussolini Confer about Spain,‖editorial, The Christian Century, 27 January, 1937, 102.
―No News from Spain Is News,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 3 February, 1937, 133.
―Powers Promise Hands off in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 24 February, 1937, 235-236.
―News from the Nofrontier News Service: Franco the Internationalist,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader,
16 January, 1937, 81.
The Leader reprinted a quip from a Richmond newspaper, applicable to both sides in the war: ―Then
there was the commander in Madrid who gave the regiment a fifteen-minute fight talk, only to find that
none of the boys spoke Spanish.‖ (23 January, 1937, 128).
The Christian Leader would report that the Germans had established an outpost in northwestern Spain,
and had from that location been broadcasting messages of National-Socialist solidarity with the
Nationalist rebellion in its battle against ―Communist, Marxist, Anarchist, Jewish barbarism.‖ (2
January, 1937, 15-16). This account would dovetail with other stories into the summer of that year: the
publication of the contents from the ―war journal‖ of a dead officer serving in the Italian Blackshirt
militia (17 July, 1937, 918), the importation of Spanish oranges into France, which arrived in crates
bearing German labeling (24 July, 1937, 945-946), and the supposed capture of a ream of sensitive
Italian military documents in the Guadalajara sector (28 August, 1937, 1113).
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before the gates of Madrid, had achieved significant gains across the north of Spain and
in the Basque provinces.124
Clearly, then, the Protestants believed that the Non-Intervention Committee had
failed in its trust and the contemporary military situation reflected it. This aside, there
were, by the end of the summer of 1937, two more facets of the conflict that captured the
attention of these newspapers and perhaps bear mentioning.
First, they expressed interest in the development of the internal politics of the
Loyalist camp, particularly after the conclusion of the so-called ―May Days,‖ which
decisively shifted political patterns within the Republic. In what would later be described
as a miniature civil war within the wider Spanish Civil War, there transpired in Catalonia
a series of events which led to an anarcho-syndicalist and ―Trotskyite‖ socialist uprising
that forced the government to act decisively against it. In the aftermath, the Prime
Minister, F. L. Caballero, himself a socialist firebrand, faced ejection from the
government, as did every vestige of anarcho-syndicalist and radical socialist
representation. This dramatic governmental reorganization received positive commentary,
particularly by the Christian Century. Its staff offered the opinion that those certain
uncooperative elements which refused to compromise on their revolutionary ideals for
the common interest of the Republic had to be jettisoned if the ―fascists‖ were ever to be
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Here the Protestant papers, particularly the Christian Evangelist, perceived a dilemma for the Catholic
Church: how could that institution countenance the Nationalist movement when it was then visiting
death and destruction on the historically Catholic Basque country, which had mostly remained loyal to
the Republic? (6 May, 1937, 583-584). The Christian Century and Leader would comment likewise, but
would focus more on the April bombing of Guernica by the German Condor Legion.
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vanquished.125
Secondly, a number of Protestant writers confessed to anxiety over the
contradictions they perceived in the enforcement of American neutrality in respect to the
Spanish war. While they admitted that the policy would serve as a considerable barrier to
prevent the United States from becoming entangled in the quarrels of the Old World, it
definitely constituted a breach of international law in that it refused to acknowledge the
right of a recognized, friendly government to defend itself in the face of an internal
revolt.126 On a similar note, the Christian Century editorialized on the potential danger
posed by illegal American volunteerism in the conflict. Though making it clear that its
sympathies lay with the cause of the Republic and those fighting for it, this paper damned
the phenomenon as the product of unthinking irresponsibility, for it held the potential to
undermine the basis of American neutrality.127 On the other hand, W. E. Davies, writing
for the Christian Leader, doubted the traditional route of neutrality. He believed that the
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―Spain Passes through Cabinet Crisis,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 26 May, 1937, 667.
―Spain's New Cabinet Gains Strength,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 2 June, 1937, 700.
―Spanish War Remains in Summer Doldrums,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 25 August, 1937, 1036.
To comment further on this important incident, one must return to Spain Betrayed. The declassified
Soviet documents within that volume offer a convincing case that the May Days were not all they
seemed. Indeed, they strongly suggest that the crisis in Catalonia was deliberately precipitated by
Spanish communists and their pro-Moscow socialist deputies, all under the direction of Soviet military
intelligence agents. Their ultimate goal in provoking militant action from the anarcho-syndicalists and
their assorted radical allies was, of course, to manufacture an excuse to topple Caballero, ever resistant
to Soviet manipulation, destroy his natural base of power, and replace him with a candidate who was
thought to have been more amenable to communist (read: Soviet) ―suggestions.‖
―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 7 January, 1937, 4-5.
―What Sort of Neutrality?,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 13 January, 1937, 38-40.
―Is Neutrality Moral?,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 17 March, 1937, 341.
―Keep out of Spain!,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 27 January, 1937, 104-106.
This same publication, however, applauded the efforts of their Quaker countrymen, who undertook that
year to organize non-partisan humanitarian relief for the souls of suffering Spain. Curiously, certain
Quaker relief representatives would report back to the newspaper and totally reinforce Protestant ideas
about the rebellion, including the complicity of the Catholic Church in it. (7 April, 1937, 452-454).
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Spanish Civil War had forced liberals to confront the discomfiting dangers of the
contemporary day and arrived at the conclusion that the world had become at once so
intimately intertwined and simultaneously hostile that isolationism had been rendered
obsolete. And while he never necessarily advocated for American intervention on behalf
of the Republic, he did stress the importance of the leadership of the United States against
the aggressor nations and nascent fascist movements, wherever they should threaten the
peace.128
By the Autumn of 1937, as demonstrated by the material discussed above,
Protestant opinion in respect to the Spanish crisis had remained fundamentally the same
and, indeed, had been further reinforced. Their faith in the essential righteousness of the
Republican cause endured, as did their disdain for the ―fascist‖ Nationalist insurgency
and all those who supported it—most pointedly, it then seemed, the Catholic Church. All
which one might say had changed was the emergence of the (perhaps limited) opinion
that the United States owed the Spanish Republic unwavering support, not only out of
the rightful recognition of international law, but also for the sake of the so-called
―democratic tradition.‖ This latter line of reasoning would soon become important to the
next phase of the Protestant discourse on the Spanish Civil War.
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W. Ellis Davies, ―Can America Become a Hermit Nation,‖ The Christian Leader, 13 March, 1937, 338339.
D. G. Lothrop, writing for the same publication, would hold a similar opinion, though he was more
expressly concerned with the Spanish war. He wrote that the cause of the beleaguered Spanish
Republican Loyalists could not be considered apart from short- and long-term interests of the United
States, and that the country should have thereby done all it could—the right thing, according to
international law—to support the Republic of Spain, a sister democracy in a modern battle against
tyranny. (10 April, 1937, 457-458).
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VI.
The year 1937 would see the Catholic press's interpretation of the Spanish Civil
War transform in a number of ways, some more subtle than others. For example, it
became increasingly uncommon to read of it as a war of religion or a holy crusade,
although these papers could never entirely escape from that early judgment.129 But
Catholic writers maintained their fixation on the primacy of international communism as
the villain in the Spanish drama while continuing to argue for the relative virtues of the
Nationalist insurgency—all of which came at the expense of somewhat lackluster
reporting on the progress of the war and the international developments which
surrounded it. However, there would develop some dissension within the ranks of these
few Catholic publications. Commonweal began to insist that the conflict be reviewed with
a greater degree of sensitivity to its nuances, cautioning against reductionist
interpretations of it, and became something of a voice of reasoned moderation amongst
its more hysterical peers. This development would be met with outraged incredulity, most
particularly by America.130 Otherwise, there would be some discussion on the notion of
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Even the previously militant America began to at least moderate its views on the conflict: ―...we must
sternly forbid ourselves to regard the Spanish war as primarily, or even secondarily, a religious war. The
rightists cannot be held as a Catholic junta, the soldiers of Franco should not be applauded as Catholic
crusaders for God.‖ (30 January, 1937, 397-398). To this paper, the religious dynamic began to recede
slightly as the struggle began to be defined more as a question of radical (read: communist)
revolutionaries versus Franco's counter-revolutionary forces—which even this paper's staff would
eventually admit had certain regrettable ―fascist‖ tendencies (13 February, 1937, 444-445).
A correspondent to The Sign even wrote to the magazine, expressing disgust at the flippancy with which
the author of the previous month's article, ―The New Crusade,‖ treated the idea of a religious war.
(January, 1937, 365-366). Another interpreted Franco's movement as ―fascist‖ (March, 1937, 491).
Others, of course, would disagree.
M. Williams, Commonweal's founder and executive editor would, however, retain some of his Catholic
militancy in respect to his opinion on the Spanish war.
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old-fashioned anti-Catholicism being a major factor in non-Catholic Americans' support
of Loyalist Spain. Here again one might perceive a certain tendency amongst the Catholic
publications: the effort being expended to defend Franco's Nationalists was also a
convenient reflexive mechanism to protect the denomination they represented.131
Definitely shifting away from the previous definition of the Spanish war as being
one of religion, there began in 1937 a veritable Catholic drumbeat to prove that the side
of Franco's Nationalists more precisely represented liberty than did the Republican
Loyalists. America even forwarded the notion that the ostensible popularity of the
uprising represented something akin to a democratic vote, which had clearly stated that
the ―people of Spain would no longer submit to a government which had allowed chaos
to prevail.‖132 This same newspaper (along with the monthly Sign) would even solicit
commentary from G. Robles, the noted Spanish rightist. He would reinforce their
convictions of the Popular Front being illegitimately constituted, and whether it had sown
discord itself or merely allowed ―chaos to prevail,‖ it had been the right of the Spanish
people to revolt.133 O. B. McGuire and B. Grimley, writing for the Sign, took further
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Even if some writers, like E. H. Smith, admitted that a considerable amount of blame had to be
apportioned to the Church, a reality not made any more palatable due to the fact that the Church,
wherever it had been threatened, tended to ally with dubious reactionary or fascist elements. (―An
Alarmist Speaks,‖ The Commonweal, 1 January, 1936, 261-263).
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 2 January, 1937, 290-291.
―Chaos‖ presumably preparatory to a revolutionary crisis.
―Comment‖, editorial, America, 13 March, 1937, 530.
Gil Robles, ―The Spanish Republic from 1931 till 1936 Elections,‖ America, 15 May, 1937, 124-126).
Gil Robles, ―The Spanish Republic from February till July, 1936,‖ America, 22 May, 1937, 149-151).
Gil Robles, ―The Spanish Republic and Basque Independence—The Truth about Guernica,‖ America,
29 May, 1937, 172-173.
Owen B. McGuire, ―Gil Robles and the Republic,‖ The Sign, May, 1937, 598-601.
America would run a piece by E. S. O'Kane, who had traveled to war-torn Spain, that would further
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interpretative liberties and asserted that duty to God, no less than patriotism, had impelled
them to strike against the baleful combine of radical elements which had seized control of
their country.134
The Catholic press would naturally continue to pillory this leftist government
coalition as a purely Soviet construct. These few papers maintained their rhetoric on the
mortal danger posed to the civilized world by international communism, holding the
example of contemporary Spain aloft to demonstrate a contextual microcosm of what the
Comintern envisioned on a global scale.135 And yet both America and the Sign would
again feature articles on Spanish anarcho-syndicalism, indicating that some of their more
savvy (or perhaps reasonable) contributors understood ideological distinctions and that
the whole of the Loyalist bloc had never existed as an entirely communist entity. This
particular strain of radicalism would receive negative commentary, namely in that it
relied upon terror and violence.136 In any event, these papers primarily condemned the
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reinforce all of this. She claimed that the righteousness of the rising was backed by some ancient
Spanish code that held that the vested authority could only be served loyally so long as it discharged its
duties faithfully. (―Viva España! The Nation in Crisis, 27 March, 1937, 585-586).
Owen B. McGuire, ―They Had to Revolt,‖ The Sign, January, 1937, 339-340.
Owen B. McGuire, ―Sifting the Spanish News,‖ The Sign, February, 1937, 411-413.
Bernard Brimley, ―Back Stage in Spain,‖ The Sign, June, 1937, 662-664.
One might add that this journal's editorial commentary would regularly endeavor to portray the future
dictator of Spain as a Godly liberator and a benevolent despot rather than a fanatic or a fascist brute.
―Current Fact and Comment: False Issues,‖ editorial, The Sign, January, 1937, 323.
―Current Fact and Comment: The Truth about Spain,‖ editorial, The Sign, January, 1937, 323.
―Current Fact and Comment: Stalin, the 'Democratic' Dictator,‖ editorial, The Sign, June, 1937, 709.
Harry Chapin Plummer ―Red and Black over Spain,‖ The Sign, January, 1937, 329-332.
The Pilgrim, ―With Scrip and Staff: Spain's Dragon No Youthful Dinosaur,‖ America, 27 February,
1937, 491.
There also seemed to be an understanding that these two political affiliations were fundamentally at
odds. They predicted that the anarcho-syndicalists would likely be crushed, either by a Nationalist
victory or by the Republican government itself, which they interpreted as becoming increasingly
communist-dominated. A sound judgment, on the whole, if only a shot in the dark at the time.
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agents of Moscow as the primary antagonists in the Spanish crisis.
Most particularly concerning to these Catholic newspapers seemed to be the florid
professions of eternal friendship and brotherhood lavished upon the democracies of the
world by the Comintern, amounting to its desire for them to join in solidarity against its
own denominated enemy of fascism. They were of the opinion that these were rather
naked attempts to lure the democracies into devastating anti-fascist wars to the exclusive
benefit of the communist cause. Auxiliary to this, on a smaller scale and closer to home,
the staffs of both America and the Commonweal warned against those native Leagues
against War and Fascism and pseudo-Popular Front organizations, which they interpreted
(not necessarily incorrectly) as Trojan Horse-like stratagems for the purposes of
domestic infiltration and the manipulation of public opinion.137 They believed such
―Trojan Horses‖ to be adept at propagandizing, most especially in the tactic of applying
damning labels to those who either remained aloof or otherwise refused to participate in
their anti-fascist adventures—in this case, the Roman Catholic Church.138
These Catholic journals assigned blame to the publications of the American Left
for their apparent role in contributing to this process, especially in their prejudiced and
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―Week by Week: Up War!,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 1 January, 1937, 259-260.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 30 January, 1937, 387.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 6 February, 1937, 422.
See also:
Wilfrid Parsons, ―Fascist-Communist Dilemma,‖ The Commonweal, 12 February, 1937, 429-431.
Wilfrid Parsons, ―Popular Front and Catholicism,‖ The Commonweal, 19 February, 1937, 464-466.
―Fascism, Communism, and Americanism,‖ editorial, America, 6 March, 1937, 516-517.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 10 July, 1937, 314-315.
All of this was essentially a vicious campaign of name-calling inspired by a rigid ideological
dichotomy. The Church found itself being denounced as ―fascist‖ for its refusal to countenance any
movement which contained anything resembling ―Marxist‖ or otherwise ―anti-Christian‖ elements. But,
to be sure, the American Catholic press was equally guilty of assigning arbitrary labels.
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dishonest treatment of the Spanish war, which had led the mass of otherwise decent
citizens to support the ―Reds.‖139 More specifically, the editorial staff of the Sign
expressed great anxiety over its perception that substantial elements of the liberal
Protestant press seemed to be enthusiastic subscribers to the cause of the Republican
Loyalists, perhaps emboldened by a resurgent anti-Catholic bigotry.140 Correspondingly,
contributors to the Sign would insist upon the necessity of ―enlightening key Americans
on Spain‖ in order to break the hypnosis that ―Red‖ propaganda held over non-Catholic
souls.141 This may have been a response to the appearance of a certain joint statement,
published by approximately one hundred American literary figures, in which they
appealed to all members of their craft to align themselves with the Spanish government,
which they interpreted as being ―in harmony with American traditions.‖142 A. Beck
believed that this campaign to arouse non-Catholic Americans had to be taken further,
and proposed the formation of an organization of Catholic ―Minute Men,‖ which he
defined as a ―group of letter-writers for protest and correction against the Church in the
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―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 9 January, 1937, 314-315.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 16 January, 1937, 338-339.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 3 April, 1937, 602-603.
Albert I. Whelan, ―Spanish Propaganda Is Not Truly Spanish,‖ America, 3 July, 1937, 296.
On this note, Commonweal would report on a happening that escaped the notice of the other
publications, that being a meeting of some 15,000 at Madison Square Garden, concerned over the unfair
treatment of the Spanish Civil War in the American press. (4 June, 1937, 141-143).
―Current Fact and Comment: An Unholy Alliance,‖ editorial, The Sign, January, 1937, 324-325.
Owen B. McGuire, ―They Had to Revolt,‖ The Sign, January, 1937, 339-340.
―Current Fact and Comment: the Truth of the Matter,‖ editorial, The Sign, February, 1937, 388-389.
―Current Fact and Comment: Loyalist Propaganda,‖ editorial, The Sign, June, 1937, 644.
Rev. M. O'Connor, ―Letters: Enlightening Key Americans on Spain,‖ The Sign, March, 1937, 489-490.
―An Attack on Democracy, editorial, The Commonweal, 12 March, 1937, 537-538.
O. B. McGuire, writing for the Sign, would elaborate on this growing trend of interpreting the conflict
through the prism of ―Americanism.‖ (―Spain Teaches Us,‖ July, 1937, 713-716).
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press.‖143 While obviously an instrument meant to combat (and seemingly escalating)
anti-Catholic bias, this phenomenon should not have been considered apart from the
developments relating to the Spanish Civil War.
On the opposite side of the same token B. B. Carter, writing for the Commonweal
did not advocate for the over-simplification of the Spanish issue. She criticized the
Nationalists, cautioning that it would have been a major embarrassment for American
Catholics to express unqualified enthusiasm for Franco's cause, only to have it become
indecent or barbaric later. In her measured opinion, while unpredictable radicalism or
communist manipulation might have been the rule in Loyalist Spain, the rightist
insurgency held the potential to institute a regime of reactionary subjugation upon their
victory.144 Indeed, G. N. Shuster, also of the Commonweal, repeated an almost identical
line in two separate articles. He explained his stance against the ideological streamlining
of the civil war in that however Catholics might rail against the ―Left‖ in the United
States for its supposed contributions to the communist propaganda machine, the Church
had its own apparatus for the same, but opposite, purpose. According to the author, it
tended to castigate the Spanish Republic and the Popular Front whole-cloth while
championing Franco's movement, which he believed had amply demonstrated its capacity
for tyranny.145
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As remarkably restrained in tone as these opinion pieces might have been they
drew intense criticism from the staff of America and some of its contributors. Those
offended believed that only fundamental ignorance about the realities of Spain could have
inspired anyone to comment thus.146 In fact, the journal felt such a sense of betrayal over
this issue that its editor, F. X. Talbot, issued a pair of articles in which he sought to clarify
some truths on the Spanish conflict for his wayward coreligionists (and not to mention
the general American reading public).147 On the other hand, it might seem to disinterested
observers that America merely seemed resentful that a sister publication would dare to
break the lockstep of the Catholic phalanx.
On the part of the Commonweal, its founder and chief editor, M. Williams,
responded to America and attempted to explain the appearance of the items which had so
enraged the staff of the other newspaper. He wrote that while his journal would always
side with the Church, its mission also required that it serve as an open forum for a variety
of perspectives.148 Regardless, he would proclaim his staunchness of attitude when it
came to the war. Subscribing to the general Catholic interpretation of the conflict, he
remained firmly within the pro-Nationalist camp and attacked the American press at large
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for what he considered to be its poisoned bias, which he explained over a series of five
―open letters.‖149
Indeed, this internal wrangling over interpretative norms (not to mention the
preoccupation with the almost paralyzing fear of some master communist conspiracy)
occupied a great deal of the attention of the Catholic press. So much so, in fact, that three
other important aspects of the war received significantly less discussion than they had
previously: the actual fighting in Spain, the evolution of the contemporary international
scene, and the lingering question of religion.
Concern naturally endured over the progress of the war and its continued potential
for it to become another major European confrontation—albeit perhaps to a degree less
so than could be found in the Protestant papers. Emphasis tended to lie with Franco's
positive momentum across Spain; these papers tended to ignore his inability to capture
Madrid, but sang his praises with his triumphant entry into Bilbao, where he had
apparently been greeted as a savior.150 The tragedy of Guernica received some treatment
by these papers, but they did not, as the Protestant journals had, attribute the crime to the
Nationalists' German aviators. Rather, in what would become a standard pro-Franco
rebuttal, they blamed the unworthy act of malice on retreating communist and anarchist

149

150

Michael Williams, ―Open Letter to the Leaders of the American Press, on Spain,‖ The Commonweal,
7 May, 1937, 33-37.
Again, one might add: ad infinitum, ad nauseam. The other concerned letters appeared on the following
dates of that year: (21 May, 85-87). (28 May, 113-115). (4 June, 151-153). (25 June, 231-234).
Edward J. Ferger, ―Normalcy Restored to Bilbao with Advent of Franco,‖ America, 7 August, 1937,
415-416.

67

incendiaries.151 They would also relate their impressions of the ―May Days,‖ which they
interpreted as perhaps being the death knell for the ―Red‖ government; it then seemed to
them that the internal unity of the Loyalist coalition faced imminent and catastrophic
collapse.152 Upon the wider stage, there remained a rather markedly infrequent interest in
the internationalization of the war, most particularly on the botched work of the NonIntervention Committee and the unbroken flow of men and materiel into Spain.153
Related to this topic, the Catholic press reported on the danger posed to American
neutrality by the foreign civil war. They commented positively on the Spanish embargo
and worried over the problem of the thoroughly illegal practice of American citizens
sneaking abroad to join in the battle, particularly on the side of the the Republic.154
And, as for the matter of religion, the Sign continued to dwell thereupon, almost
alone amongst its peers to do so. That monthly pursued its fixation on cataloging the
atrocities committed against the Church by the Spanish ―Reds‖ under Russian tutelage,
According to J. Q. Murphy, this even included a ―Cheka-like‖ police force, designated to
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the task of running religious figures and the ardently faithful to ground before dispatching
them in devilish public spectacles.155 Commonweal, however, did offer some little
commentary on the question of religion. E. A. Peers wrote of the ―Spain that had no
Easter,‖ which he damned as an enduring crime forced upon a bleeding nation by the
―Reds.‖156 As with the Commonweal, so too with America. Surprisingly, that newspaper
spent but little space in attempting to refute the charge that had been leveled against the
complicity of the Spanish Church in fomenting the rebellion, which had been ostensibly
inspired by the reflexive desire to protect its power and privilege.157 Even when America
and its contemporaries did address these accusations, they tended to treat the very notion
as if it should have been beneath the contempt of any decent Catholic soul.
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VII.
The evidence presented above indicates that, from the election of the Popular
Front until the outbreak of the civil war, and into the early Autumn of 1937, the opinions
of the American Catholic and Protestant presses remained strongly polarized and, indeed,
fresh developments from Spain only seemed to encourage each camp to further entrench
themselves. Correspondingly, their respective narratives interpretative the evolving
Spanish conflict remained in virtual stasis, almost as do broken records.
The Catholics maintained their stance on the evils of the embattled Spanish
government, believing it to have been the product of a malignant foreign doctrine while
the Nationalist insurgency represented something approximate to the ―true‖ soul of Spain.
But, while the representative American Catholic journals initially attached enormous
religious significance to the conflict, they eventually retreated from this position.
Although one could never be entirely sure, one might suggest that this might have been
due in part to a natural emotional response to the supposed horrors being visited upon
their supranational Church in a foreign land, one which cooled over time. Of course,
another possible interpretation might suggest that Catholics writers might have restrained
their religious readings of the conflict out of a fear of provoking the latent antiCatholicism of their co-religionists on the other side of the Schism.
The Protestant journals, for their part, had entrenched themselves firmly in the
pro-Loyalist camp from the beginning and served as its rather vocal champions. These
defenders of the Spanish government were active in dismissing denunciations of

70

radicalism (most especially that of communism) as being the dominant factor in the
Popular Front. Rather, they insisted upon the government's adherence to the so-called
―liberal tradition‖ but still retained some vague notions of the almost Marxist inevitability
of the conflict in Spain. On the other hand, they were quite as active in casting stones at
the rightist insurgency, which they denounced as being a malicious fascist combine, only
made possible through the connivance of Italy, Germany, and the authoritarian Roman
Catholic Church. Here, amongst the Protestant papers, there seemed to be a curious
mixture of wishing to be the most in line with the spirit (anti-clerical) Left, which might
have allow them to justify their own proclivities to heap abuse upon the Church.
Whatever the case might have been for either side, there would be printed in July
of that year a certain pivotal document, a joint pastoral letter from the ranking members
of the Spanish Catholic hierarchy. This missive would not be recognized by any of these
Christian publications until late August, but it would soon serve as the impetus for a new,
albeit brief, phase of discussion of the Spanish Civil War in religious press of the United
States, a phase of discussion centering around an unique conception of religion.158
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Chapter 2: ―A Species of Religious War‖
Autumn-Winter, 1937
The ―American Civil Religion‖ and the
Public Climax of the Catholic-Protestant Discourse on the Spanish Civil War
―Well, there's somethin' else to turn to and its just as good as religion. I refer to patriotism. That ain't played
out. Not only has it not played out; its organized for you just as neatly as religion was when people were
still religious. Not as many units and individuals, but a better organization than the church ever was. It's
better because it can use pressure as well as propaganda to put itself over.‖ 159

I.
However vehement the disagreement had been between American Catholics and
Protestants in respect to their fundamentally irreconcilable interpretations of the civil war
in Spain, the waning months of 1937 would witness a dramatic episode that would
demonstrate the passionate sincerity of commitment with which each Christian faction
defended its perspective on the Spanish conflagration. Up to that time, the developing
interdenominational dispute over the distant conflict had been relatively muted by virtue
of it being essentially relegated to the variously diverse organs of the nation's religious
press. That comfortable distance from the secular outlets of the news media would be
significantly reduced beginning in September, 1937 and would continue through October
of that year; thereafter, the Catholic-Protestant debate would once again become almost
totally submerged into its accustomed milieu of denominationally-oriented publications.
What lends this specific affair its remarkable peculiarity lies in the fact that it took
shape within the distinguished pages of the New York Times and thereby provided a wider
reading public with an intimate snapshot of the uncompromising ideological duel even
159
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then developing between two distinct blocs of the American Christian intelligentsia. Such
a prestigious and widely-circulated platform provided each side with the opportunity to
enunciate the arguments they had been formulating in relation to the bloodshed in Spain
since the inception of the rightist rebellion in July, 1936 and the subsequent eruption of
civil war in that country. Furthermore, it is compelling that both the Catholics and
Protestants took exceptional care in their published missives to conflate their respective
sentiments regarding either of the belligerent coalitions in Spain with particular reference
to the ―liberal-democratic tradition,‖ or what might otherwise be delineated as the
―American civil religion.‖
Here, of course, one must address what is meant by ―civil religion,‖ specifically as
it applies to the United States. It must first be understood that this concept is distinctly
sociological in its origin and rather flexible, if not nebulous, in its definition. One might,
however, cite the religious and cultural scholar W. Herberg as a primary historiographical
progenitor of the theory. He writes that ―civil religion‖ in the United States is the
enshrinement of the so-called ―American Way of Life,‖ a certain category of civic faith
held implicitly in common by the nation's citizenry, which tends to operate as a unifying
force.160 The primary determinant of this peculiar dogma of Americanism, Herberg
further emphasizes, is the intensely romantic and idealistic notion of the immortal
struggle of democratic liberty against the tyranny of arbitrary authority.161
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R. N. Bellah, moreover, has earned recognition as another definitive promulgator
of the theoretical principle of the American ―civil religion.‖ In an article from latter 1977,
he posited broadly that:
―...there are...certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of
Americans share. These have played a crucial role in the development of American
institutions and still provide a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life,
including the political sphere. This public religious dimension is expressed by a set of
beliefs, symbols, and rituals...‖162
Bellah further asserted that the sacral lore and iconography of the American Revolution
represents perhaps the deepest fount of this supposed ―civil religion,‖ which has
contributed to a shared national experience that is: ―...genuinely American,‖ having ―...its
own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred places, its own
solemn rituals and symbols.‖163
It follows, then, that such a ―creed of Americanism‖ in the United States would be
primarily constructed upon a highly romanticized (indeed, pseudo-religious) history of all
that which contributed to the roiling ferment of ideological passion at the nation's
conception—which could further be defined as a sort of legitimizing ―origin myth.‖
Indeed, one need not reach far to identify the underlying legendary trappings in the
American ―civil religion.‖ The prophets, heroes, and saints of the American myth would
certainly be the righteously rebellious Founding Fathers, the Continental Congress and
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Army. The mortal victims of the repression of the Crown, most notably those fatally
wounded in the so-called ―Boston Massacre‖ of 1770, could correspondingly fill the
―religious‖ role of the martyred dead. Likewise, the signing of the Declaration of
Independence (itself a ―holy‖ American text) in 1776, General George Washington's bitter
encampment at Valley Forge in the Winter of 1777-1778, and the fateful Siege of
Yorktown in 1781 all serve similar ―religious‖ functions. Such factors, perhaps,
compound to form a sense of a common national doctrine of civic faith or, as Bellah
writes, ―...the civil religion is...a genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent
religious reality as seen in or...as revealed through the experience of the American
people,‖164 which ―serve[s] as a genuine vehicle of national religious selfunderstanding.‖165
With this essentialist definition in hand, it might now be posited that, at least in
part, it was through this unique prism of the ―American civil religion‖ that the Catholic
and Protestant factions in the United States had come to observe the unfolding events of
the civil war in distant Spain. It seems as if, by the autumn of 1937, either
denominational bloc had determined, whether consciously or not, to interpret the highly
politicized conflict in the familiar context of their own nation's formative revolutionary
experience and ideological traditions, the fundamental essence of ―Americanness.‖
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II.
The clearest evidence to suggest such a phenomenon might be found across three
specific, denominationally-oriented articles featured prominently in the New York Times
between 3 September, 1937 and 14 October, 1937. This short series of articles laid bare
the intensity of a curious religious segment of the antagonisms wrought in the United
States by the Spanish Civil War, wherein both Catholics and Protestants publicly and
most fully integrated their arguments with the principles of the national ―civil religion.‖
The most remarkable feature of these opinion pieces is that they illustrate, in a
general sense, how certain groupings of concerned Americans projected themselves into
the Spanish trenches based upon lines of religious fidelity. Moreover, the pro-Nationalist
Catholics and their pro-Loyalist rivals, as reflected in the contributions to their press
organs, imbued their respective factions in Spain with the most heady, enlightened
principles which energized the American Revolution, the so-called ―Spirit of 1776.‖
Furthermore, these uncompromisingly sectarian letters positively overflow with
acrimonious trans-factional denunciations. Either camp accused its opponent of
lamentable political irresponsibility (if not gross political illiteracy) and essential moral
bankruptcy for supporting the ostensibly ―wrong‖ combatant alliance in the Spanish
conflict. Such charges naturally lent themselves to mutually opposing indictments
suggesting the deplorable American character and ideological extremism of one side
against the other.
This highly publicized episode of the theretofore obscured clash within the
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American religious press between Catholics and Protestants began to take shape as the
war raged into the summer of 1937. On 1 July of that year, a number of the upper Spanish
Catholic hierarchy issued a joint pastoral letter to the effect of justifying the position of
the Church in relation to the civil war. It would be reprinted in the New York Times on 3
September, 1937, ultimately becoming the catalyst for the intensification of the
denominational dispute in the United States; moreover, it would serve to encourage the
discussion of the American ―civil religion‖ in the context of the Spanish Civil War.
This piece must first be noted for its length, being in excess of a full page. The
mere fact that it received such a substantial amount of space in what can certainly be
nominated as a premier American publication suggests that a great deal of
contemporaneous importance had been attached to it. Yet one must also question,
however unprofitably, why there had been a delay of two months between the letter's
original publication abroad and the date at which it appeared in the columns of the Times.
Whatever the case may have been, one must next recognize the editorial introduction to
the letter, which stated that it represented the ―...official and authoritative Catholic
position with regard to the war in Spain‖ by virtue of it being ―...signed by two Cardinals
six Archbishops, thirty-five Bishops, and five Vicars Capitular.‖166
Given the prestigious ecclesiastical background of the letter's signatories and the
generally discomfiting experiences of the Spanish Church since the founding of the
Second Republic, it should be of little surprise that this clerical interpretation accentuated
166

―Text of Pastoral Letter Signed by Spanish Prelates Justifying Franco Rebellion,‖ New York Times,
September 3, 1937, 4-5.

77

the religious dynamic of the conflict. Rather than identifying the war as a product of
exploded political, social, and economic tensions, the prelates referred to it primarily as a
kind of modern holy war, a ―...decisive struggle for or against the religion of Christ and
Christian civilization.‖167 Indeed, the prelates expended a great deal of space in
enumerating the radical attacks mounted against the Church by the Republican
government—ostensibly an insufferable series of heinous crimes that had been ongoing
since 1931. While the hierarchs asserted that the organs of Spanish Catholicism had acted
in the properly submissive manner toward the legally-constituted political authority in the
interest of the national weal, they also wrote that the forces of secularizing liberalism
offered no quarter to the Church and her orders, and had acted determinedly to abolish
the ancient rights. To the clergymen, this perfectly encapsulated the unreasoning and
uncompromising hatred of the Faith by the political Left. In response to the virulence of
Republican anti-clericalism, they further claimed to have expressed their disagreement
with the government through peaceful protest, for they believed that such a direction
represented a potentially fatal deviation away from the traditional union of the Faith with
the functions of temporal government in Spain.168
Though the electoral mechanisms of the Republic provided for the ascent of a
conservative administration (as aligned beneath the banner of G. Robles' CEDA coalition)
after November, 1933, the prelates emphasized that the threat embodied by the militant
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forces of the Left had not been ameliorated. In fact, their letter suggested that the political
frustrations of the Left had left it sullen and seething. Over time, the danger from that end
of the political spectrum compounded, reaching its essential apex as the diverse factions
of the Left unified in a pact of mutual solidarity—the Popular Front. Aligned thus, the
Left managed to secure the general elections of February, 1936. To the clerics, however,
this novel political confederation had triumphed at the ballot box only through fraud,
intimidation, and violence. Moreover, the Popular Front represented little more than a
puppet to certain ―...hidden powers which controlled its functions,‖ a rather thinly veiled
reference to the Communist International and the Kremlin.169 Therefore, Catholic
authorities insisted that the legality of the government existed only in name, and that the
Popular Front stood merely as a mirage to conceal the sinister collusion between the
Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España, PCE), its allies, and the Soviet
Union. Naturally, they wrote, this conspiracy had been carefully designed to maneuver
the nation into position for positioning the nation for a sanguinary Marxist revolution
with the ultimate aim of shifting governmental power from an ―irresponsible autocracy of
a parliament‖ toward ―a more terrible one of a dictatorship without roots in the nation.‖170
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According to this ―authoritative‖ Catholic interpretation the military uprising in
July, 1936 should have been lauded, in spite of the terrible civil war it wrought. The
hierarchs wrote that even as the former failed to attain its immediate objective and the
latter took shape, the looming prospect of wholesale revolutionary upheaval had been
mercifully preempted, at least partially quelling the attendant Red terror that would have
moved to extinguish the torch of Christian civilization in Spain for all time. They
believed that such a claim found ample justification in light of the breathtaking number of
sacrilegious outrages committed against the Church throughout the reign of the Popular
Front and the course of the war.171
And yet, it would have likely been interpreted as highly unseemly if
representatives of this transnational, ostensibly peaceful Christian institution asserted so
openly belligerent a position. Even while the signatories affirmed the righteousness of the
Nationalist cause in the defense of the Faith, traditionalism, and sound government, they
also contended that they did not wish for the war and, indeed, lamented it. However, they
believed that the fury of war could sometimes act as a facilitator of peace, for ―...war...[is]
yet sometimes the only remedy for replacing things on the center of the pivot of justice
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and bringing them back to the Kingdom of Peace.‖172 And, to this end:
―...the Church, even while she is the daughter of the Prince of Peace, has blessed the
emblems of war, has founded the military orders, and has organized the Crusades against
the enemies of the Faith.‖173
One need not dwell on this statement, for it is readily apparent that the clergymen
had already delineated the Republic (or, perhaps more specifically, the Popular Front and
its Loyalists) as the ―enemy of the Faith,‖ the principal target of a cleansing ―Crusade‖
for the purpose of replacing the nation ―on the center of the pivot of justice.‖ This
―center‖ could have been fairly interpreted by any critical audience to suggest an
aggressive return to a more traditional and authoritarian Spain, with the former temporal
powers and privileges of the Church restored unto her. Through this argument, then, the
clerics would have certainly appeared to have married the religious elements of their
supposed holy war with the broader, more mundane socio-political aspects of the
struggle.
Even as these members of the Spanish hierarchy clearly emphasized the conflict
as a necessarily Christian campaign against the savage throngs of Marxist infidels, they
also posited that the war had been required to correct a dire political imbalance in Spain.
Indeed, they insisted that the rebellion represented the popular will given martial form, a
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natural manifestation of the mass murmurings of the dissatisfied and disillusioned
citizenry. The rightist insurgency stood as a ―civil-military movement,‖ an ―armed
plebiscite‖ and, in so being, actually demonstrated unimpeachable loyalty to the liberal
ideals of popular government. Therefore, the Nationalist coalition embodied the only
truly patriotic spirit of modern Spain, essentially reflecting the traditionalist impulses of
the general public, which simultaneously harmonized with the ―historical essence of
Spain.‖174
For all the support lent to the counter-revolutionary Right, the representatives of
the Spanish Church also seemed to have had some reservations against fully committing
to the cause of the Nationalists, for:
―...[it] has not been able to identify herself with [the] conduct, tendencies, or intentions
which at the present time or in the future might be able to distort the character of the
national movement, its origins, manifestations, and ends.‖175
Moreover, the clerics urged prudence from the leaders of the insurgency—specifically in
that when the time came to establish a new regime in peaceful Spain, that:
―...they [would] not accept foreign models for the structure of the future of the State, but
that they [would] consider the requirements of the national life from within, and the
course marked by past centuries.‖176
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September 3, 1937, 4-5.
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Given their highly privileged vantage point, these two statements probably
indicate that the clergy felt at least a certain degree of apprehension in respect to the
rebelling faction. That they were not willing to more forthrightly express such any such
misgivings regarding their ostensible defenders should be obvious. Whatever the case, it
seems that their not unfounded concerns were twofold. First, while the prelates' letter
underscored the crimes of the Republic against the Faith and the atrocities that followed
the ascent of the Popular Front, there remained the unsettling reality that the Nationalists,
especially their Moorish auxiliaries, could be unnecessarily cruel and bloodthirsty.
Yet again, for the seeming double-mindedness on this first point, the ecclesiastical
statement partially reversed direction and claimed that if any unseemly or barbaric
conduct could have been attributed to the Nationalist camp, then it had been essentially
defensive in nature—an unfortunately necessary countermeasure against a guileful and
merciless foe.177
Considering their second statement, the clergymen apparently had cause to worry
that the Nationalists, pending their victory, might unduly impose some alien system of
governance upon the nation, something hazardously foreign to the traditions and
historical essence of Spain. Such a reference hearkened to the reality of the rather
substantial Italian and German intervention on behalf of the Nationalist upstarts: the
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September 3, 1937, 4-5.
Antony Beevor writes that the ―Nationalists justified the brutality of their repression as reprisals for the
red terror...but the subsequent nationalist killings exceeded those of the left several, if not many, times
over.‖ (93)

83

Spanish prelates seemed to have feared, as did international observers, that the rebels had
become so beholden to their benefactors that a triumphant Nationalist Spain would have
been essentially forced into a humiliating state of vassalage, if not puppetry, to the Fascist
and National Socialist regimes. Once again, a critical audience might have interpreted
this position as being one that embraces authoritarianism—albeit in form thoroughly
Catholic in its conception and execution, as dictated by ―the course of past centuries.‖178
The signatories concluded their apostolic letter with a prayer that the passionate
hatreds rampant in Spain might be dampened, and for the love of Christ to be restored for
the sake of sanity, justice, and order. In the meantime, however, they stressed the
necessity of Catholic solidarity, primarily through the steadfast adherence to the line they
had established by ―watching over the Catholic press and propaganda, rectifying the
mistakes of that which is indifferent or adverse.‖179
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―Text of Pastoral Letter Signed by Spanish Prelates Justifying Franco Rebellion,‖ New York Times,
September 3, 1937, 4-5.
Alpert's A New International History of the Spanish Civil War deals exclusively with topics of this
nature: in France and Great Britain, there were understandable worries that a German- and Italianbacked ―fascist‖ victory in Spain would upset international politics and the strategic balance of Europe.
Similarly, Tierney's FDR and the Spanish Civil War details the evolution of Roosevelt's understanding
that a ―fascist‖ Spain could serve as a springboard through which such rightist extremism could
penetrate into the Western Hemisphere.
―Text of Pastoral Letter Signed by Spanish Prelates Justifying Franco Rebellion,‖ New York Times,
September 3, 1937, 4-5
To this effect, has has been demonstrated, many American Catholic periodicals had performed
admirably, and would continue to do so until the end of the civil war in Spain.
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III.
The Spanish hierarchs' letter, following its rather belated publication in the United
States, floated about unanswered for approximately one month. Then, on 4 October,
1937, a group of some 150 assorted American Protestant clergymen and laypersons—
educators, literary figures, and sundry—issued a vitriolic (and, perhaps, presumptuous)
challenge in the New York Times to the Spanish prelates and, by an immediately obvious
extension, their Catholic brethren in the United States. Therein, one might find one of the
very few significant instances of the secular publicization of the Catholic-Protestant
debate on the American ―civil religion‖ as it related to the Spanish Civil War.
In their reply to the Spanish hierarchy, the Protestant signatories dismissed out of
hand the interpretative notion of the distant conflict as any sort of holy war or Crusade;
rather, they diagnosed the war as being one borne of long-festering political, social, and
economic tensions within that unhappy nation. Furthermore, they asserted their profound
disquiet that ranking officials of the Spanish Church would attempt to justify a military
insurrection against a legally-constituted democratic government to the world at large, all
for the ostensible purpose of defending the worst sort of regressive traditions of the
establishmentarian Roman Catholic Church.
As such, the Protestants' missive denounced the Spanish clergy for its
unapologetically reactionary position, which offended a number of the fundamental
components of the American experiment (or, perhaps, certain tenets of the liberaldemocratic tradition that act as the infrastructure for the national ―civil religion‖): ―[the]
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principle [of] democratic institutions, the freedom of worship, and separation of church
and State.‖180 These Protestants felt so strongly about the socio-political stance adopted
by the Spanish Church that they condemned it as being an essentially medieval entity—
thus the mortal enemy not only of the Republic and the Popular Front, but also of the core
precepts of liberalism and parliamentary government in general. They reviled this
―authoritative‖ position of Spanish Catholicism, holding it aloft to demonstrate it as being
singly representative of a hopelessly obscurantist worldview; indeed, they found it
―...hard to believe that [it] was written in the twentieth century.‖181
Further lambasting the Spanish clerics, the Protestants reiterated the prelates' own
assertion that following the legal incorporation of the Second Republic in 1931, the
Spanish Church had dutifully bent the knee to the secular authorities of a dawning
political regime. Then, expressing mock puzzlement, they wondered why the Catholic
position had been so thoroughly reversed after the elections of 1936. Essentially leveling
an accusation of rank duplicity and cynical opportunism against the Spanish hierarchy,
the Protestants queried that if the Church had truly honored the democratic mechanisms
of the Republic, why had she rallied to the banner of an unseemly coalition of
seditionaries which fomented open rebellion with the express intent of usurping the
power of the duly constituted government administration of the Popular Front? This was
180
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―Open Letter in Reply to Spanish Hierarchy's Recent Views of War,‖ New York Times, October 4, 1937,
12.
Ibid.
Similarly, Guttman cites the words of the Pope Pius IX, in which the Vatican condemned the Republic,
even from its inception in 1931, of anti-religious animosity in that the ―...separation of Church and State
[was] a 'serious...and particularly repugnant error' in Spain 'where the Church has always and rightly
held the most important... and active part in legislation...and public institutions.'‖ (33)

86

considered to be doubly heinous in that the Church had conspicuously lauded the election
results of 1933, after which the political pendulum in Spain swung heavily toward the
traditionalist Right.182
Thereby, the Protestants declared, this ―authoritative‖ stance of the Spanish clerics
could only be interpreted as a malignant sally against the fundamental ideals and
institutions of liberal democracy, and also as a naked expression of longing for a
wholesale return to the Church's preeminent position of worldly power in Spain, with all
its attendant privileges restored. They found further cause for dismay in the hierarchy's
assertion that the rebellion represented an ―armed plebiscite‖ of the Spanish people—for
if this were to be accepted as truth, would it have not also been just to describe the
Moorish, German, and Italian ancillary forces supporting the Nationalists as ―imported
voters?‖183 Indeed, though the mainline Catholic position never hesitated to illuminate
and condemn Soviet intervention in the civil war (and not to mention the ostensible
international communist conspiracy embodied in the Popular Front), it consistently
ignored, evaded, or dismissed the embarrassing complication of the collaborative
relationship shared between Nationalist Spain and the two ―fascist‖ behemoths of the
182
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―Open Letter in Reply to Spanish Hierarchy's Recent Views of War,‖ New York Times, October 4, 1937,
12.
See Thomas (Chapter 8, 64-73), Bolloten (8) for the developing political troubles between 1932 and
1933 and the temporary rise of a traditionalist-conservative, if not reactionary, government under the
heavily Catholic CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas).
―Open Letter in Reply to Spanish Hierarchy's Recent Views of War,‖ New York Times, October 4, 1937,
12.
Indeed, as the rebellion began in Spanish Morocco, much of the initial composition of the Nationalist
forces was made up of Moorish troops; see Part Three of Beevor's work for a discussion on how the
civil war mutated into an international proxy war, with contingents of Soviet, Fascist, National
Socialist, and other miscellaneous contingents of internationalists ultimately coming to participate in the
Spanish struggle.
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Continent.
According to the Protestants, these elements coalesced as certain ranking clerical
officials of the Spanish Catholic Church stated that their support of the rightist insurgency
emerged from their interpretation of the movement as being a defensive maneuver, a
preventative measure from having the nation shift from the ―irresponsible autocracy of a
parliament‖ toward ―a more terrible one of a dictatorship without roots in the nation.‖184
Naturally, the Protestant's challenge subscribed to the logic that such a statement would
imply that the only fitting form of autocracy or dictatorship for Spain would be one with
roots in the nation—that is, one defined by a traditionalist and authoritarian power
structure, reinforced by a virile military apparatus, the unassailable moral authority of the
Roman Catholic Church, and so forth.
To the citizenry of the United States, presumedly inculcated in their peculiar ―civil
religion,‖ such an condemnatory interpretation of the stand taken by eminent Catholic
ecclesiastics would certainly seem to reflect a base contempt for the basic criteria of
enlightened, liberal democracy. However, for this self-appointed group of Protestant
prosecutors, the problem of the Catholic position on Spain ran far deeper. They worried
whether the Spanish hierarchy spoke merely for itself, or if it echoed the enshrouded
sentiments of the governing authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, as directed from
the resplendent halls of the Vatican. Might, they further reasoned, the clerical leadership
184
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of the Church in the United States hold a similar degree of disdain for the institutions of
liberalism and popular government? Could the American Catholic hierarchy and
priesthood have the ability to leverage moral or spiritual suasion over their collective
flock to inculcate and entrench such a point of view? They believed this to be a plausible
scenario with a reasonable basis for alarm, for during the approximate month after the
publication of the prelates' letter, no detectable voices from the estate of American
Catholicism had raised the hue and cry of incredulity against their Spanish coreligionists.185
Concluding their response, the Protestants expressed their profound regret that the
issue of religion had been dragged into the fray by the Spanish clerics, especially when
the true battle in Spain could so obviously be delineated as one between the avatars of
progressivism and democracy versus those of reactionary elitism, if not militaristic
fascism. While lamenting the meteoric upsurge of popular anti-clerical (as opposed to
simply anti-religious) violence mounted against the Church in Spain, they regarded the
scenario as almost unavoidable—implying that such acute suffering had been the just
reaping for a centuries-old tradition of institutionalized reaction. Regardless, the
representative Protestants believed that it had been quite unfortunate that the Spanish
hierarchy had situated itself on the ―wrong‖ side of the conflict, and that the official
position of the Church in that country had unflinchingly expressed ―...contempt [for the]
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―Open Letter in Reply to Spanish Hierarchy's Recent Views of War,‖ New York Times, October 4, 1937,
12.
See also Traina (178-185).
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principles that are precious to the heritage of the American people.‖186
This concluding statement, then, might be fairly nominated as an interpretation of
the Spanish war through the lens of the American ―civil religion,‖ as it seemed to evoke
certain ―sacred‖ tenets of Americanism—particularly those which have been thought to
have propelled the course of the nation's Revolutionary past and endured to define its
enduring politico-cultural ideology. As such, the concerned Protestants seem to have
rallied to the ostensibly democratic ideals which they believed to have been the animating
force behind the Republic—rather than attempting to present any sort of comprehensive
defense of the beleaguered government administration itself. On the other hand, they did
not hesitate to place the the Spanish Catholic Church alongside the selfsame forces of
tyranny against which the American revolutionaries of generations past had waged a war
of liberation. And, to this effect, the Protestant signatories seem to have offered a
challenge to the Catholics of the United States to establish a case in defense of their own
righteous adherence to the unspoken precepts of ―Americanism.‖
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IV.
A mere ten days after the publication of the American Protestants' open letter, a
group of some 175 American Catholic clergymen and miscellaneous laypersons issued a
bitter riposte, again published in the New York Times. Prior to scrutinizing the content
therein, it must be noted that this bloc, ostensibly representative of American Catholicism
as a whole, could not countenance being upstaged by the assailants of their denomination,
and so assembled twenty-five more signatories for the purpose of strengthening their
retaliatory missive. Moreover, they seemed particularly interested in ensuring that only
the very best and brightest of the American Catholic intelligentsia, the opinion-shapers of
their sect, signed the document. Indeed, their list of signatories includes over twenty
presidents and deans from numerous American universities, colleges, and seminaries, an
approximate number of individuals occupying professorial posts, and, in an amazing
display of professional solidarity, nearly eighty editors and managers of Catholic
publications from all around the nation.
While their response dwelt briefly upon the primarily religious interpretation of
the conflict, as originally established by their Spanish brethren, they also felt a natural
compulsion to pick up the gauntlet of ―Americanism,‖ which had seemingly been cast at
the feet of American Catholicism by their Protestant countrymen. Herein one might
discern a continuation—and even and intensification—of the quarrelsome domestic
discourse on the ―civil religion‖ of the United States in respect to the civil war in Spain.
Positing that the Spanish strife had been grossly misrepresented, these Catholics
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insisted emphatically that the general understanding thereof had been perverted by the
non-Catholic American press through a pronounced lack of anything even remotely
resembling an objective, adequately nuanced presentation of the conflict. Naturally, such
a charge indicted both the the secular and Protestant presses on the count of open
partisanship in favor of the Republican Loyalist cause. Given the dominant influence of
these (rather generalized) presses, it had become an unfortunate contemporary reality that
the balance of the American public had been induced ―...to favor the Madrid government
and to condemn outright those who were immediately designated as rebels.‖187 They
argued that the dynamics of the struggle had been rendered more glaringly apparent as
the war raged into the latter half of 1937, and that therein had been created an opportunity
for a genuine reappraisal of either belligerent coalition then active in Spain.
Striking at the vital center of the issue, these select Catholics immediately declared their
support for the Spanish Nationalists, heralding the rightist alliance as the collective
champion of ―civic and religious freedom for all men.‖188
Wasting neither space nor ink, this formidable group of eminent Catholics
immediately registered their profound disgust with the statement issued to their suffering
Spanish coreligionists from the camp of American Protestantism. They not only
denounced the contrarian interpretation of the contest in Spain as misinformed and
irresponsible, but further accused the Protestants of malicious intent, in that their position
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―...[had] also tended to create a species of religious war in the United States.‖189 While
obviously a tremendous exaggeration of the rhetorical skirmishes in which the conflicting
denominations of American Christianity had engaged over the Spanish Civil War, such an
assertive comment evidences the depth of passion that the debate had engendered in this
supposedly representative section of the American Catholic intelligentsia. In any event,
the counter-response sought to defend the essential consonance of Roman Catholicism
with the principles of ―Americanism,‖ while simultaneously challenging the ostensible
foes of the Church with a similar volley of searching criticism.
In reality, the Catholics believed that the test had been put to their denominational
antagonists. How, they demanded, could these self-appointed delegates of American
Protestantism endorse a governmental regime that had been founded upon the
predominant participation of dangerously radical socialist, communist, and anarchosyndicalist elements, and which further had actively pursued a relentless campaign of
anti-Christian persecution since its fraudulent ascent in February, 1936. How, in short,
could American Protestantism ―...champion a regime that [had] consistently violated in
theory and in practice the fundamental principles of liberty and democracy guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States?‖190
After having thus established such a framework, which obviously incorporated a
number of the elements critical to the infrastructure of the American ―civil religion,‖ the
Catholic clergymen reinforced the argumentative foundation previously established by
189
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their Spanish brethren. Namely, they reaffirmed that the Nationalist uprising represented
a justifiable strike against the malevolent forces of Bolshevism and anarchism, as
embodied in the Popular Front coalition. Although the Catholics' rejoinder tended to
disregard certain inconvenient, anti-democratic statements made by the Spanish
hierarchy, it nevertheless attempted to inject a certain element of ―Americanism.‖ Indeed,
they insisted that the treacherous conspiracy impelling the Popular Front government
sought only to usurp the liberty afforded to the people of Spain by the institutions of the
Second Republic. To that effect, the Catholics seized upon the prelates' declaration of the
insurgency as an ―armed plebiscite,‖ and applauded it as being in keeping with the most
noble principles of the American revolutionary experience:
―The citizens of Spain...were justified by the right of self-defense in rising up against a
malign power that was surely and inevitably destroying their country. Those who would
deny them the exercise of this inalienable right would with equal logic have denied to the
American people in 1776 the exercise of their inalienable right to rebel in arms against a
government which suppressed their liberties.‖191
Here the Catholic signatories obviously attempted to craft a thematic corollary
between the American War of Independence and the Spanish Civil War. To complete this
dramatic narrative of interpretation—however curious it may have been—one needed to
substitute the patriotic thirteen colonies with Nationalist Spain to fill the role of the
protagonist; similarly, the villainous British Empire had to be replaced by the Popular
Front (with, of course, the ―imperial‖ might of the Soviet Union lurking just behind it).
However, the Catholics did not attempt to overburden this image. To have done so would
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have necessitated the portrayal of Soviet intervention and the Loyalists' deployment of
the Comintern's International Brigades as essentially ―Hessian‖ in complexion; yet that
would have perhaps suggested the troubling notion of leaving the heroic roles of the
Marquis de Lafayette and the Baron von Steuben to Fascist Italy and National Socialist
Germany.
Yet, for this heightened exposition on the heady precepts and ―sacred‖
iconography of Revolutionary America (or, rather, on the national ―civil religion‖), the
representatives of American Catholicism could not seem to totally escape from the
religiously-oriented interpretative framework established by their Spanish counterparts.
Citing the words of Paul Claudel, former French ambassador to the United States, they
posited that:
―It is impossible to understand the Spanish Revolution...unless one sees it not as an
attempt at social construction as in Russia, with the idea of substitution one order for the
other, but an enterprise of destruction, long prepared and guided, particularly against the
Church.‖192
As had the Spanish Catholics before them, the Americans strongly emphasized the
elements of early Republican anti-clerical secularism, which had metamorphosed into
repressive anti-religious brutality under the auspices of the communist-directed Popular
Front.
However, while their sentiments definitely echoed those of the Spanish hierarchy,
even a cursory reading of the American Catholics' letter would suggest that they
recognized a great deal more importance in the ideological frameworks then conflicting
192
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in Spain. This may have been, of course, a defensive maneuver against the Protestants'
broadside; after all, the Catholics necessarily had to marshal their counter-arguments on
the rhetorical battlefield of their adversary's choosing. Whatever the case, they concluded
by brooking absolutely no compromise with their opponents. They did not waver in their
conviction that the administration of the Popular Front stood as a perverse Soviet
connivance and that the Loyalist military apparatus represented the vanguard of a
revolutionary Red Army for the pending Bolshevization of Spain. Meanwhile, the
Nationalists exemplified the patriotic cause of God and Country, the insuperable will of
the Spanish people, as transmitted through the anguished plea of the valiant prelates of
the Church. Collectively, theirs betokened the true spirit of liberty then struggling to
emerge in Spain, for the Nationalists championed:
―...the principles enunciated by George Washington and the founders of the American
Republic and embodied in our democratic laws and institutions: the freedom to worship
God in peace, freedom to educate one's children according to the dictates of one's
conscience, freedom from the interference and tyranny of foreign States and alien
agitators.‖193
Any potential analyses of the American Catholics' response notwithstanding, one
must acknowledge that the Protestants did not invoke the iconography of the national
―civil religion‖ to nearly this extent. Whether culling forth these ―sacred‖ principles
demonstrated either the fundamental strength or weakness of their contextual translation
of the Spanish turmoil is, again, a matter of individual interpretation.
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V.
Brief in duration though it may have been, the series of articles which appeared in
the columns of the New York Times in Autumn, 1937 must have served to inform the
general reading public as to the intensity (if not the mere existence) of this contemporary
denominational conflict in the United States. Meanwhile, this peculiar war of words
continued apace in the pages of the various organs of the nation's religious press.
Even as the Spanish prelates' appeal passed before the eyes of the American
public for the first time on 3 September, 1937, the respected Catholic publication
Commonweal, published a brief editorial on the controversial topic of the Spanish war.
This particular piece discusses the position of Cardinal Isidro Gomá y Tomás, the
Archbishop of Toledo and the Primate of Spain—certainly the highest-ranking member of
the Catholic clergy to survive the violent anti-religious campaign in that troubled country.
Gomá y Tomás, in adhering to the Catholic interpretative line, emphatically denied that
the struggle in Spain had anything to do with the competing tyrannies of atheistic
communism versus totalitarian communism. Rather, the war stood as the crucial modern
struggle between antithetical civilizations, the first tilt of the final duel between the
spiritual bankruptcy of Marxist materialism on the one hand, and the redeeming grace of
Christianity on the other. Leaving no question in respect his prejudices, the Primate
situated himself firmly within the Nationalist camp, those so-called ―fascists‖ who
wielded the holy sword in the name of most Catholic Spain.
Closing on a note of tempered frustration, this article confirmed that the opinions
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of Gomá y Tomás represented the authoritative Catholic position in Spain, at least as far
as hierarchical preeminence had been concerned. And, being such, Commonweal believed
that the Primate's irreproachable word should have contributed to the general efforts of
the Catholic press to awaken the American public to the true dimensions of the war in
Spain.194
Only by the next week's issue, however, did Commonweal recognize the
existence, to say nothing of the importance, of the Spanish clerics' missive. The newssheet restated the arguments set forth in the prelates' letter: that the Church had in no wise
been culpable in fomenting the war, that the Church faced a malevolent opponent who
sought to occasion its extinction, that the Nationalist revolt had been a preemptive
measure against an impending Marxist revolution, and so forth.195 When taken together
with the previous editorial, the discussion of this, the truly ―authoritative‖ Catholic
position on the Spanish strife could only have served to sharpen the sense of rectitude
entertained by some of the more zealous Catholic elements in the United States.
Indeed: as in Commonweal, so in America. By 11 September, 1937, this weekly
newspaper noted that the Vatican had afforded de facto recognition—and therefore moral
subscription—to the legitimacy of the cause of Nationalist Spain. Its editorial staff also
acknowledged the existence of the joint pastoral letter and further insisted upon the
document's significance as the only reasoned, dignified (and ostensibly truthful)
statement to have emerged in respect to the Spanish conflict. To that effect, the paper
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insisted that the dictates of conscience should require every responsible thinking
American to review and contemplate the clerics' missive.196 It hardly needs to be stated
that America obviously believed that this plaintive letter from distant Spain would serve
to win more American supporters to the pro-Nationalist camp.
Presumably, hardline Catholic publications like America would have liked to have
seen a greater prevalence of opinion like that demonstrated by one A. F. McGovern,
whose letter saw publication in the 17 September edition of Commonweal. He wrote of
the Spanish Loyalists and their international supporters as being not unlike the pro-British
Loyalists and their Tory masters in the American Revolution: that is, of course, those who
stood as the enemies of the true cause of liberty. Meanwhile, the Spanish insurgents, in
spiritual consonance with the bygone American upstarts, represented the side of
intelligence and dignity, of God and Country—with Franco as their man-on-horseback,
their twentieth-century Washington. As freighted with elements of the national ―civil
religion‖ as this sentiment might have been, McGovern still partially leaned upon the
clerical insistence that the Spanish Civil War stood as a fundamentally religious conflict
between the competing civilizations of communism and Christianity.197
This particular facet of the Catholic argument found more support in an article
entitled ―Further Processes in Spanish Sovietization‖ in America. The author believed
that no true Christian soul who also bent the knee before the altar of democracy should
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either condone or support the Loyalist cause—Moscow's most obvious marionette in the
international communist conspiracy against the Faith in the pursuit of global ascendency
for its heretical creed. Contrarily, the article denounces the oft-repeated calumniation
against the Church for situating herself amidst the ―fascists.‖ Returning to the Spanish
clerics' assertion, the author reiterates that the Church's alliance with Nationalists had first
been borne from the necessity of self-preservation; nevertheless, the Church had come to
recognize and bless the banners of the insurgents, those crusaders for God and Country.198
Though the September, 1937 edition of the Sign did not (or more likely had been
unable to) acknowledge the appearance of the Spanish prelates' appeal, it remained in
lockstep with its sister publications. As to the Nationalist movement, of course, the
magazine retained the uniform Catholic stance of it being the champion of the spirit of
Christian civilization and humanitarianism.199 For the ostensible respectability of Loyalist
cause based upon its ―anti-fascist‖ credentials, as asserted by many non-Catholic
publications, the editorial staff of the Sign had little patience. Rather, they believed (not
without justification) that the aegis of ―anti-fascism‖ could be extended to cover a
veritable menagerie of non-rightist political affiliations, but that the whole apparatus
stood definitively as a contrivance for the international expansion of communist
influence. Moreover, as universally inclusive as the general anti-fascist movement
pretended to be, it would not suffer the membership of any elements even remotely
critical of the Soviet Union or of communism in general. And as for the charges leveled
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by the anti-fascist camp against the Roman Catholic Church for her supposed sympathy
with militaristic fascism, this same editorial stated plainly that it had merely been
exploited as a convenient outlet for virulent anti-Catholic prejudice.200
Almost as if to punctuate the collective sum arguments offered by the disparate
Catholic publications in the Autumn of 1937, the September edition of the Sign also
featured a curious article, essentially approximating a contemporary ―human interest‖
story. Entitled ―Two Funerals,‖ and penned by noted foreign correspondent W. P. Carney,
this piece purported to tell the story of one E. M. Alonso, a physician who had been
dragooned into medical service at the front with the Loyalist forces. Although he had
initially been an ardent supporter of the Republic and the Popular Front, the doctor
apparently grew disgusted with the routine nature of violent revolutionary intemperance
that attended the Loyalist cause. Despairing at the prospect of any sort of rational system
of governance emerging from the anarchic Left, and living in perpetual fear of being
denounced as a covert ―fascist‖ agent for his inability to save more ―anti-fascist‖ lives,
Alonso stole into Nationalist territory where he could breathe more freely.201
This story, to be sure, has a certain ring of authenticity, given the range of welldocumented excesses perpetrated by radical leftist elements throughout the war. On the
other hand, a close reading of this version of the refugee's tale—it having been reported
by a foreign journalist, and therefore hearsay—might seem to raise suspicions against its
almost too-neat formulation as a microcosmic glimpse into the supposedly unrelenting
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and irredeemable sadism of the whole of the Loyalist camp. Perhaps, indeed, such
suspicions might be carried to the point where one would probably not be too far afield in
attributing to this testimonial certain echoing qualities more generally applied to the
sensationalist propaganda, the ―atrocity stories‖ of the Great War. Whatever the case, this
textual recreation Alonso's harrowing experience served to accentuate without
discrimination the generic characteristics of frothy-mouthed radicalism that ostensibly
animated the Loyalist coalition opposite the supposedly stainless dignity of the
Nationalist movement.
By the following month's issue, however, the Sign acknowledged the appearance
of the Spanish prelates' letter and duly lent it credence as the resounding voice of
Catholic Spain. Commenting likewise, the magazine's editorial staff underwrote the
justice of the Nationalist uprising as in accordance with Catholic orthodoxy on the
grounds of ―resisting an unjust aggressor,‖ in this case being a defiant reflex to stand
against the forces aligned against Christian civilization itself.202
This wholly Christian ―Spirit of the New Spain,‖ indeed, had been what certain of
the magazine's correspondents had believed to be the motivating force behind the
Nationalist movement. Catherine de Hueck, for example, wrote of her extended visit to
insurgent Spain and found there a nation in arms, battling for deliverance for itself and
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for all Christendom. While the author admitted that a certain degree of blame for the
conflict could be laid at the doorstep of the overly regressive conservative elements of
Spain, she nevertheless insisted, in typical Catholic fashion, upon the Nationalist bloc as
being representative of the very best of the nation. De Hueck wrote that the movement
stood as the only instrument that could effectively offset the designs Red Moscow had for
Spain. Further, Franco's proposed system of governance—the supposedly benign,
ambiguously Fascist-like ―corporate state‖—would stand as an iron bulwark against
future communist encroachment into Western Christendom. And, perhaps seeking to allay
the fears of those unconvinced by the Catholic interpretation of the Spanish scene, the
author sought to assure her audience that the underlying complexion of the Nationalists'
political ideology did not draw nearly so much influence from either the Italian or
German variants of totalitarian nationalism as had been so anxiously suggested by other
contemporary observers.203
America, too, maintained this pattern into October, 1937, even if it did seem to
contradict the general ―non-fascist‖ interpretation of Franco's rebels held by other
American Catholic publications. Earlier that autumn, the paper had dispatched a
correspondent to Nationalist Spain, one N. Belmonte, who had secured an audience with
Generalissimo Franco himself. Truly a notable accomplishment, the interview provided
America with what could only be interpreted as the authoritative justification for the
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rising, coming as it did from the very fount of the movement. As had the Spanish prelates
before him, Franco established his staunchly pro-Republican credentials and insisted
upon his belief that it had never been the province of the Spanish military apparatus to
entangle itself in the wranglings of the political arena. However, as the misruled Republic
careened toward anarchy—most particularly after the Popular Front, clearly a Soviet
manufacture with revolutionary intentions, had acquired power—a natural caveat against
that apolitical conviction had been found. Thus the reasoning followed that the
insurrection Franco inherited stood as a campaign to rescue a nation wallowing in the
sanguinary chaos instigated by Red provocateurs bent on executing the will of a certain
hostile foreign power.204
Interestingly enough, Belmonte's article indicated that Franco offered little, if any,
indication of battling on behalf of the Faith against the great Satan of Moscow; with her,
rather, he dwelt upon the political interpretations of the struggle. To the Nationalist
chieftain, the battle for dominance of Spain primarily represented a chapter in the mortal
struggle of civilization against the ill-bred barbarity of rootless Marxism. Secondarily, of
course, the war stood a fight to save the nation from the bottommost depths of acute and
destructive disorder. To this end, his cause had been forced to accept succor from
whichever hands had offered it, but in no wise did that mean that Spain would become an
outpost of the contemporary regimes in either Italy or Germany. Indeed, Franco asserted
that his victory would preserve and restore the ―heritage of Spain‖ foremost, though that
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objective would necessitate the establishment of a temporary military dictatorship as the
immediate precursor to what he labeled an authoritarian ―corporate state.‖205
As October began to wane, both America and Commonweal began to couple their
blandishments of Franco's movement with outraged incredulity over the Protestants' reply
to the Spanish pastoral letter. Commonweal, with measured sobriety, indicated that such
an inflammatory response merely demonstrated that those Protestant leaders who had
affixed their names to the offending document had been ―thoroughly and completely
hoodwinked on the real issues of the Spanish Civil War.‖206
Meanwhile, America reacted with more marked severity. In its turn, the paper
demanded answers from the 150 signatories and pondered whether the opinion expressed
in the open letter represented the wider attitudes of the whole of American Protestantism
in respect to the conflict in Spain and to the Catholic Church. If this were true, remarked
the editorial staff, then it could be put down as yet another episode in the sordid legacy of
anti-Catholic bigotry in the United States, and would further tarnish the ideals of
tolerance and the liberty of conscience for which the nation ostensibly stood. And, like
Commonweal before it, the editorial staff of America stated that the true significance of
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the war, the ―real issues‖ of the contest which had so totally escaped the Protestants,
could be summarized as a question of communism versus Christianity, of tyranny versus
civilization.207
Responding similarly, the following month's issue of Sign opened with a scathing
editorial invective from the pen of Father T. Maguire against the Protestants' open letter.
While first accusing the signatories of being possessed of a not altogether unexpected
strain of putrid anti-Catholic bigotry, the author leveled the charge of their being, at the
very least, co-opted dupes of the insidious Red propaganda machine; for all their sallies
against the alleged excesses of the Nationalist insurgency, the Protestants had little but
adulation for the ―democratic‖ Loyalist coalition while ignoring its obvious domination
by dangerous revolutionary elements. According to the author's interpretation, what
should have been considered as the most concerning aspect of the Protestants' statement,
endorsed as it had been by leading figures on that side of the schism, was the impression
it gave of ―reveal[ing] the value in which Protestant clergymen...hold their religion.‖208
And, furthermore, that the Protestants:
―...[were] of the pure-blooded American type who bubble over with patriotic fervor at the
mention of our American Revolution. They imply that it was glorious to revolt against
taxation without representation. But they are amazed and alarmed that men should resort
to arms to protect their civil and religious liberties and their most cherished
institutions.‖209
207
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A contemporary issue of America featured a piece of correspondence the reinforced the questions asked
by Maguire—namely whether or not the Protestants' letter stood as representative of the whole of
American Protestantism. In closing, the letter quotes the words of Christ to respond to the seeming
apostasy of the Protestants over their stance against the Church in Spain: ―These people honor Me with
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From a militantly Catholic perspective, these could hardly be considered to be
unfair charges—especially as the Church in Spain had ostensibly been targeted for
liquidation on the orders of a reprehensible governmental regime, which pretended to
liberal democracy while in reality being a Soviet construct, a device in the hands of
communists and anarchists to further the cause of world atheism. From that assumption,
then, it would not be a difficult leap to assume that in their declaring solidarity with the
Loyalist cause, the Protestants were siding with the swelling forces of anti-religion. In
fact, Maguire elucidated such a train of logic against the Protestants, lamenting that while
―they [had] definitely and publicly committed themselves,‖ such a revelation carried the
benefit demonstrating to observant American Catholics that American Protestantism (or,
more realistically, some vague and unquantified segment of it) could not be counted upon
as allies in the monumental struggle of Faith against Godlessness.210
J. A. Toomey, writing for America, believed very much like his colleague from
Sign, although he sensed a kind of larger, communist-directed propaganda conspiracy in
the American press that extended far beyond the Protestants' volley against the Spanish
prelates and seemed willing, even eager, to assign the status of victim to the Catholic
Church in the United States and around the world. For his part, the author specifically
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For an interesting opinion on the supposed anti-Catholic bigotry of American Protestantism, ostensibly
amplified as a result of the civil war in Spain, see America (4 December, 1937, 202-203). The author,
actually a Protestant, wrote that virulent radicalism had steadily risen in the Protestant intelligentsia,
that their creed had been infused with pro-communist sympathies which, as a result, had become
increasingly anti-Catholic—nearly to the point of excusing the butchery of the Church altogether.
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nominated the case of what he considered to be the unjustified and unjustifiable
misrepresentation of the civil war in Spain and the rough treatment afforded to the
ancient Church in that unhappy country by the several organs of the American media.
Though the press had delivered innumerable thrusts against the Church for its support of
the rebellion (which, after all, had been conceived as the only way to forestall the
―reddening of Spain‖), it had worked tirelessly to dilute public notions of unseemly
radicalism within the Popular Front and to render the Loyalist enterprise more palatable
by portraying the coalition as being made up entirely of respectable, freedom-loving
democratic republicans.211 Either the unwitting participation or outright complicity of
sections of the American press in this vast and insidious plot, Toomey contended, only
furthered the determined march of uncompromising atheism that had been violently
dismantling the Faith in Spain, but that the latent power of the Catholic laity could be
leveraged to redirect the press onto the path of righteousness.212
Especially among its contemporaries, America could not seem to let the dust from
the inter-denominational duel settle. Rather, the editorial hierarchy of the publication and
its contributors seemed more keen than ever to flog away at the eternal bogeyman of
communism, both as it existed in the United States and abroad. For example, the
remaining weeks of November, 1937 featured editorials and articles on such subjects as:
211
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This must also be considered alongside a piece of correspondence that later appeared in America which
asserted that it was grossly improper to accuse the entire non-Catholic American press apparatus of
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Loyalist Madrid's red-festooned commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the
October Revolution, the return of two treasonable International Brigadiers from Spain,
the attitude of disgust on the part of prominent American socialist leader and POUM
sympathizer S. Baron in respect to his investigation of communist domination and
manipulation of the Loyalist cause, and the entrance of a Popular Front organization onto
the American political scene in the form of the Farmer-Labor Party.213
As 1937 entered into its final month, there appeared to be something of a slight
decrease in the focus on the Spanish conflict amongst the Catholic publications, though
each featured small pieces in respect to it. One such article in Commonweal, for instance,
discussed the circulation of carefully tailored Loyalist propaganda in the United States,
which originated from the respective Red commissariat of Barcelona (and, one would
assume, from those situated in Madrid and Valencia), and which, in turn, issued forth
from the Republican embassy in Washington and from more subterranean outlets. Of
course, from the contemporary interpretation of the inflexible Catholic partisan, any such
pro-Loyalist literature, regardless of how it might be attired in the raiment of liberal
democracy, could by then only be interpreted as a component of the massive Soviet
conspiracy to sow misinformation and engender bewilderment—for the task of the
propagandist is to lie and to lie in enormity—as a method to foment or stoke
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revolutionary crises.214
Most alarming to certain contributors to America appeared to be the seeming
reality that such devious propaganda actually found a substantial degree of resonance
with the middle class intelligentsia, the natural defenders of liberalism. This being more
particularly true if the propaganda erected romantic analogies linking the American
Revolution and the contemporary ―war of Independence‖ in Spain, and most especially
true if it also bore heavily implications that all those who did not support the Loyalists in
the struggle against reactionary tyranny were scarcely liberal democrats, but were
actually fascist in their sympathies—an odious charge no good liberal could abide,
making him or her a far easier target to manipulate by radical agitators.215
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VI.
Differentiated by theological sectarianism though it may have been, this
representative section of contemporary American Protestantism remained wholly
unsympathetic to the Catholic position in respect to the Spanish Civil War, even if some
of the organs of the generalized Protestant press had been slow to recognize the
significance of the Spanish hierarchs' appeal.
Remarkable amongst its contemporaries, in fact, the Christian Leader
demonstrated an acuity lacking among its other contemporary publications. A mere day
after the appearance of the Spanish prelates' letter in the New York Times, the paper
printed an article concerning what the author, one G. Seldes, believed to be the
intertwined factors of fascism and religion in the civil war. Scarcely bothering to veil his
sentiment, the author had little but disdain for what he believed to be the proclivity of a
certain Christian denomination to arouse unnecessary parochial division over the
specious question of religion as it pertained to the conflict. Indeed, he wondered whether
the famous dictum of Samuel Johnson might be amended to substitute ―religion‖ for
―patriotism‖ as being the last true refuge of the scoundrel. After a trip to six various
European nations, Seldes came away with the impression that the lines between progress
and reaction were starkly drawn across the water; meanwhile, ―...America is the only
country...where a war whose causes are social and economic has been turned by
obscurantists into a religious issue.‖216
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While clearly a broadside against the hierarchy of the Spanish Catholic Church
(and probably those who subscribed to the claims made in their missive), the author's
attack also went on to emphatically deny that any truth whatsoever existed in the prelates'
position that the Popular Front government existed only as a formality to disguise
communist domination, or that the real seat of Republican power lay within the walls of
the Kremlin. Yet on the other hand, Seldes wrote that little complexity existed in the
Nationalist rebellion: it stood exposed as a naked attack on democracy, a bid made by the
forces of backwardness to establish a fascist (or perhaps fascist-esque) state or, at the
very least, one grounded in reactionary traditionalism.217 By this, one could reasonably
infer that by this he merely meant Catholicism.
Secondly, he wrote that the reports of atrocities against the Church had been
systematically exaggerated without denying the essential reality of violence perpetrated
against the Church. Rather, he denied charges that such violence existed as an
immediately contemporaneous phenomenon and insisted that such incidents had an
ancient tradition in Spain, very often erupting from socio-economic frustrations of the
lower classes and its conception that the established Church represented a substantial
contributor to their eternal submersion. In any event, wrote Seldes, the outbursts of
violence could be attributed to mostly isolated incidents of mob action executed by the
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irresponsible radical fanatics beyond the control of the government in the chaos which
followed the uprising. The same could not be said to be true of Franco's movement,
which the author wrote as having acted with precise considerations to inflict brutality.218
Seldes concluded his article by emphasizing that the chief antagonists of the true
spirit of modern Spain were the twinned evils of medieval clericalism and militarism, and
that the thinking Catholics of Europe had come to the realization that the Spanish conflict
represented not a war of religion, but rather an episode in the class struggle—and that the
Spanish Church had betrayed her secret trust and had aligned with the forces of black
reaction and militaristic fascism for purely self-interested reasons.219
The Christian Century, for its part, did not acknowledge the Spanish hierarchs'
letter until nearly the end of September, 1937. Characteristically, the Protestants of this
―undenominational‖ periodical hurled stones at the statement, denouncing it as grossly
misrepresentative and deliberately untruthful, particularly in its portrayal of Republican
Spain as being nothing but an instrument of Moscow, while none dwelt in the rebel camp
but saints and patriots. This, the editorial asserted, stood as definitive proof of the
reactionary tendencies of the Catholic Church in Spain, born of a jealous love of privilege
and power that had been inculcated over centuries. Concluding on a vaguely threatening
note, the Century promised something almost like an authoritative response from the hold
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of American Protestantism.220
In the meantime, however, this paper focused on emphasizing that the continued
Nationalist triumphs in Spain, particularly the seizure of the valuable port of Santander in
northern Spain, had been achieved only through force of Italian arms.221 Similarly, the
editorial staff continued to nurture their then-ingrained habit of worrying that the war in
Spain had the potential to ignite a larger conflict. Specifically, it had been not
unreasonably posited that because the Nationalists' totalitarian allies had risked a great
deal and had already incurred substantial expense to ensure the victory of the insurgent
Right in Spain that they would risk a general war before suffering a potentially
devastating loss of prestige by reneging on their Spanish commitments. This could be
considered to be no less plausible because rumors also flew that they had been promised
certain economic and territorial concessions from Franco, pending his victory.222
As to the idea of the American ―civil religion‖ or the ―liberal-democratic
tradition,‖ as it developed in the discourse of the Spanish crisis, the final September
edition of Christian Century featured an article on the ―Tragedy of Spain,‖ wherein the
author discribed his journey to the traditional ―backwater of Europe,‖ but there he
discovered a new Spain being constructed by a romantic, ill-disciplined, but nevertheless
―great-hearted‖ people.223 The author expressed great sympathy for the democratic
people's revolution of the Left in Spain, locked as it was in mortal battle against the
220
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historically repressive oligarchy of the degenerate and obsolete aristocracy, the military
officer corps, and the high Church (itself being the most noxious of the offenders).
Though admitting that the Loyalist coalition included a not insubstantial communist
presence, the author insisted that Spanish communists had never been of the Bolshevik
brood, and that they had renounced their revolutionary imperatives in favor of
statesmanlike cooperation within the Republican political infrastructure. Finally waxing
romantic, the author wrote that the struggle of Spain represented a continuation of the
strife-wrought heritage of democracy and independence, a legacy reaching back to those
heady days of 1776, 1789, and even unto 1917.224
By the following month, Seldes's article, ―Spain Fights Fascism, Not Religion,‖
previously featured in the 4 September issue of the Christian Leader had been reprinted
in the Christian Evangelist. Adding only the subtitle ―Some Facts for Misled Americans,‖
the reappearance of the article in unaltered form probably served as a convenient,
agreeable way for the editorial staff of the publication to acknowledge the prelates' letter
and might also be interpreted, in however slight a way, as a small glimmer of the essential
solidarity of Protestant opinion in relation to the Spanish war.225
More rounded than Seldes's sentiment, however, was that of R. T. House, who
commented on Spain's ―holy war‖ in the 6 October issue of Christian Century. Rather
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than taking sides in what had clearly become a passionate issue, even in the United
States, the author wrote that partisanship had blinded supporters of their respective sides'
shortcomings. Catholics believed that God had spoken in Spain and that the rebels wore
blessed armor in a modern crusade; liberals and radicals, for their part, seemed eager to
swallow leftist propaganda and to dismiss the questionable conduct (if not organized
sadism) of the Loyalist factions as a necessary evil in the fight against reaction, itself a
kind of holy war. House argued that if cold light of disinterested reasoning were applied
to the belligerent factions active in Spain, then the moral allies of both sides would be
forced to realize that precious little justice existed in either, and that Loyalists and
Nationalists alike heartily deserved condemnation.226
Several miscellaneous articles regarding the war in Spain aside, very little
mention of the Protestants' reply to the Spanish hierarchy or, indeed, of the Catholics
counter-riposte to the Protestants' thrust could be found in these columns of the Protestant
press. The 13 October edition of Christian Century merely mentioned in passing the
appearance of the letter signed by the 150, assigning responsibility for the tract to G. E.
Shipler, editor of the Churchman, an Episcopalian fortnightly. Otherwise, this mention
simply reiterated the editorial position that the Church in Spain only had itself to blame
for the particularly violent iteration of contemporary Spanish anti-clericalism. Agreeing,
the 16 October issue of the Christian Leader commented likewise.227 Addressing the
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publication of the American Catholic response, the Christian Century would only merely
acknowledge its publication briefly and summarize its content thus: Catholic luminaries
charged Protestants of merely rehashing irresponsible charges made against the Spanish
Church that had been thoroughly discredited and they had grown concerned that
American Protestantism had sided with a Red-hued regime grounded in and committed to
diabolical heresy.228
During the final two months of 1937, the substantive volume of pieces
specifically relating to the Spanish Civil War (and, indeed, to that autumn's public
eruption of the Americanized Catholic-Protestant discourse) dwindled slightly in these
representative Protestant publications. However, these papers continued to feature items
which actively criticized what their contributors interpreted as the pro-fascist proclivities
of the Roman Catholic Church and other miscellaneous fear-mongers of the anticommunist stripe.229
In fact, the Christian Century featured no real articles on the Spanish crisis during
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the month of November, merely brief editorials lamenting the continued ineffectiveness
of the Non-Intervention Committee, summarily reporting this institutional condition as
working for the exclusive benefit of the insurgent faction and its foreign abettors,
however certain other participant nations might be discomfited by this reality.230 S. E. G.
Priestley, writer for the Christian Leader, wholly agreed with such sentiments, adding
that Italian and German involvement in the civil war did not necessarily come from a
genuine sense of fascist or ―anti-communist‖ solidarity with the Spanish rebels, but rather
out of the knowledge that the conflict could be leveraged as a pressure point for coercive
negotiations with both France and Great Britain.231 The editorial staff for this publication
evidently thought this to be a reasonable scenario, and furthermore warned that it could
hold dire consequences in the immediate future. Specifically concerned about the nations
of South America, the Leader held that the ostensible crusade of ―anti-communism,‖ so
readily trumpeted by the Spanish rebels and their totalitarian allies could easily encourage
the intrepid little tyrants of that continent to hoist hastily-sewn white banners and await
international fascist assistance to install and entrench unwelcome fascist or reactionary
regimes in the Western Hemisphere.232
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Editorial commentary on the international dimensions of the war aside, however,
there were some reverberations of the inter-denominational debate in the Protestant press;
some even revisited the theme of the ―civil religion.‖ For example, the 9 December issue
of the Christian Evangelist briefly discussed the findings of J. T. Whitaker, special
correspondent to the Chicago Daily News. On a journey into Nationalist Spain, the
journalist discussed the conflict with a officer on Franco's staff who, in marshaling
chilling language of the fascist variety, advocated a policy of extermination in Spain.
According to this solider, up to one-third of the Spanish population (in fact all those
―rats‖ who sympathized with the Republic) would, for the sake of necessity, be ground
beneath the wheel of this great political culling to ensure that control of the country
passed forevermore into the hands of the ―right people.‖ While this, too, has something of
the ring of ―atrocity stories‖ from the Great War, the commentator from the Evangelist
interpreted it with marked seriousness:
―This officer, if he had lived in 1776, would have talked about the 'rats of Valley Forge'
and would have argued for their extermination. Americans who sympathize with Franco
are the lineal descendants of the Tories who sabotaged Washington and supported
Benedict Arnold. If the people who voted for a republic in Spain are rodents, their
opponents might well be characterized under a familiar species of the feline family which
has a more or less malodorous reputation.‖233
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interestingly illustrates it, between St. George and the Dragon.
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Finally, then, and as a parting shot to the Roman Catholic Church for the year
1937, the Christian Century printed an article entitled ―the Catholic Heresy‖ by K. P.
Reinhold Niebuhr, the eminent theologian and intellectual. In this piece, the author
lambasted the Church, stating particularly that it had become ―daily more apparent that
the Catholic Church [had] cast it lot with fascistic policies.‖234 Furthermore, he mocked
the justification with this moral alignment of one of the world's great religious institutions
with fascism on the grounds that the alternative extremism, communism, meant to
destroy religion entirely. To Niebuhr, such reasoning had severe structural weaknesses.
He questioned whether the stated anti-religious ethic of communism should be
considered any worse than the intention of fascism to opportunistically co-opt religion,
particularly the Christian faith, force it to submit to party discipline, and bastardize it to
the point of essential nihility.
In this piece, the author specifically selected the Spanish Church and its hierarchy
as being the most obviously guilty of this ―Catholic heresy,‖ which he defined as the selfrepresentation of the Church as being the infallible, Earth-bound manifestation of the
Kingdom of God when, in reality, it remained a thoroughly human institution—and
therefore susceptible to all manner of human failings. In the case of Spain, for example,
Niebuhr cited that the Church in that country had traditionally indulged in temporal
selfishness, nurturing intimate connections with the ruling class of a rigid feudal social
order as it had. And, with respect to the prelates' missive, he echoed the opinion voiced in
234

Reinhold Niebuhr, ―The Catholic Heresy,‖ The Christian Century, 8 December, 1937, 1524-1525.
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the Protestants' open letter of October by writing that it never seemed to have occurred to
the Spanish hierarchs that the profanation of the Church did not necessarily come from a
place of Marxist-inspired anti-religious hatred. Rather, perhaps lacking imagination, they
never considered the possibility that such violent passion against the Church might have
been the expression of the common Spaniard against what he identified as the human
organization that had been historically allied with the forces of oppression.235
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Ibid.
This article quickly shifts from being a screed against the Roman Catholic Church to being a celebration
of liberal Protestantism, which the author considered to be the only bulwark against totalitarianism,
including the spiritual totalitarianism of the Vatican—though admitting that Protestantism did have its
own set of faults. Furthermore, Niebuhr's article would receive a response in the following week's
edition of the Century (―The Protestant Heresy,‖ 15 December, 1937, 1550-1552). This piece would,
however, focus more on what its author perceived to be the arrogance of Protestantism, which the
Spanish Civil War had only elevated to new heights of sanctimoniousness.
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VII.
There ended the discourse on the Spanish Civil War in these but few diverse
organs of the American Christian press for the year 1937. The evidence presented above
would seem to indicate that as the flames of conflict continued to consume unhappy
Spain, the dimensions of the war mounted to almost bewildering complexity, especially
to foreign observers—and particularly to those in the United States. Facing an
increasingly incomprehensible scenario of ―internationalized‖ civil strife in a foreign
land, certain segments of the American public (distinguished, in this case, by
denominational affiliations) came forward with contrasting interpretative frameworks
with which either side attempted to cast the Spanish war in more familiar, or
―Americanized,‖ terms. These separate models were predicated upon what might be
described as the American ―civil religion,‖ that peculiar litany of all that is ―sacred‖ to the
experience of the United States as a revolutionary experiment and as a democratic
republic. In fairness to both factions, both American Catholics and Protestants were able
to marshal relatively well-crafted and effective, though overly emotional and
unreasonably idealized, arguments for their chosen avatars in the war based upon their
congruence with the ideals of ―Americanness.‖ In other words: always were the
Nationalists or the Loyalists, according to their respective champions, represented as
being the inheritors of the most noble tradition of the revolutionaries of 1776, while their
antagonists were billed as the contemporary incarnation of immortal tyranny. Always
were the Nationalists or the Loyalists, according to their respective champions, fighting
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the good fight of liberty, of democracy, and of common decency. And so forth.
One can, of course, indicate the appearance of the Spanish prelates' missive in the
New York Times, belated in appearance though it may have been, as being the catalyst for
this phenomenon and the subsequent Catholic-Protestant debate that it inspired within the
columns of the same eminent national publication. Shortly thereafter, however, this interdenominational conversation reverted its erstwhile channel of the religious press, where
editors and contributors were content to hurl stones at one another. All this did, perhaps,
was to exacerbate and intensify the inter-denominational discourse on the significance of
the civil war in Spain, producing a great deal of heat and smoke, but little light as to the
actual truths of the struggle or the justice of either belligerent coalition. Both American
Catholics and Protestants, by the end of 1937, merely continued to talk past each other to
the effect of contributing to the spinning of tires in an essentially undifferentiated morass
of facts and opinions, conjecture and reality.
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Chapter 3: ―The Tyranny of Semantics‖
Early Winter, 1938 – Summer, 1939
The Denouement of the Spanish Civil War and the
Last Considerations of the Catholic-Protestant Dialog in the United States
―...Fallacy creeps in when a word comes to stand for an ill-defined object, or for a loose generalization, or
for an abstraction that is not recognized as one, or for an object or concept blurred or obscured by an
emotional coloration or an established reaction pattern that has become inseparable from the word.
...Having decided that communism—or fascism—is a hideous monster ready to devour civilization, we
have a convenient label by which to damn any other program that seems objectionable. 236

I.
From the rise of the Leftist Popular Front government in Spain and the subsequent
inception of the Nationalist insurgency in 1936, the desperate conflict in that country had
been a crucial topic of passionate discussion in the American Christian press. However,
throughout 1938 and into 1939, the Spanish Civil War began to fade in importance in the
American Christian press.237
The reasons for this relative de-emphasis on the dramatic Spanish struggle are at
once multifarious, and yet simple. In the estimation of the respective staffs of these
papers and their contributors, Spain had by that time ceased to be the critical arena of
Europe. Indeed, it seems as if they believed that if a general war had not broken out over
the Spanish question by the time the war approached its second anniversary, it was not
likely to at all. During this period of time, of course, the Continent experienced other
emergent issues which were considered to be much more pressing and which held more
236
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―The Tyranny of Semantics,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 9 March, 1939, 296-297.
As will be demonstrated below, this phenomenon would be far more remarkable in the columns of the
representatives of the American Protestant press.
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potential to become flashpoints. For example: the general expansion of Hitler's Reich
with the Anschluss, the crisis over the Czech Sudetenland, the capitulation at Munich, the
German seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, Italy's invasion of Albania, the
escalation of European rearmament, and, finally, the rumblings over the Polish issue, and
so forth.238
And yet, even though there would be somewhat less content on the Spanish Civil
War than there had been previously, these Catholic and Protestant newspapers would, by
and large, maintain their partisan fidelities on the befogged conflict as it was fought to its
bitter conclusion, and as it continued to demonstrate the comparable evils of both sides
and, indeed, the ultimate evil of modern warfare itself.239
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S. E. Gerard Priestley, ―Watchmen, What of 1938?,‖ The Christian Leader, 1 January, 1939, 22-23.
―The Predicament of Peace,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 9 February, 1939, 168-170.
To the Protestant papers particularly, the expansion of Hitler's Germany was construed as incremental
steps toward his covetous goal of the Soviet Ukraine lebensraum, as laid out in Mein Kampf. More so
than the Catholic journals, the Protestant publications would exhibit a keen interest in East Asian affairs,
for Protestant missionary efforts were increasingly imperiled by Japanese aggression.
See, amongst innumerable others:
Lewis S. C. Smyth, ―Aggression Pays No Dividends,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 2 June, 1938,
616-617.
M. Searle Bates, ―Searle Bates Describes Nanking Under Japanese,‖ The Christian Evengelist, 2 June,
1938, 625.
Though again peripheral to the emphasis of this study, this period was marked by continued bewildered
disappointment on the part of the Protestant papers for what they considered to be the vain selfimmolation of the Soviet experiment as Stalin's continued his purge, destroying the ―Old Guard‖ of the
Revolution and many of its best, most talented minds. Many contributors began to more frankly
question whether that country had ever really been the friend of liberty and democracy, especially as it
seemed to them that the ―Stalinist Constitution‖ was a farce and that the elections of 1937 had been a
rigged affair and an unqualified travesty.
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II.
For their part, the Protestant newspapers seemed to appreciate, however
grudgingly, that by 1938, the shadows were lengthening for the Spanish Republic after
Franco's Nationalist movement formally established a civil government, but most
especially after his brilliant Teruel offensive, which penetrated to the blue waters of the
Mediterranean, summarily cutting the remainder of Republican territory in two. In the
opinion of the staff of the Christian Century, the success of Franco's military maneuvers
had only been made possible through a fresh surge of aid from his unscrupulous allies.240
At the same time, however, the Spanish Civil War had begun to recede as the flashpoint
for all Europe and, accordingly, these papers began investing more attention in the
successive crises faced by the Continent as they arose, most of which were instigated by
Germany, and, furthermore, those created in East Asia by the ambitions of Japan.241 The
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―Franco Gets New Help for Quick Drive to Victory,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 6 April, 1938,
420.
―Loyalist Spain Split by Franco,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 27 April, 1938, 516.
Otherwise, this paper would report that while the insurgency had formed a governmental cabinet, it
contained little but ―fascist‖ representatives, and Franco retained dictatorial control. Still more
ominously, said cabinet included a position for a ―minister of corporations,‖ which seemed to have been
inspired by Italy's corporative Fascism. Finally, Franco's government had made it a priority to cultivate
relations with the Vatican, presumably being an indicator as to the future relations between Church and
State in Spain.
―Insurgent Spain Sets up a Civil Government,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 16 February, 1938,
197.
―Spanish War Enters Final Phase,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 30 March, 1938, 388-389.
―The Predicament of Peace,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 9 February, 1938, 168-170.
Jean Beaven Abernethy, ―Is Youth to Be Betrayed Again?,‖ The Christian Century, 2 March, 1938,
271-272.
―Which Way to Peace,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 24 March, 1938, 335-336.
Particularly concerning about these two evils (and, to an extent, including the Spanish war itself),
according to these journals was the increasingly hard-line attitude taken by some citizens, even to the
point of their urging for the immediate revision of American neutrality laws—in respect to the war in
Spain, the leveling of crippling economic sanctions against the ―aggressor nations‖ and their allies, and
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essence of this decrease in the interest in the developments in Spain might be best
embodied in a piece authored by one S. E. G. Priestley, who offered in early 1938 that
―with the Spanish Civil War gradually ceasing to contain the potential causes of a major
world crisis...Europe looks with anxiety and fear at the gathering clouds which hang
heavy and dark over Central Europe.‖242
Indeed, 1938 would not be long advanced in days before these Protestant
publications were reporting on the latest Hitlerian triumph: the annexation of Austria, his
homeland, into the greater Reich. To the Christian Century, it seemed as if the
―Bohemian corporal,‖ already bestriding Europe, would ride his cresting wave on to new
victories, and that it seemed likely that Czechoslovakia would be his next objective. Yet,
on the other hand, the staff of this paper also believed that such limitless expansion would
not be tolerated, especially by Great Britain—for German domination of the mainland
would have been as abhorrent to British authorities as would Italian suzerainty over the
Mediterranean. The latter of these two fears the Century held to be a potentiality, pending
the conclusion of the Spanish conflict in the favor of Franco's Nationalists.243
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even isolated suggestions of outright military intervention.
S. E. Gerard Priestley, ―Thunder over the Danube,‖ The Christian Leader, 15 January, 1938, 75-76.
This author would be rather prescient in his concerns for what fresh crises 1938 might yield, including
the then-emerging issue of the German-Austrian Anschluss and the potential danger posed by the
question of the Sudetenland. He also predicted the diminishing international power of London and
Paris.
―The Day of the Dictators, editorial, The Christian Century, 2 March, 1938, 262-263.
See also:
―Hitler Would Destroy Nations to Build a Racial Empire,‖editorial, The Christian Century,
9 March, 1938, 292-293.
―Europe Picks Up the Pieces,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 9 March, 1938, 293-294.
―Hitler over Europe,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 17 March, 1938, 310.
―Herr Hitler Promised,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 19 March, 1938, 355.
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Not long after the Anschluss, these few papers began to worry over Hitler's next
target. One I. Domonkos, writing for the Christian Leader, suggested the multi-ethnic
muddle of Czechoslovakia as the primary candidate for victimhood. In this case, the
author wrote that however wildly the dictator might gesticulate in his harangues that all
those of German blood deserved to live on German soil, his true aim in what then seemed
to be his intention to undermine Czechoslovakian territorial sovereignty was his desire to
obtain the valuable industrial infrastructure of that country to further expand his war
machine.244
Yet, despite the unquestionable de-escalation of the international primacy of the
contest in Spain, these Protestant publications continued to express interest in it for the
same reasons that had been established during the previous months, primarily in that a
sister democracy faced destruction and an innocent people enslavement under a ―fascist‖
regime—and that it had been to the eternal shame of the free world that it had not aided
Spain in her hour of greatest need.245 While this period would feature comparably little
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―Europe's Master,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 23 March, 1938, 358-359.
John C. de Wilde, ―Austria: a Summary and Forecast,‖ The Christian Leader, 2 April, 1938, 435-436.
Imre Domonkos, ―Hitler over Czechoslovakia,‖ The Christian Leader, 2 April, 1938, 432-433.
See also:
―Notes from the Nofrontier News Service: Hitler's Next Move,‖ editorial, in The Christian Leader,
4 June, 1939, 722.
This second piece wondered whether the next blow from the German hammer would fall upon a
bewildered France, or if it would be another step in the so-called Drang nach Osten. Yet another
comment from the Leader would opine that Hungary might be the next nation to be assimilated into the
emerging Nazi empire.
―Among the Nations: What Next in Hungary?,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 11 June, 1938, 753.
Indeed, their conviction that fascism represented the greatest danger to civilization would only be
reinforced during the coming months. And although a portion of the commentators would stand firm
upon their twinned positions of neutrality and non-intervention, there would be a growing bloc of
opinion that held that the time had come to confront the fascist and militarist brigands of Europe and
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discussion on the merits of the embattled Leftist government of Spain, or, indeed, the
progress of the war itself, these newspapers at least managed to produce glowing reviews
of the ongoing relief efforts in that country administered by (Protestant) American
organizations, even if they only dealt with the programs established in what little
remained of the Republic.246
But where these newspapers could no longer offer positive comment on the
prospects for ―their side,‖ they could at least find solace in attacking the Roman Catholic
Church on the question of its commitment to the ―democratic tradition.‖ Again, one must
take this position to have been one adopted in response to what appeared to be American
Catholics' uncompromisingly pro-Nationalist position on the Spanish war, which had
been thoroughly couched in anti-communist sentiment. The Christian Leader would
attempt to shame the American branch of the Church and its Roman authorities for its
attempt to ―[do its] level best to convince the American people that the government of
Spain is 'dangerous' and that lovers of liberty should show their sympathy and support to
Franco,‖ as he apparently stood as a defender of Christendom against the encroaching
blight of communism.247 While this editorial comment would fairly recognized that
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Alfred C. and Mary W. Jones, ―War Relief in Spain,‖ The Christian Leader, 5 February, 1938, 179-181.
Interest in this topic would more precisely focus upon the seemingly insoluble problem of the mass of
wretched refugees who had, in fleeing from the undulating battle lines, greatly overburdened the
capacity of the government and various relief organizations to feed, clothe, and otherwise care for them.
―Democracy in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 19 February, 1938, 228-229.
A later piece would further discuss ―Spanish Church Politics,‖ in which J. L. Davies had apparently
discovered that, according to a certain Spanish Catholic catechism, it had been delineated as a ―mortal
sin‖ to vote liberal.
―Notes from the Nofrontier News Service: Spanish Church Politics,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader,
19 March, 1938, 368.
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neither belligerent faction held any true claim to absolute virtue, and acknowledged that
there certainly existed an element of undesirable radicalism within the Loyalist camp, it
nevertheless asserted that the cause of the Spanish government more closely represented
the ideals enunciated in the American Declaration of Independence, a definite echo of the
―civil religion‖ debate of the previous year. 248 Whatever the actual attitudes of the
various branches of the Roman Catholic Church, its clergy, and its faithful, such anticommunist militancy, of course, would be interpreted by these weeklies as veiled
sympathy for fascism. An assessment of this sort, while somewhat sensational, might be
considered reasonable, for from the earliest days of his post-Great War political activism,
Mussolini's own platform had strongly emphasized anti-communism.
Assuming thus, S. H. Fritchman, writing for the Christian Leader would
summarily denounce this perceived relationship between a generalized ideology of
fascism and the Church as ludicrous and impossible to maintain for, at the bottom of the
matter, ―fascism and Christianity [could not] combine.‖249 Not only did organized
religion require an atmosphere of freedom, which fascism totally denied its subjects, but
the ideology also sought to bring glory unto itself by way of the sword, a practice
contrary to Christian teachings. Further commentary by contributors to the Leader would
offer that in no wise could any good Christian soul countenance the inhumane tactics
employed by the Spanish Nationalists, that ostensibly Catholic-fascist combine, which
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Ibid.
Stephen H. Fritchman, ―Fascism and Christianity Cannot Combine,‖ The Christian Leader,
5 February, 1938, 175.
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included the aerial bombardment of defenseless civilian centers.250
In spite of this heated anti-Catholic antagonism, and as the noose slowly tightened
around the doomed Republic, there remained genuine curiosity as to the role of the
Church in the coming regime; such would be commonplace in the Protestant press. The
Christian Century believed that the Spanish Church had gained a unique chance to
redeem itself, and that, given the appropriate change in spirit, it could act as a force for
moderation and progress. But, by that same token, it had also been afforded an
opportunity to return to her reactionary traditions and oppress yet further generations of
Spaniards, which would inevitably result in the repetition of the contemporary cycle of
bitterness and violence.251 F. D. Kershner, of the Christian Evangelist, took a more
markedly pessimistic view as to the future of the Church in that country, believing that
ancient institution to be impatiently waiting for the restoration of its privileges and a
chance at vengeance.252 The Christian Leader's S. E. G. Priestley would comment
likewise, believing that with the impending fall of the Republic, another light had gone
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Frederick M. Eliot, ―'A Military Maneuver,'‖The Christian Leader, 2 April, 1937, 434-435.
This piece, reprinted from the Christian Register, sought to underscore the notion of fascism as being
fundamentally incompatible with Christianity, but that somehow officials of the Catholic Church still
generated excuses for it, especially where Spain was concerned. Citing Cardinal O'Connell of Boston,
the author attacked this clergyman for his insistence that the bombing of civilian targets by the
Nationalist coalition stood as a legitimate military practice and not, as Eliot asserted, directed cruelty.
Interestingly, the Christian Century would report in June that the Nationalists' dastardly campaign of
aerial bombardment against civilian settlements had not been contained to Spain: rumors coming from
France suggested that insurgent military aircraft, likely crewed by Italians or Germans, had bombed
French villages. And, oddly enough, the Christian Evangelist would editorialize upon this abhorrent
tactic, specifically in respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict, but would leave the question of Spain out of
the discussion.
―French Towns Bombed by Planes from Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 15 June, 1938, 748.
―Bombing Civilians,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 16 June, 1938, 667.
―The Spanish Church Gets Another Chance,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 13 April, 1938, 454-455.
As pro-Loyalist and generally anti-Catholic as the Century had been throughout the course of the
conflict, the journal hoped that the Church would serve as a sort of counterweight to offset possible
Italian or German manipulation after the war ended, but also that it might serve as a moral conscience to
prevent the Franco from engaging in a campaign of bloody reprisal.
Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: Are the Christians Pharisees?,‖ The Christian
Evangelist, 14 April, 1938, 419.
Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: ―A Roman Catholic Pacifist,‖ The Christian
Evangelist, 16 June, 1938, 669.
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out in Europe and that Franco's Spain, in which the Church would most certainly be
participatory, would be the ―Spain of yesterday and not tomorrow.‖253
The Spanish war, then, had obviously retained a significant degree of interest in
the Protestant press, but coverage upon it shrunk as emerging crises took hold of Europe
with the expansion of Hitler's Reich and his seemingly insatiable appetite for the
acquisition of new lands. Nevertheless, the conflict in Spain remained important, for the
papers appreciated that, while it might have no longer held as great of a potential to be a
flashpoint for another major war, there were still substantial geopolitical and strategic
considerations bound to its outcome. All the while, the partisan fidelities of these
particular newspapers remained essentially unshaken, even if they did seem to realize that
the eleventh hour had arrived for the embattled Spanish Republic and its motley array of
Loyalists. And so, too, did they continue their narrative on the ―fascist‖ aspects of the
Roman Catholic Church.
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III.
On the part of the American Catholic press, journalistic interest in the Spanish
Civil War endured, unsurprisingly, in much the same fashion as it had throughout the
conflict. Into the last phase of the war, these representative publications hailed, perhaps
somewhat jeeringly, the impending victory of the Rightist rebellion and the ostensible
salvation of their Church in Spain while continuing to vilify the Loyalist cause as Soviet
in design and apocalyptic in purpose. The applause for what increasingly appeared to be
the coming of Franco's triumph grew ever louder, ostensibly due to two factors: his
decisive drive to the Mediterranean through Teruel during the early months of 1938,
isolating Catalonia from Castile, and the preliminary processes to the extension of formal
diplomatic relations and eventual recognition of Nationalist Spain by the Vatican by late
May of that year.254
More markedly, however this same period demonstrated a definite increase in the
amount of content devoted to illuminating the subversive menace of international
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―Chronicle: Spain,‖ editorial, America, 8 January, 1938, 328.
―Seven Days' Survey: the Wide World,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 4 March, 1938, 520.
―Chronicle: Spain,‖ editorial, America, 5 March, 1938, 520.
―Seven Days' Survey: the Wide World,‖ editorial, in The Commonweal, 1 April, 1938, 632.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 16 April, 1938, 26-27.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 30 April, 1938, 74.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 28 May, 1938, 170.
Arnold Lunn, ―Redeemed Spain,‖ America, 18 June, 1938, 247-248.
As a curious aside on the latter topic, these Catholic publications would express incredulity at the
revelation that approximately sixty members of the United States' Congress sent a letter of greeting and
solidarity to the ―Red Parliament‖ in Barcelona, which they naturally considered to be a gross and
outrageous impropriety. Many of these statesmen would later claim that they had given their signatures
in ignorance, or else that they had been forged or acquired through trickery.
―Week by Week: the Trend of Events,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 11 February, 1938, 423.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 12 February, 1938, 434-435.
―Editorials: January 30, 1938,‖ editorial, America, 12 February, 1938, 445.
―Week by Week: the Trend of Events,‖ The Commonweal, 18 February, 1938, 451.
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communism, which these papers and their contributors believed to be gradually, subtly
expanding in influence, even unto the shores of the United States. These newspapers
seemed determined that their respective readerships should share their convictions (which
seemed at times to border on the pathological), even to the extent that bearded Bolshevik
bomb-throwers lurked beneath every bedstead. Apparently meaning to demonstrate this,
America would run a pair of editorial comments, which related the experience of one of
the journal's own editors, who suffered an attack by a pro-Loyalist—and therefore
presumably pro-communist—picketer armed with an ―iron cane‖ while attending a
reception held on behalf of visiting Catholic Spaniards by Catholic Americans.255
While the following year would witness a disturbing increase in the activities of
the pro-Nazi German-American Volksbund, these Catholic journals would find far more
the fear in the habits of CPUSA and its allies, which had apparently transformed in 1938.
J. E. Westfield, reporting America, would comment on a mass meeting at Madison Square
Garden in March, which attempted to appropriate the rhetoric of ―Americanism‖ in the
party's assault on fascism.256 Still others would comment on the continue efforts of that
organization, abetted by its assorted allies and miscellaneous dupes, to foster a domestic
Popular Front-esque movement in the United States, tamper with the nation's policy of
neutrality, and, pointedly, to lift the Spanish embargo.257 Their anxieties would only be
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―Editorials: Congratulations,‖ editorial, America, 18 June, 1938, 252.
―Editorials: Intimidation,‖ editorial, America, 18 June, 1938, 253.
J. Edgar Westfield, ―Communist Hymn Resounds in Madison Square Garden,‖ America,
12 March, 1938, 534-535.
Similarly, a major theme of the rally was solidarity with the Loyalists of Republican Spain.
John E. Kelly, ―World Revolution's Objective,‖ The Sign, April, 1938, 552-553.
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exacerbated by the extension of the ―brotherly hand‖ to American Catholics by E.
Browder, secretary of CPUSA, that they might reconcile with the revolutionary
movement and join in the common struggle against fascism and reaction.258 More
specifically, this would be in relation to an address and subsequently published pamphlet,
entitled ―A Message to Catholics,‖ published under the auspices of the Workers' Library
Publishers (New York, June, 1938). In it, as stated, Secretary Browder wished to make
inroads toward Catholic-communist understanding and friendship. He declaimed at
length upon the commonality of spirit in politics and social justice shared between the
two groups. And, in respect to the Spanish crisis, it seemed as if Browder hoped to
convince American Catholics that only the upper Spanish clergy had joined in supporting
the Rightist insurgency, that the communist party fought for the liberty of the
impoverished Catholic souls of that country, and that it did not in any way seek to destroy
their ancient Faith.259 This would naturally elicit a derisive response, as contributors to
these publications cautioned against communists bearing gifts.260
In any event, these newspapers also seemed to have believed that the
contemporary swelling of American anti-Catholic bias had been fueled, at least in part, by
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Gault McGowan, ―The Popular Front Is Baloney,‖ America, 2 April, 1939, 606-607.
―Points and Lines: Neutrality—Then and Now,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 13 May, 1938, 75-76.
―Spanish Embargo,‖ editorial, America, 14 May, 1938, 132.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 21 May, 1938, 146-147.
―Week by Week: the Trojan Horse,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 10 June, 1938, 169.
Gerard Donnelly, S. J., ―Secretary Browder Extends a Brotherly Hand,‖ America, 18 June, 1938,
244-245.
Earl Browder, A Message to Catholics (New York: Workers' Library Publishers, Inc., 1938), 3-15.
Gerard Donnelly, S. J., ―Secretary Browder Extends a Brotherly Hand,‖ America, 18 June, 1938.
244-245.
David Goldstein, ―Come into My Parlor Says the Communist Spider,‖ America, 25 June, 1938.
274-275.
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the supposedly ballooning power of the Comintern and its efficient propaganda
apparatus. And they would undertake the counter this phenomenon in a manner most
fitting for organs of a free press.261 First, there would arise a campaign, proposed by T.
Maguire (then executive editor of the Sign), designated as the ―Catholic Minute Men.‖262
This effort, in brief, would seek to organize teams of Catholic letter-writers on a
nationwide basis; these specialized correspondents, making vigilance their code, would
undertake to combat anti-Catholic ―propaganda‖ in the wider American press.263 Then,
shortly thereafter, America took up the call, announcing its intention to hold a ―Bias
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Anthony Clifford, ―What Democracy?,‖ America, 8 January, 1938, 321-322.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 8 January, 1938, 339.
―The Free Religious Press,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 4 February, 1938. 393-394.
Robert L. Otto, ―Silent Paralysis Creeps Slowly over Us,‖ America, 5 March, 1938, 508-509.
―Current Fact and Comment: 'Liberal' Catholics,‖ editorial, The Sign, June, 1938, 645-646.
Benjamin L. Masse, ―Christian Liberals—to Whom Are They Allied,‖ America, 11 June, 1938,
226-227.
The Catholic emphasis here would be against those ―liberals‖ who had undertaken to attack the Church
with their perpetual intonation that it was ―the enemy of democracy,‖ or otherwise that it comfortably
communed with fascists of any description. And, moreover against those ―emancipated,‖ contrarian
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Contest,‖ beginning in March of that year.264 This paper encouraged its readers to select
articles from the more notable national publications, as well as from their local press, that
contained notes of anti-Catholic bigotry, whether overt or subtle. There were to be a
number of cash prizes awarded to those who sent in the most offensive pieces. No fewer
than three of the nine prizes, including second place, went to individuals who provided
clippings of articles which were vociferous in their denunciation of Franco's Nationalists
and the Church which ostensibly supported his particular strain of ―fascism.‖265
Obviously, then, neither of these efforts should be considered apart from the
developments surrounding the Spanish Civil War. As to the campaigns undertaken by
America and the Sign, the Commonweal's D. Hayne would urge a more reasoned
response to this apparent anti-Catholic ―propaganda,‖ offering that caustic, knee-jerk
backlash would only cause the non-Catholic press to further solidify its impressions of
the Roman Catholic Church, especially its Spanish branch, as being allied with
fascism.266 But this stood as only one example of the Commonweal acting the deviant
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amongst its sister publications. In April, 1938, the weekly underwent significant changes
in ownership, attended by a reorganization in its editorial staff. M. Williams, the founder
and, since 1924, executive editor of the newspaper would step down from his position.
He would, however, retain his own weekly column of opinion.267 During this transitional
period, the journal would ―affirm and reaffirm‖ its stance of fundamental opposition to
totalitarianism in any form, whether of the Left or the Right.268
Yet this same transformational period would witness a new official editorial
position adopted in respect to the conflict in Spain. In a statement from late June, the
newly reorganized Commonweal would admit that the discussion of the Spanish Civil
War in the United States had devolved into little more than polarized partisan bickering,
which had been distinguished ―more for its heat than for any light cast upon the
significance of events,‖ a reality made worse due to the fact that little, if any, reliable
information had ever come out of bloodied Spain.269 To the staff of this newspaper, there
had been little to admire in either belligerent coalition: one identified, at least partly, with
the evils of the revolutionary Soviet regime; the other espoused malodorous totalitarian
doctrines of reaction similar to certain other regimes condemned by the Church. In
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essence, the leading writers for the Commonweal felt as if no good choice existed
between comparable evils, and announced that, thenceforth, the publication would do its
best to encourage attitudes of ―positive impartiality.‖270
Meanwhile, Williams, the former editor of the paper would comment on this
piece. He applauded some elements of it, but lamented its content on the while—for
under his direction, Commonweal had adopted a strong pro-Nationalist stance. However,
he recognized his limited power to change the position of the publication after his
resignation, and did not wish to muddy the waters further by pursuing his version of the
narrative; nevertheless, he rejected ―positive impartiality,‖ in favor of his established,
reductionist simplification of the conflict in Spain as being one between Bolshevism and
Christianity.271
Apart from the apparently paired issues of communism and anti-Catholicism,
interest dwelt upon wider international events as these publications began to perceive,
however slowly, that Spain had ceased to be the point of greatest danger in Europe,
especially after the Anschluss in March, 1938. And, as with the Protestants, many
270
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contributors would enumerate the Sudetenland, if not the whole of Czechoslovakia, as the
next target for absorption into the Reich.272
But, exhibited thus, the evidence indicates that the conflict in Spain, the issue of
international communism and its attendant dangers were more or less all-consuming to
these few Catholic newspapers. Summarily, they were tardier than their Protestant
counterparts to respond to the escalating tensions in other parts of Europe as Hitler made
further strides toward his dream of imperial domination over a significant portion of the
Continent. This was, perhaps natural, as questions of the Faith and of the Catholic
denomination were still enmeshed in the Spanish war, which they seemed to have felt
obliged to lend further commentary. Moreover, this might also have been due to the
strength of non-Catholic opinion in the United States on the foreign civil war, which
many Catholic writers believed to have trended increasingly toward anti-Catholicism.
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IV.
For the latter half of 1938, and as the second anniversary of the civil war passed,
the contributions of these Protestant newspapers to the discourse on the declining Spanish
war, including the general Catholic factor, and wider world events did little to alter their
established narrative on those respective topics.273 Yet even while the Republic seemed
doomed to defeat, there lingered some slight degree of enthusiasm for its cause, which
some still believed to be ―fighting for the future of Spain.‖274
On the larger stage, the discussion of the Spanish struggle remained somewhat deemphasized in importance, particularly in its latent potential to spark another general
European war. However, there were some briefly-expressed concerns over the enraged
promises of the Republican Loyalists to retaliate for the insurgents' targeting of ostensibly
unarmed civilian centers. These threats were not directed against non-military settlements
located inside Nationalist territory; rather, the violence they intended were to be directed
against the nations where the Nationalists' auxiliary forces had originated—that is, of
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course, Italy and Germany.275 Contrarily, and perhaps as a result of these sensationalist
claims, the Christian Evangelist reported that in Spain there still existed more than a
glimmer of a spark that could ignite a wider conflict. But more than the bombing of
innocent Spanish settlements (and the supposed attacked mounted against French villages
by Nationalist air forces), the Evangelist worried more over the British dynamic: stories
had surfaced that rebel aircraft had been attacking her merchantmen.276 Amidst this fear,
there would be some brief coverage on the struggling efforts of the Non-Intervention
Committee to reach some sort of compromise to cut off all foreign intervention in Spain.
The Christian Century believed this to be an exercise in the realm of fantasy: two years
of working toward this very objective had demonstrated the depth of international interest
in the conflict and that, in any event, none of the interloping nations could be trusted to
withdraw, even if by October of that year the tide of ostensible foreign invasion appeared
to be ebbing.277
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Similarly, there would be an increasing level of discussion on the topic of
American neutrality and non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, which had apparently
become distasteful to a growing number of citizens. In early August of that year, the
Christian Evangelist reported on a rather strange incident to this effect: the White House
received two postcards, allegedly the largest in existence, bearing the signatures of some
5,000 individuals who would have had the government of the United States lift its
embargo against Republican Spain, which they collectively considered to be a ―shameful
discrimination against a people fighting for world peace and democracy.‖278
Otherwise there would be somewhat more commentary on the attitudes of
appeasement that had so enraptured the fearful governments of Great Britain and
France— which had already allowed for the creation of an enormous German continental
empire—and speculation on the topic of where German jackboots might next march that
might trigger a general war.279 This paired discussion would also naturally dovetail with
the question of American neutrality in respect to general European affairs. The general
consensus on the former topic seemed to be that with Hitler's aggressive posturing toward
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Czechoslovakia over the issue of the Sudetenland, and Germany's concerted effort to
encourage pro-German agitation on the part of K. Henlein's Czech National Socialist
Party, he had made his intentions fairly obvious to these Protestant journals.280
This anxious uncertainty over the Czech problem would, of course, be answered
by the Autumn of 1938, following the Munich Agreement of September. These
newspapers recognized this event as a historic watershed and would collectively
condemn its outcome (essentially entailing the willful abandonment of an innocent
democratic nation) as perhaps the greatest example in the shameful legacy of diplomatic
capitulation in the face of fascist bullying on the part of Great Britain and France. Many
contributors to and, indeed, the respective staffs of these publications believed that this
folly would only briefly forestall a reckoning of blood and tears.281
F. D. Kershner, ever vociferous, wrote in agreement with the former British Prime
Minister D. L. George, who had fervently expressed his disappointment with the
readiness of the Chamberlain government to give in to the demands of a tyrant, which
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had led to the ―British flag becoming the jest of nations.‖282 Following the conference at
Munich, this author would offer further disdain for Chamberlain and the policy of
appeasement as a whole, as well as his developing belief that the time for such moral
cowardice had passed; duty bound the democracies to stand together against the fascists
and say ―no more.‖283 But the question of Spain would not be entirely divorced from the
contemporary proceedings in Central Europe. Significantly, as the Czech crisis
approached its tipping point, the Christian Century would report that Franco had rather
hastily declared that his Spain would be neutral in a general European conflagration, a
pronouncement which this paper interpreted as an unqualified slap to the faces of his
benefactors in Italy and Germany.284
Outside of the realm of geopolitics, religious interest in the Spanish conflict, and
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in the world at large, endured. There would be a massive, outraged response to the
meteoric escalation of the anti-Jewish campaign inside the Reich following the
assassination of vom Rath in Paris and Krystallnacht. And there would continue the
familiar rhetoric of criticism against the Roman Catholic Church, which many writers
believed to have surrendered every last vestige of spiritual fortitude by wearing a mask of
mask of anti-communist zealotry, which only concealed the reality that it stood as an
authoritarian construct that propped up unjust systems and promoted fascism—the most
egregious example of which could have been found its unwavering support of Franco's
Nationalist Spain.285 F. D. Kershner, in typical fashion, agreed with such sentiments. He
wrote that a ―real problem‖ existed with the very fabric of the Catholic Church when, in
Detroit, the local Council of Catholic Organizations had been working relentlessly to
suppress the works of E. Hemingway, ostensibly for his unapologetic sympathy for the
Loyalist cause in Spain.286 This, to this author, represented a crime against the freedom of
expression and that no institution, not even one as venerable as the ancient Church,
should be able to ―penalize‖ those who held views contrary to its own—for such was the
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―essence of fascism.‖287
Considering the above, it should have been of little surprise that the comments
and articles published by these journals at the conclusion of 1938 were exceedingly
dismal. The Spanish Republic faced imminent defeat, seemingly forsaken by those who it
should have had as its allies and the democratic Czech government had been deserted,
sold to an unpredictable dictator for a moment's peace. Indeed, the European aggressor
nations had gained further, virtually unimpeded victories with the promise of more to
come in the future, the armies of the Japanese Empire continued to maraud across China,
and, to these papers, it seemed a logical conclusion that the world once again teetered
upon the brink of yet another catastrophic conflict.288
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V.
For these Catholic publications, the remaining half of 1938 reiterated much of the
established narrative on the Spanish Civil War. By this phase of the conflict, Franco's
Nationalists were capitalizing on the decisive advantages afforded to them following the
Teruel offensive, and were slowly capturing Loyalist territory (with the ultimate
objectives of Barcelona, Valencia, and Madrid). The Republic appeared to be in its death
throes—even if, as the Catholics believed, the ―Reds‖ administering the government and
their puppeteers in the Kremlin refused to admit it.289 The editorial staff of America
would even note what it believed to be the beginning of a tidal shift in American opinion
in favor of Franco, ostensibly because it had become increasingly evident that his
coalition would emerge triumphant from the struggle, but most especially after the
Loyalists' catastrophically-botched offensive across the Ebro River (from July until
November of that year).290 And also, in the view of the Commonweal's J. A. Magner, that
more American citizens had decided to embrace Franco might have been attributed to the
extension of de facto recognition to Nationalist Spain.291
In short, circumstances allowed for these Catholic journals to demonstrate a more
marked degree of optimism than they had previously: the faction they had championed
seemed to be marching inexorably toward a total victory, and the Spanish ―Reds‖ were
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soon be routed. But yet their contributors would continue to play upon the dangers of
international communism, insisting that even where it had failed to wash over Spain, the
Red tide threatened to engulf the United States, given the development of the proper set
of conditions.292 Here, again, there would be an absolute wealth of articles on the topic of
the apparently pervasive efforts of native agitators, foreign infiltrators, and their culpable
dupes to manipulate and mislead American public opinion for the combined interest of:
fostering both pro-communist sympathy and anti-fascist hatred, reinforcing solidarity
with the Spanish Loyalists, and undermining isolationist neutrality for the sake of leading
the nation into some grand anti-fascist military alliance with the European democracies in
combination with the Soviet Union, where it did not belong..293 These efforts, America
opined, also extended into Hollywood and liberal literature circles.294
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Similarly, America reported that it had been due to the efforts of these penetrators,
CPUSA, and its front organizations, that so many American volunteers had illegally
traveled to Spain to fight alongside the Loyalists, a fact seemingly confirmed by W. P.
Carney, of the New York Times, who visited a forlorn POW cage in Nationalist territory.
There he interviewed a number of young men who had served in the Abraham Lincoln
Battalion (of the larger XV International Brigade). They apparently confirmed the truth
behind these suspicions of communist influence in the phenomenon of pro-Loyalist
American volunteerism.295
Indeed, Catholic commentary on these subjects during this period remained nearly
identical to what it had been during the previous months of the conflict: pro-Nationalist,
pro-Franco, mixed with fervent anti-Loyalist sentiment, which these publications insisted
to be perfectly congruent with the most fundamental sort of anti-communism (and
perhaps anti-radicalism). However, it will be remembered that the Commonweal broke
the apparent lockstep of Catholic opinion after that newspaper underwent reorganization.
After June, 1938, its staff asserted that the Spanish issue had been so befogged with
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J. Edgar Westfield, ―Communist Effrontery Designs New Trojan Horses,‖ America, 17 September,
1938, 560-561.
―Chronicle: Spain,‖ editorial, America, 23 July, 1938, 376.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 3 September, 1938, 506-507.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 29 October, 1938, 74.
By this point in 1938, the men of the Lincoln Battalion began returning to the United States. America,
of course, had nothing but disdain for these volunteers, whom it considered to be traitorous criminals
for so desecrating the name of that great American president in service to a toxic cause. The journal
would also attach sentiments of anti-Semitism and xenophobia to its opinion. Its staff claimed that the
returning militiamen were ―mostly Jewish,‖ or otherwise ―foreign-born riff-raff,‖ who were aligned
with the domestic communist movement in the United States, which existed to slavishly serve Moscow.
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propaganda, and otherwise so generally misunderstood, that the only logical position for
foreign observers to adopt—especially citizens of the United States—should have been
one of absolute, ―positive impartiality.‖296
This stance naturally aroused an uproar from the newspaper's peers. America
offered commentary to the effect that the Commonweal had reached absolutely false
conclusions in respect to the war in Spain, regardless of the courage its staff might have
had in voicing a contrary opinion. Criticizing further, this editorial went on insist that the
Spanish issue could be explained in far simpler terms than the new staff of the
Commonweal believed to be the case. While taking pains to de-emphasize the religious
dynamic, America maintained its established position that the Republican government,
under the direction of the Popular Front, existed only as a transitional stepping-stone to a
genuine, atheistic Soviet-style state. The Nationalist rebellion, on the other hand, rose as a
―native Spanish protest to a tyranny that had become unendurable and that was becoming
permanent.‖297 Yet the author(s) of this piece could not yet move entirely away from the
religious interpretation of the conflict, illuminating Franco as a Christian solider and
statesman, who offered Spain rejuvenation based upon ―Catholic,‖ and not fascist,
principles.298 Therefore, in this publication's considered opinion, it had been inexcusable
for the shuffled staff of the Commonweal to implore ―positive impartiality‖ in respect to
the Spanish Civil War when the choice for that country teetered between the misery of
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―Civil War in Spain and the United States,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 24 June, 1938, 229-230.
―The Commonweal and the Spanish War,‖ editorial, America, 2 July, 1938, 292-293.
Ibid.
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vassalage to the alien ideology of Moscow, or the reinstitution of a sane social order
grounded in centuries-old tradition.299
As for the Commonweal itself, it staff would note a wide variety of opinions in
respect to the editorial that had aroused such fury in America. In mid-July, the publication
would acknowledge the receipt of a great number of letters which had made it difficult to
gauge the sum reaction of its readership to the article in question, indicating a certain
ambivalent uncertainty in Catholic opinion on the Spanish question and the paper's
suggestion of impartiality.300 A few wholeheartedly supported the suggestion, admiring it
as a ―refreshing breeze,‖ while others seemed discomfited, if not disgusted by it, and yet
still others clung to the idea as the Spanish struggle as a battle in the ―holy war‖ against
the Great Satan of Moscow.301 But despite all of the negative commentary, the
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Ibid.
America and its contributors would continue to insist on this interpretation as the conflict passed its
second anniversary, which the publication celebrated as the commencement of the counter-revolution
which would be Spain's salvation. Otherwise, it would later report, without citation, that the entirety of
the American Catholic Press rebuked the position of the Commonweal. The Sign, for its part, would
continue to trumpet the virtues of ―Americanness‖ to be found within Franco's coalition.
―Current Fact and Comment: Franco and the American Rebels,‖ editorial, The Sign, July, 1938,
708-709.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 16 July, 1938, 338.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 23 July, 1938, 362-364.
―Current Fact and Comment: Catholics and Spain,‖ editorial, The Sign, August, 1938, 4-5.
John LaFarge, S. J., ―While Spain Burns They Strum Impartiality,‖ America, 20 August, 1938, 462-463.
Owen B. McGuire, ―Catholics Should Be Neutral!,‖ The Sign, September, 1938, 74-77.
Francis X. Connolly, ―The Fascist State Is Not Emerging in Spain,‖ America, 24 September, 1938,
580-582.
Francis X. Connolly, ―Spain Renews Itself in the National Movement,‖ America, 22 October, 1938,
52-54.
―Communications: Spanish Letters,‖ letters to the editor, The Commonweal, 15 July, 1938, 324-325.
Or, perhaps more precisely, an ambivalent uncertainty amongst all those who took the Commonweal.
Ibid.
Once again, this demonstrates the falsity of the notion of any monolithic quality to Catholic opinion in
the United States.
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Commonweal would maintain this stance of ―positive impartiality,‖ or the examination of
the evidence of contemporary world problems beneath the cold light of reason, thereby
stripping them of ―emotional mythology and partisan odium.‖302
Conversely, however, there would be indications of significant initial success on
the campaigns proposed and staged by the Sign and America. The latter noted that,
following its own ―Bias Contest,‖ there had been a definite upsurge in Catholic opinion
for some greater form of action to address the ostensible anti-Catholic bias in the
American media. Further, that weekly asserted that this bigotry had grown ever more
insistent in its claims of harmony between the Church and fascism during the previous
two years (a development obviously in connection to the civil war in Spain). Even though
events in that country had led the Church to face terrible persecution, it did not receive
the emphasis that it deserved, especially considering the contemporary coverage on the
anti-Semitic barbarism in Hitler's Reich. The Commonweal would at least agree on this
point, as would its former editor, M. Williams.303
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―Week by Week: Impartiality and Neutrality,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 2 September, 1938, 458.
―Week by Week: the Church in America and Dictatorship,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 15 July, 1938,
310.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 30 July, 1938, 396-397.
Michael Williams, ―Views and Reviews,‖ The Commonweal, 18 November, 1938, 99-100.
―Week by Week: Disturbing the Peace,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 25 November, 1938, 116-117.
―Current Fact and Comment: Nazis Prepare Their Doom,‖ editorial, The Sign, December, 1938, 260.
―Current Fact and Comment: 'Gentlemen' of the Press,‖ editorial, The Sign, December, 1938, 261.
―Week by Week: Indignation Plus,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 2 December, 1938, 141-142.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 3 December, 1938, 194-195.
―Comment‖ editorial, America, 10 December, 1938, 218-219.
Francis X. Talbot, ―The Catholic Church Has Battled for Christ,‖ America, 31 December, 1938,
295-297.
―Persecution and False Liberalism,‖ editorial, America, 31 December, 1938, 300-301.
Further, one should be remiss in not mentioning a peculiar series of articles that had already been
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With all this, one might fairly arrive at the conclusion that there seemed to be a
certain difficulty in these Catholic journals in seeing beyond the Spanish conflict to
wider, and far more troubling, European development. Indeed, Spain and communism, as
ever, seemed to endure as the absorbing problems of the day, even if some of these
publications managed to relate that there still existed a great deal of importance in the
Spanish arena in relation to international strategic relations, still a particular concern for
Britain's maritime lifeline to her empire and a nearly encircled France.304 Nevertheless,
there would still be some spotty reporting on the wider world, including a rather belated
recognition of the Czech crisis, the subsequent sacrifice of the Sudetenland, and even
some on the trouble in the Far East, where Soviet and Japanese interests were poised to
clash. On the former development, many Catholic commentators lamented it as tragic,
but necessary, outcome to avoid the cataclysm of war. Others did not think that the
Munich conference had solved anything, for they had learned all too much about Hitler to
believe that his appetite for eastward conquest had been sated. But there would be
universal worry over the neutralization of the democratic powers of Europe as they stood
dumbfounded, frightened, and helpless as the German dictator's gambles paid dividends.
These happenings seemed, at least, to hint at an awakening in the Catholic press to the
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appearing in the Sign by one A. O'Brien, which might be slotted in under the heading of ―countercommunist‖ propaganda. This special correspondent reported incidents from Spain, portrayed as true,
that meant to demonstrate the ultimate Christian righteousness of the Nationalist cause and,
respectively, the abysmal emptiness of the Loyalists' apparent Godlessness. See the pieces from: (July,
1937, 741-743). (October, 1937, 141-144). (March, 1938, 462-465). (May, 1938, 583-587). (July, 1938,
730-732). (November, 1938, 215-218). (January, 1939, 347-350).
―Week by Week: Peace for Spain,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 19 August, 1938, 418-419.
Robert Sencourt, ―British Policy toward Spain,‖ The Commonweal, 11 November, 1938, 66-67.
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shifting of the diplomatic center of gravity away from Spain and toward Central
Europe.305
As demonstrated, Catholic emphases remained almost exactly the same as they
had been over the previous months of 1938 and, indeed, throughout the course of the
strife in Spain—albeit perhaps with an increased focus on the issue of communism,
fascism, and the Church. This, against, might have been considered only only natural.
However, there also seemed to be something of a desire on the part of the Catholic
journals to wave the impending defeat of the ―Red‖ cause at the hands of ―their side‖ in
the face of their adversaries in the secular and Protestant presses. And again, to reiterate,
Spain endured as something of an all-consuming problem, even as developing crises
threatened to engulf the whole of Europe.306
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―Week by Week: Battles and War,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 12 August, 1938, 398-400.
―Week by Week: the Franco Reply,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 2 September, 1938, 458-459.
―Week by Week: the Flight of the Minister,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 23 September, 1938, 544.
―Week by Week: the Czechs and Europe,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 30 September, 1938, 569.
Michael Williams, ―Views and Reviews,‖ The Commonweal, 7 October, 1938, 612-613.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 8 October, 1938, 2-3.
―Chronicle,‖ editorial, America, 8 October, 1938, 15-16.
―Week by Week: Pause after Munich,‖ The Commonweal, 14 October, 1938, 625-626.
Hans Anscar and C. O. Cleveland, ―Europe—Two Conflict Forecasts,‖ The Commonweal, 21 October,
1938, 662-663.
George N. Shuster, ―Mr. Chamberlain's Dove,‖ The Commonweal, 21 October, 1938, 664-666.
On this note, the Catholic newspapers, particularly America, were overjoyed that the Soviet Union did
not receive an invitation to participate in the Munich talks; they saw this as a positive development in
which the Russian colossus would be increasingly isolated and friendless—otherwise, any major
conflict would only be manipulated by that country for the benefit of the revolutionary cause.
―The Passing Year,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 30 December, 1938, 256-258.
John LaFarge, S. J., ―Of Peace and Conflict through Both Hemispheres,‖ America, 31 December, 1938,
292-294.
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VI.
The first quarter of 1939 would witness the denouement of the Spanish Civil War.
By March of that year, both Great Britain and France would recognize the legitimacy of
the insurgent government; by the first of April, the conflict would be resolved in favor of
Franco's Nationalist coalition, prompting the United States to follow suit. Protestant
coverage on the struggle correspondingly declined as these few publications were forced
to reconcile with the agonizing, piecemeal collapse of the faction that they had so heartily
championed—a defeat which they would naturally interpret as a body blow to
―democracy,‖ a further advance for the forces of fascism, and yet another unsettling
tremor in a world poised upon the precipice of war. The occasion allowed for
retrospection. The staff of the Christian Century, in particular, wrote that history would
demonstrate that the decisive moment of the conflict would not be delineated as the then
impending fall of both Barcelona and Madrid, but rather as the moment when Great
Britain and France allowed Italy and Germany to make Franco's cause their own. And,
whatever the future held for Spain, those two capitulating nations would have to face the
immediate strategic consequences of an ascendent ―fascist‖ Spain, presumably under the
tutelage, if not domination, of both Mussolini and Hitler.307
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―If Barcelona Falls,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 1 February, 1939, 143-145.
See also: ―In a Nutshell,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 4 February, 1939, 173.
―Loyalist Catalonia Shrinks in Area,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 8 February, 1939, 173.
―The Curtain Falls on Catalonia,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 15 February, 1939, 203.
―Settlement in Spain Cannot Be Long Delayed,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 1 March, 1939, 267.
―Spanish Rebels Are No Longer Rebels,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 8 March, 1939, 309.
―General Maija Heads Spanish Loyalists,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 15 March, 1939, 339-340.
―The Spanish War Is Ended,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 5 April, 1939, 435.
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Waning as it was, and though wider European events continued to take
precedence, the battle in Spain remained an object of some attention; these Protestant
journals would concern themselves with three particular aspects of the war. The first
would be the continued, and, indeed, intensified attack on the United States' legal position
of neutrality. A growing segment of the American public then believed that that the policy
had been nothing if not destructive, perhaps as much as appeasement had been, and were
then urging for an official revision so that the nation might take greater steps to contain
the ―aggressor nations.‖ This line of thinking also extended to the war in Spain. Even as
the hour grew late for the Spanish Republic, some still seemed to believe that it could be
rescued with the immediate rescission of the embargo against that country and, further,
that Franco's effort would crumble instantly if the United States could eliminate the flow
of external aid to his faction by way of a stout naval blockade.308
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―Peace in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 6 April, 1939, Pg. 359.
The Christian Century still managed a degree of optimism, having faith in the ability of Great Britain to
simultaneously maintain the Mediterranean status quo while also potentially being able to detach
Franco from his fascist allies through the leveraging of British economic muscle. On the other hand, the
staff of the Christian Leader argued that the United States, Great Britain, and France should formulate a
concerted policy of economic isolation against Franco's Spain. They offered that such would oblige the
fascist powers who helped install him to bear the entire burden of keeping his regime afloat.
Commenting further, they also believed that this could potentially have the added benefit of crippling
the offensive capabilities of both Italy and Germany.
―Preparing for Mussolini's Next Move,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 22 February, 1939, 238-239.
―No Arms for Franco,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 8 April, 1939, 321.
―The Attack on the Neutrality Law,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 18 January, 1939, 76.
―Spanish Rebels Advance with New Italian Aid,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 18 January, 1939,
77.
―Spanish War at Most Crucial Stage,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 25 January, 1939, 109.
The Christian Evangelist would agree, printing a quote from from an article featured in The Nation,
which offered that if the Republic had been able to purchase armaments from more widely abroad, then
the war could have been turned in its favor, and that the international ―device‖ which prevented it from
doing so, of which the United States had been a participant, was an atrocity of the modern age. And the
Christian Leader would have a correspondent (presumably affiliated with the North American
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There would be, of course, varying degrees of response to this sentiment,
especially as it seemed that this attitude had penetrated to the highest levels of the
American government. Particularly horrifying to the Christian Century would be
President Roosevelt's address at the opening of the 76th Congress, in which he expressed
his desire to more the nation further along in the direction of rearmament,
internationalism, and interventionism—in the interest of preserving religious liberty and
democracy against those in the Old World who would destroy them. The paper
reasonably editorialized that such appeals should have only elicited bitter memories of
1917.309 Yet others would suggest that the world had become such an unfriendly,
unstable, and even dangerous place that perhaps the time had then come to forthrightly
reassess the state of the American military apparatus and her role in world events.310
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Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy) who, being ―on fire about Spain,‖ urged the publication to
declare solidarity with the Loyalists. While the paper refrained from doing so, it nevertheless
proclaimed its anti-fascist credentials and regarded the cause of the Spanish government as essentially
American. F. D. Kershner, of the Christian Evangelist, also agreed with these sentiments.
―Views and Comments: Lift the Embargo,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 5 January, 1939, 2.
M. W. J., ―On Fire about Spain,‖ letter to the editor, The Christian Leader, 7 January, 1939, 20.
Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: Shades of Seventy-Six,‖ The Christian
Evangelist, 16 March, 1939, 276.
―Invitation to a Holy War,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 18 January, 1939, 78-80.
The Christian Evangelist generally agreed, offering editorials that worried over the potential for the
United States to get sucked into the frenzy of the contemporary arms race and contribute to the eruption
of a war. For its part, the Christian Leader thought likewise.
―We, the People,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 19 January, 1939, 76.
―No Blank Checks for Armament,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 28 January, 1939, 80.
William E. Shelton, ―A Survey of World Trends,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 12 January, 1939, 34-35.
Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: What Would We Do?,‖ The Christian Evangelist,
19 January, 1939, 78.
―Foreign Policy and Public Opinion,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 8 February, 1939, 175-177.
By that April, Roosevelt had issued a message to Italy and Germany, which laid responsibility for the
maintenance of world peace at their thresholds. Meanwhile, he continued to shift the United States into
the Anglo-French camp, a truly bold maneuver, considering the enduring strength of American
isolationist sentiment.
―Europe and Our Neutrality,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 6 April, 1939, 535-537.
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Secondly, these newspapers would demonstrate a continued interest in the
administration of relief in war-ravaged Spain. There would be significant discussion on a
bulk purchase of American wheat by the Surplus Commodities Corporation, which turned
the excess foodstuff to the Red Cross, which then shipped it to Spain through the
Maritime Commission; thence it would be organized for distribution via the American
Friends Service Committee. The discourse would be extended beyond the effort to aid
those inside suffering Spain. These Protestant journals also highlighted the plight of
hundreds of thousands of refugees who had been forced to flee over the jagged Pyrenees
into France. There they had been quarantined, essentially incarcerated, in a network of
concentration camps. Apart from the misery and squalor of such living conditions, there
also existed the danger that these souls would be deported to a Franco-dominated Spain
to an uncertain fate.311
Finally, the matter of religion as it pertained to the Spanish conflict (and, indeed,
to world developments at large general) merited continued discourse in the columns of
these Protestant weeklies.312 This interest would primarily focus upon the significant
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―The Message to Hitler and Mussolini,‖ editorial, in The Christian Leader, 22 April, 1939, 368.
―Mr. Roosevelt Intervenes,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 26 April, 1939, 535-537.
―American Wheat for Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 4 January, 1939, 3.
―News of the Christian World: American Quakers Aid Spanish Families,‖ editorial, The Christian
Century, 4 January, 1939, 38.
―Bok Award Is Given to Quaker Leaders,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 307-308.
―Don't Forget the Spanish Refugees,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 1 April, 1939, 297.
These Protestant publications were vociferous in their support for the Spanish outcasts. They believed
that the democracies had made Franco's victory possible, and that duty and decency bound them to
support the victims of his rebellion.
This, of course, included the increasingly abhorrent anti-Semitic hysteria inside Hitler's Reich.
See: ―The Reply to Germany,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 7 January, 1939, 3.
―The Plight of the Jews,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 23 February, 1939, 195-196.
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changes in the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church with the passing of
Pius XI in February of that year, and the subsequent election of Cardinal E. Pacelli as the
papal successor, who would be styled as Pius XII. These Protestant newspapers would
commemorate the life and service of the deceased Pontiff, but could not resist the
opportunity to level censure against the Church that the occasion provided. Even while
acknowledging Pius XI as a lover of peace, the Christian Century attacked what it
believed to the eternal spiritual arrogance of the authoritarian Church and that cleric's
own relationship to Fascism in Italy and, indeed, in Spain.313 The Christian Evangelist
would opine likewise, asserting that his influence had been crucial to the collapse of
Republican Spain.314
And, as for the new Pope, there would be a great swelling of keen Protestant
interest in this prince of the Roman Catholic Church after he had gained the Chair of St.
Peter. They, amongst others, wondered if he could (or would) leverage the massive power
of his office on the emerging order in Spain, especially as it seemed apparent that
Franco's intent for the immediate future included a campaign of arbitrary ―punishment‖
for any and all who did not take up arms for his insurgency. These publications expressed
their hopeful wish that the weighty moral influence of the Pontificate would at least
313
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―Pope Pius XI,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 22 February, 1939, 239-241.
―Pope Pius XII,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 15 March, 1939, 342-343.
― Pope Pius XI,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 16 February, 1939, 171.
Meanwhile, the commentary from the Christian Leader would be far more subdued.
See: ―Pope Pius the Eleventh,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 18 February, 1939, 151-152.
In respect to the ascending Pontiff, these publications seemed to be convinced that, due to the fact that
he had formerly served as the Vatican's secretary of state, Pius XII would likely maintain the modus
vivendi established with the Mussolini's regime and, indeed, with ―fascism‖ in general, including the
Spanish variant which had, by then, nearly gained total national dominance.
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temper the venom of what appeared, by the early Summer of 1939, to be the development
of a modern Inquisition.315
Apart from the Spanish conflict, on the other hand, there would be far more
discussion on wider world events, particularly where Europe was concerned. There would
be commentary on the seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia as German aggression
reached a new peak, ostensibly a further step toward realizing Hitler's vision as laid out in
Mein Kampf. This would be followed closely by the escalating clamor in Germany over
the problem of Poland and Danzig as relations between those two countries descended
into new realms of unpleasantness and, soon thereafter, the Italian invasion of Albania.
As a consequence, the democratic powers of Europe had pledged to defend Polish
sovereignty while shifting more definitely toward a war footing—even to the extent of
considering the Soviet Union as a potential ally to once again encircle the Teutonic
menace with foes.316 Nevertheless, the Christian Leader managed to demonstrate a little
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―Pope Pius XII,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 9 March, 1939, 250.
―Pope Pius the Twelfth,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 11 March, 1939, 223).
―What Kind of Peace in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 22 March, 1939, 374-375.
―The Spanish War Is Ended,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 5 April, 1939, 435.
―Can the Pope Stop a Massacre?,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 12 April, 1939, 467.
―Will the Pope Check Franco's Reprisals,‖ editorial, The Chrisitan Century, 19 April, 1939, 499.
―Franco Reported to Be Executing Thousands,‖ editorial, The Christianity Century, 14 June, 1939, 755.
This fear was due to the earlier publication of a certain document form the Nationalist camp, entitled the
―Law of Political Responsibilities,‖ which had been interpreted as a rather broad, vague, and entirely
elastic provisional outline for the said ―punishment‖ of anyone who might be considered offensive or
otherwise undesirable to the reactionary order.
―Sequel to Munich,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 23 March, 1939, 299.
―Democratic Powers Are Disillusioned,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 29 March, 1939, 403.
―Triumphal Entry, 1939,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 30 March, 1939, 323-324.
―Tragic Europe,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 5 April, 1939, 439-440.
―Threat and Counter-Threat,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 12 April, 1939, 471-473.
―Is War Near?,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 13 April, 1939, 383-384.
―What Will Russia Do?,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 19 April, 1939, 503-505.
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hope in an atmosphere which increasingly appeared to be tainted with notions of the
inevitability of war: despite his previous triumphs, this paper believed that with each
fresh victory, Hitler further over-extended himself, which would ultimately be his
undoing.317
There essentially concluded the Protestant coverage on the Spanish Civil War. The
evidence presented above indicates that interest in the waning conflict remained, though
perhaps rather subdued and resigned to the defeat of the Republic as it became more
obvious that it would not survive. Even so, the Protestants never wavered in their faith to
the Republic. Similarly, they remained convinced that had it not been for Italy, Germany,
and the Roman Catholic Church—paired with the moral cowardice of the world's
democratic nations—the Nationalist rebellion would not have prospered unto victory.
And as the Spanish crisis continued to slide into a position of relative unimportance, their
attentions would be focused upon the ominous rumblings from the Continent as the black
clouds of war gathered above it.318
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―The Hitler Speech,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 6 May, 1939, 415.
As Hitler rode his cresting wave from victory to victory, the Protestant publications also worried about
what to them seemed to the budding of a nascent fascist movement in the United States. The Christian
Century ran an article by one A. J. Smith, which detailed a large rally staged by the German-American
Volksbund at Madison Square Garden, at which the Stars and Stripes flew alongside the swastika, and
all beneath a gigantic portrait of Washington. The author did not think that this was anything to be
ridiculed, for it had been from such seemingly insignificant seeds that fascism had arisen in Italy,
Germany, and, indeed, Spain. (This analogy, however, might not have been entirely appropriate).
Alson J. Smith, ―I Went to a Nazi Rally,‖ The Christian Century, 8 March, 1939, 320-322.
―What Hitler Dares,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 25 March, 1939, 271-272.
This editorial offered further that Hitler would meet his Waterloo before the gates of Moscow.
―Who Won the Spanish Civil War,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 14 June, 1939, 756.
―Pope Hails Christian Triumph in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 21 June, 1939, 787.
Pius XII seemed at once to disappoint the Protestant journals' hopes and yet to fulfill their worst ideas of
the Roman Catholic Church as he ―hailed [the] Christian triumph in Spain‖ as a God-ordained victory.
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VI.
The early months of 1939 would prove to be the concluding phase of the Spanish
Civil War. During this time, the Nationalist rebels closed in on Barcelona, finally
capturing it in late January of that year. This signal victory forced many of the last
significant holdouts of the collapsing government, including the Stalinist puppet J.
Negrín and the communist firebrand D. Ibárruri (―La Pasionaria‖), to flee north, over the
Pyrenees, and into France. Franco then turned his attention to the business of eliminating
pockets of resistance and capturing Madrid, where the last vestige of Republican
legitimacy laid; this he eventually did, bringing the conflict to an official close by 1 April,
1939.319
Due to these developments, the Catholic journals increased the tempo of their proFranco drumbeat, demanding that the time had come for the government of the United
States to formally recognize his fledgling administration. This resolution would be
reinforced by March, as the publications would acknowledge that some twenty other
nations, including Great Britain and France, had already done so. Moreover, they would
insist upon expedited recognition due to the fact that Spain had always exerted great
cultural and social influence over Latin America, and, therefore, it would have not been a
319

―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 7 January, 1939, 314.
―Chronicle: Spain,‖ editorial, America, 21 January, 1939, 376.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 28 January, 1939, 386-387.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 4 February, 1939, 410-411.
―Chronicle: Spain,‖America, 11 March, 1939, 543-544.
―Chronicle: Spain,‖ America, 18 March, 1939, 568.
―Spain Multiplies Its Revolutions: Who's Red Now?,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 24 March, 1939.
591-592.
―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 1 April, 1939, 602-603.
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prudent diplomatic decision to unnecessarily provoke Franco into unfriendliness. But
while they would express moderate consternation that the American government had not
embraced the emerging reality of an ascendant Nationalist Spain, these Catholic
newspapers would express what appeared to be a tone of mocking condescension toward
the relative silence of the non-Catholic press in the United States on the topic of the
impending demise of ―Red‖ Republican Spain, which they attributed to frustration and
shame. In any event, these few Catholic circulars would have their desire of America
recognition of Franco's government fulfilled very shortly after his battered forces
marched into Madrid.320
Further, they would criticize the petulant hypocrisy of certain segments of
American society which had previously supported relief work in Spain—but when the
insurgency's triumph became virtually assured, had reversed course and demanded that
all aid be cut off immediately. These representatives of Catholic opinion would express
incredulity that the same individuals and organizations who had endeavored to promote
the Loyalist cause and insist upon international support for the doomed Spanish
government would then have the audacity to beg, even demand, clemency from Franco.
According to America, the Sign, and some of their contributors, the Nationalist chieftain
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―Editorials: American Recognition of Spain,‖ editorial, America, 4 February, 1939, 420-421.
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had the right and, indeed, the duty to mete out stern punishments to those responsible for
tearing Spain asunder, and that leniency would have only set that country up for future
revolutionary upheavals.321
Such a necessity would, to these Catholic papers, be made obvious following the
capture of Barcelona (and, later, Madrid). There would be published a number of
shocking stories regarding how those cities had festered under the increasingly
desperate—and correspondingly violent—―Red‖ regime. For example, America would
feature a horror story, apparently related by an escaped ―eye-witness‖ from Spain, telling
of the destruction wrought by the radicals and their hostile, alien ideology in that
unfortunate country. It would include what had by then become typical of Catholic
descriptions of Republican Spain: chaos, squalid misery, and so forth. But this tale would
also discuss the fear engendered by the SIM (Servicio de Información Militar), the
government's internal secret service. That organization had been inspired (and partly
established) by the Soviet NKVD in August, 1937 in the aftermath of the ―May Days,‖
operated under a similar doctrine, and employed equally brutal tactics.322 Conversely,
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however, there would be a great deal of space and ink expended on the success of
Franco's initial efforts at restoration and reconstruction, which were working wonders to
heal the corruption. Also these Catholic newspapers remained convinced that, despite
what others were saying, his Spain would not be dominated by either Italy or Germany,
and nor should his movement have been considered ―fascist,‖ as it more precisely
represented a more benign form of Catholic-based traditionalism. Spaniards, they
insisted, were too deeply Catholic to long tolerate anything that approximated fascism,
which tended to make a deity out of the State.323
With these elements considered, it should have been no surprise that the Catholic
publications continued to rail against international communism, just as they had
throughout the course of the conflict (the volume of which, it will be remembered,
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international public consumption, that the appropriation of American symbolism had been cynically
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atrocities of the miniature Stalinist state: the absolute domination of the communist commissariat and its
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the concentration camps, the routine executions, and so on.
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increased into 1938). In early January, America would feature an article that seemed to
reassert the Catholics' fear that the enemy was already within the gates, waiting to enact
another Spanish crisis in the United States. Entitled ―Red Tactics on Fourteenth Street,‖
author J. Doherty discussed the ―first attack against the Catholic Church in America‖ by
those sinister souls in solidarity with the Spanish Loyalists.324 Finally unmasking their
revolutionary hatred, apparently the fuel of the Popular Front, pro-Loyalist Americans in
New York had attacked individual Catholics; later, they would picket a Catholic
sanctuary which had come out as pro-Nationalist, denouncing its congregation as
―fascists.‖ The church itself would be defiled with the crimson emblem of the hammer
and sickle. Further, extortion and even violence had been leveraged against proNationalist business leaders in that same area—and those who did repent faced
reprisal.325
Otherwise, while significantly less sensationalist, these papers maintained their
narrative on the ―subversive‖ activities in the United States, especially regarding the
clamor to rearm, align with the European democracies and the Soviet Union, lift the
Spanish embargo, and begin a concerted campaign of anti-fascist action to redress the
balance of the Old World. America believed these efforts had grown frantic to the point of
becoming totally transparent, and that that most radical segment of American society
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John Doherty, ―Red Tactics on Fourteenth Street,‖ America, 7 January, 1939, 318-319.
Ibid.
Note that here, again, Catholics were still having to defend their Church against accusations of fascism,
which appeared to have been coming from all directions, but, at the time, there were not unsubstantiated
fears that they would have to defend it against actual physical attacks as well.
See also: Michael Williams, ―Views and Reviews,‖ The Commonweal, 10 February, 1939. 435-436.
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should have, by then, been thoroughly discredited. To that journal, such peoples only
sought to promote conflict, in this case global, as a mechanism to excite revolutionary
turmoil, just as they had done in Spain.326 The editorial staff of the Commonweal did not
exactly take such a view, but nevertheless worried over what it perceived to the be the
increasingly belligerent stance of the United States' government in respect to foreign
relations, particularly where Germany and Japan were concerned. It believed that
Roosevelt's government had undertaken to engage in subtle, but dangerous, forms of
diplomatic and economic warfare against those ―aggressor nations.‖ That weekly, as well
as the Sign, lamented this reality—in addition to American rearmament and the nation's
friendly advances toward Great Britain and France as those countries reached out for a
possible alliance with the Soviet Union—as only aggravating a world already tense from
an apparently impending war.327 As a result, the Catholic papers grew ever more
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determined to keep the United States neutral and isolated, especially as it appeared that
Roosevelt and the Congress considered supporting the dying Republican cause, late
though the hour was, in a bid to shift national policy toward interventionism and
internationalism.328
Here, again, the Catholic press tended to cast the blame for the above phenomena
on the activities of the Comintern, CPUSA, their overlapping front organizations, and
their agents.329 The fronts and those openly affiliated with them could be dealt with, for
they were mostly visible and their loyalties could be confirmed by the messages they
preached. But, as before, these Catholic newspapers expressed far more concern in the
impressive ability of communist infiltrators and their fellow travelers to dupe
unsuspecting, otherwise innocent and well-intentioned people, into serving their cause of
building pro-communist sympathies and constructing a domestic Popular Front
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movement in the United States.330 It had been, after all, Lenin's dictum to ―build
communism with non-communist hands.‖331
Yet, for all this anti-communist fixation, Catholic interest dwelt on other
contemporary issues, the first being the issue of religion. Naturally, of course, these
publications would discuss the death of Pope Pius XI and the transitioning of papal power
into the hands of his successor, Pius XII. The latter Pontiff would maintain the policies of
his precursor, and would hail the springtime victory of Franco's Nationalists as an
essentially Christian victory.332 And, secondly, even with the developments inside Spain
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and within the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church, these publications
managed some meager discussion of the events of the wider world. There would be brief
acknowledgment of the German seizure of what remained of Czechoslovakia in the
Commonweal, but comparably less said about this fresh act of Hitler's aggression
elsewhere.333 On that same note, there would be a recognition of the heightening of
tensions following the Italian invasion of Albania, which that same newspaper believed to
be a further step toward Mussolini's ambition of dominating Yugoslavia, Greece, and the
whole of the Mediterranean.334 The developing crisis of Poland, too, received some slight
degree of commentary, though far less than it had in the Protestant papers.335
The evidence above indicates that, without much surprise, the question of Spain
retained a great deal of interest in the Catholic press, especially where it intersected with
the problem of international communism and domestic subversion within the United
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States. Simultaneously, denominational developments (most pointedly with the passing of
Pius XI and the ascent of Pius XII), might have blinded these periodicals to the emerging
realities in Europe as the Italian and German dictators claimed fresh victories and
appeared determined to play their dangerous game, subsequently forcing their enemies to
adopt ever more belligerent stances, all of which incrementally increased the pressure on
the trigger of war.
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VII.
This final phase of the Spanish Civil War, unsurprisingly, saw but little variation
in the opinions and interpretations offered by either the Catholic or the Protestant presses
of the United States. By and large, the respective publications from each maintained their
established, entrenched positions. The Catholic journals mostly remained adamantly proNationalist, while the Protestant publications determinedly defended the Republic; they
would defend them for the same reasons that they had stated since even before Franco's
uprising and the commencement of martial hostilities.336 Insisting that the Rightist
rebellion stood as a justified uprising against an illegitimate, hostile, Soviet-directed
government, the Catholic newspapers ever championed it as a bulwark against the spread
of the atheistic communist blight and the defender of Christian civilization. And flawed
though it might have been, the Protestant papers continued to assert that the embattled
Spanish government stood as one of the last flickering lights of liberal democracy in
Europe, finally and tragically extinguished beneath the swelling tide of fascism.
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A Brief Conclusion and Summation
In considering the evidence presented over the previous three chapters of this
thesis, one can reach a number of suggestive conclusions in regard to the respective
opinions of the American Catholic and Protestant presses on the Spanish Civil War. With
little variation, and with but few exceptions, the selected representatives of either
segment of the American Christian press maintained their interpretations on that highly
controversial conflict. On either side, the selected publications came out early in favor of
the Spanish Left or Right—months before the battle had in fact been joined.
Given the turbulent nature of contemporary Spanish politics and the intensity of
anti-clerical conviction with which the political Left in that country assailed the Church,
even from the rise of the Republic in 1931, it should not have been surprising that
American Catholic opinion tilted heavily toward the Right. Indeed, the contentious
elections of 1936, which gave rise to the Popular Front, would prove to be the genesis of
the not altogether inaccurate narrative that such a political confederation stood as nothing
more than a thinly veiled manufacture of the Comintern, a puppet of the Kremlin, and a
malignant force bent upon fomenting revolutionary upheaval. This opinion on the part of
the American Catholic press, as demonstrated by those few examples, seemed only to be
reinforced as the immediate aftermath of the political season found Spain awash in
uncontrolled and perhaps directed chaos.
As the attacks against the Right and the Church mounted, the Catholic papers
expressed greater sympathy with those co-sufferers and, when the rebellion erupted in the
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summer of that year, claimed moral solidarity with it. Their reasoning might be explained
thus: that the Spanish government had been seized by an inherently evil force, impelled
by atheistic Marxism and Bolshevik barbarism, which was determined to assault Western
Civilization and Christendom itself in most Catholic Spain. The uprising, therefore,
would be conversely defined as a patriotic movement of true-hearted Spaniards to whom
the heinous abuses of the government had become too numerous to endure. But, early in
the conflict there would also be strong religious connotations affixed to the insurgency,
primarily in that it existed as something of a modern Crusade or Reconquista to reclaim
that country from the heathen infidels.
The religious fixation naturally endured throughout the course of the struggle, but
it would decline in emphatic importance as the Catholic journals and most of their
contributors began to understand and agree upon the impropriety of insisting on the ―holy
war‖ interpretation. Rather, the focus would increasingly be directed on the blight of
international communism as it continued to exist in the Soviet Union and as miniature
communist states threatened to blossom forth in Spain, in France, and even in the United
States.
Yet at the other end of the discourse, the American Protestant press held
absolutely contrary views on Spanish politics and that nation's civil struggle in nearly
every way. Rather than condemning the Popular Front as a revolutionary conspiracy, they
instead praised it as a democratic construct, peacefully built to take back the
governmental apparatus away from the reactionary regime of 1933 and to once again set
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Spain back upon the path of progressivism. And as for the pre-war suffering inflicted
upon the Right and the Church, those few representatives of American Protestant opinion
maintained that it had been thoroughly earned, as those targeted forces had colluded
together for centuries to repress the mass of common Spaniards, to keep them bound to
feudal subservience and mired in medieval superstition.
After the outbreak of the revolt in Spain, the Protestant publications would
reiterate this narrative—that the reactionary Right and the traditionalist Church had risen
to seize what they so arrogantly believed to be their God-ordained position in society—
but would quickly add that it had been organized by a certain fascist component. Those
Protestant publications correlated the Spanish crisis to wider European events and would
delineate it as another swelling of the fascist tide. Indeed, they insisted that the adherents
to the curious Spanish iteration of the ideology had been emboldened by the virtually
untrammeled successes of Italy and Germany and would, pending their victory,
contribute to something far more menacing than the Catholics' Red bogeyman: the
―fascist internationale.‖
Such would be their stance throughout the course of the war in Spain, even as it
became increasingly evident that the Republic and its Loyalists were doomed to a tragic
defeat. All this would be blamed, of course, on the interference by the fascist powers, the
moral credence lent to the insurgency by the topmost authorities of the Roman Catholic
Church, and, not least, to the cowardly failure of the Western democratic nations to
render aid to the beleaguered Spanish government.
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The climax of this Catholic-Protestant discourse in the United States, and perhaps
its most interesting feature, would develop during the Autumn of 1937 and would play
out until the end of that year. Lacking, it seems, the prerequisite ability to develop a
nuanced understanding of a conflict so fundamentally foreign and confoundingly
complicated, either side attempted to do so through the familiar lens of ―Americanism.‖
In short, both the Catholics and Protestants sought to attribute such traits to ―their‖
respective Spanish factions that befitted the revolutionary and democratic heritage of the
United States. On the part of the Catholics, the Nationalist rebellion stood as a revolt
against the unconscionable tyranny of an oppressive government, a repetition of the
glorious days of 1776. Conversely, the Protestants maintained that the cause of the
Republic and the Popular Front represented the hatred of backwardness and the fire of
democracy that burned in the hearts of all humankind. To them, it was the the very
passion that demanded the American patriots of old strike for their independence against
the imperial domination of Great Britain. For the Spanish context, the Protestants merely
substituted the ancient, repressive oligarchy of the aristocratic elite, the military officer
corps, and the Roman Catholic Church for the English.
But to judge the stances of the American Catholic and Protestant presses, as
highlighted by those few examples, historical inquiry requires that one be as objectively
fair as possible. Either side championed its chosen belligerent coalition with little
qualification, and neither was willing to admit the unique faults and failings thereof. Both
the Nationalist and the Republican Loyalist camps sheltered rather unattractive elements,
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both received the majority of their materiel and moral assistance from unpalatable foreign
sources that sought to manipulate the Spanish contest to their respective interests, and it
certainly could not have been said of either cause that they aligned with ―Americanism,‖
even in a vague sense. Neither was willing to admit that the war in Spain was far more
tinted with gray ambiguity than they had allowed for, and neither was willing to abandon
the static, quixotic idealism that they had invested in it.
Both, moreover, might be also be accused of a degree of intolerance and bigotry,
whether they were conscious of it or not. The Spanish Civil War seemed to enable the
American Protestant publications to give voice to that classic anti-clerical, anti-Catholic
hatred; those selected publications constantly intoned that the conflict had definitely
proven the Church the be the mortal enemy of liberalism and democracy. On the other
hand, the Catholic journals seemed to be guilty of a kind of reactionary backlash against
any progressive cause that contained even the slightest hint of communist approval or
influence. That the Protestants had proclaimed solidarity with the Spanish Republic
meant that they were the allies or agents of world communism and, ergo, an abettor of
evil.
In a final estimation, the best, most intelligent, and perhaps most Christian stance
that those projectors of American Catholic and Protestant opinion might have taken was
offered by Jacques Maritain and which was later adopted by the Commonweal: that of
―positive impartiality.‖ However, the struggle was too emotionally and ideologically
charged for that. It was representative of the tensions of the time and of the troubles that
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had yet to come. Both the Catholics and the Protestants took it as such and could not help
interpreting it based upon their own prejudices and convictions. But one must never
forget that the essential realities of the conflict escaped them and, indeed, that none of
them spoke Spanish.
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